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This thesis focuses on the relationship between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s counter 
-terrorism legislation and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001). This 
project aims to fill a gap in published writings about the impact of the United Nations’ 
obligations under the resolution and the manner in which the Saudi Arabian judicial and 
administrative systems’ respond. The resolution was adopted in the wake of the September 
11th, 2001 events which involved 10 Saudi Arabian citizens among the perpetrators. Despite 
international attention regarding this fact, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, itself, has been the 
victim of a series of deadly terrorist attacks. This thesis maps out the process of developing a 
national response to these heinous attacks consistent with the provisions of the United Nations 
resolution. In examining the relationship between international juridical treaties and Saudi 
Arabian counter-terrorist legislation the thesis offers an account of the complex negotiations 
between international instruments and the legislative proposals inherent in the Islamic 
Shariah. 
As the political and social considerations are inevitably linked to the analysis of the 
interaction between domestic laws and international ones, the thesis will use the policy-
orientated (New Haven) approach to International Law, as espoused by Rosalyn Higgins, 
former President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The thesis is mainly a library-
based or theoretical study, which is informed by semi-structured interviews conducted of 
former and present policy-making officials of the government of Saudi Arabia.  
The thesis will seek to highlight the inclination of the consequential nature of the laws, 
regulations, and policies, issued by the decision-makers in the Kingdom. The Saudi Arabian 
strategy of counter-terrorism has experienced several stages in which it tried to harmonize the 
domestic legal system to the spirit and wording of UNSC Resolution 1373.The resolution 
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adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter required all member states to effect 
conformity of their legal systems in relation to counter-terrorism and terrorism finance, inter-
state cooperation and respect for human rights norms. The analysis of the Saudi Arabian legal 
system will show that although this system has, to a large extent, achieved considerable 
compliance with UNSC Resolution 1373, fighting terrorism within the Kingdom, and 
eliminating Al-Qa’idah, nevertheless, it continues to face unique challenges, to which some 
are still ongoing. The question of respecting international human rights laws is one of primary 
challenges faced by the system. This is either due to the implementation of the internal 
judiciary, or the interpretation of international legal norms, which, in essence, do not consider 
the particularly distinctive role of Islamic Shariah Laws. 
This thesis will suggest that there has been insufficient research in exploring and 
analyzing the development of the legal and policy framework of counter-terrorism in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It offers an analysis of the concrete complexities of developing the 
legislation that is faithful to the Saudi Arabian system of Shariah, and to its commitments to 
the international community. The thesis aims to further contribute to the research and policy 
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Terrorism is a challenge not only to world security but also to the world’s legal order 
as it demands not only an international response but also the coordinated action of states 
themselves. This thesis shines a spotlight on a case study of the relationship between that 
international response in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) and the 
counter-terrorism strategy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In engaging with current Saudi 
counter-terrorism legislation, the thesis evaluates the discontinuities within the existing law 
and the problems of establishing a coherent legal strategy in common with the principles and 
provisions of UNSC Resolution 1373. The study focuses on the legislative process of the 
Kingdom and how this facilitates or inhibits the implementation of the UN strategy. The project 
aims to demonstrate and explain the manner in which Saudi Arabian counter-terrorism evolved 
and its current form. In this respect, it will track the Kingdom’s legal developments in the face 
of the evolving terrorism threats and the resultant changing global concerns and responses. It 
aims to show the different sets of law and regulations, and the structural policy of counter-
terrorism that has been passed and established respectively.  
The thesis focuses on the following research question: To what extent can UNSC 
Resolution 1373, genuinely assist in the development of a national legal counter-terrorism 
strategy in Saudi Arabia? The question will help narrow the scope and sharpen the focus of the 
entire thesis. The world has faced the threat of terrorism for long periods of time in the modern 
age, with corresponding actions to try and combat it. The critical historical moment came in 
the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks (9/11) in the USA. This was the largest terrorist 
attack in the modern world by volume of deaths and casualties. Roughly 3,000 citizens of 78 
nations died,1 while many more sustained injuries that would kill more while maiming others 
 
1 September 11 Attacks, History, 25th August, at [https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/9-11-attacks] (Last Access: 
12th September, 2019). 
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permanently. The attack came with the realization that in the post-cold war era, terrorism was 
one of the greatest threats to world peace and stability.2 The international community made its 
stance on the fight against terrorism evident and formalized it in policy. 
The United Nations Security Council responded to the new scale of threats with two 
critical resolutions: the first being Resolution 1368 (2001),3 condemning the 9/11 attacks and 
reiterating the right of states to resort to self-defense, followed by Resolution 1373,4 under the 
United Nations Charter Chapter VII, which provided a comprehensive regime to counter-
terrorism through the close co-operation of its members. This resolution is the point of 
departure for this thesis. The resolution was highly innovative as it sought to create common 
legal approaches within member states. This resolution would be the framework within which 
all constituent members of the UN would develop their cooperative measures to independently 
commit to fighting terrorism. Notably, the focus of the resolution was on a preventive approach 
to combating terrorism. This new framework was ground-breaking in the annals of counter-
terrorism policies owing to several deviations from the standard operating procedures 
preceding it. It established that terrorism is a threat to the peace and stability of the world, 
justifying the drastic measures that it would institute. The resolution’s first such feature is that 
it formulated specific guidelines that cooperating member states were to follow. For instance, 
all member states must prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts.5 Additionally, it 
also obligated all member states to share any knowledge or intelligence pertaining to terrorism 
activities or plans, thereof. Further specific stipulations of the law will be discussed in depth in 
the third chapter of this thesis. The importance of the subject was evident in the fact that the 
 
2 Threat to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, United Nation Office of Counter-Terrorism, available 
at:  https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/threats-international-peace-and-security-caused-terrorist-acts-0. 
3 S/RES/1368 (2001), available at:  https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/sres1368-2001. 
4 Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) on Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/security-council-resolution-1373-2001-on-threats-to-international-peace-
and-security-caused-by-terrorist-acts/. 
5 UNSC Resolution1373, Article.1. 
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resolution also established the Counter-terrorism Committee to oversee the adoption and 
implementation of the resolution. As a result of this policy, the UN had, for the first time, 
blurred the boundaries between the sovereignty of states, which had always been a fundamental 
pillar of UN Membership and the UN Security Council. Therein lay the potential areas of 
conflict for member states in the practical formulation of the required local laws, since each 
country has unique legislative procedures. One state especially subject to such complexities is 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, whose unique law-making process poses many challenges to the 
smooth relationship between national legislation and international obligations under UNSC 
Resolution 1373. The focus in this project will be on the role that this resolution has played in 
the elaboration of the counter-terrorism strategy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Prior to the landmark 9/11 attacks, the approach toward terrorism was largely reactive 
to attacks with rudimentary forms of coordination. The initial notable attempt to highlight 
terrorism within the UN came in 1972, when the General Assembly established the 35-member 
Terrorism Ad Hoc Committee. The committee met and reported their deliberations thrice 
between 1973 and 1993. Between 1981 and 1993, as well as 1994 and 2005, the committee 
held regular biannual meetings. The meetings yielded several resolutions that the General 
Assembly adopted, noting that the fight against terrorism was deficient and needed a definite 
structure, including a definition of international terrorism. Resultantly, and in a session, held 
in 1996, the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly6 was charged to work on the 
aforementioned definition. The definition would not become apparent until 2004, through the 
UNSC Resolution 1566. As the thesis will suggest, changing forms of terrorism resulted in 
significantly different types of terrorist threats. This phenomenon has been one of the major 
challenges to Saudi Arabia’s counter-terrorism policy. As we will see, this has necessitated 
 
6 United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly 




frequent changes to policy and law relating to various forms of terrorism include shootings, 
hijackings, hostage taking and bombing campaigns. The shifts in the forms of terrorism are 
also mirrored in the changing types of terrorist organizations and terrorist networks. Over the 
past 5 years this has included a new terrorist strategy of seizing territory and its hostage 
population as a base and creating a state-like existence as with the Islamic State (ISIS)/Da’ish.  
In the second century (of the Islamic calendar), or 8th century CE, scholars developed a 
discourse of Islamic law as applied to international relations. One such leading jurist was Imam 
Muhammad Ibn Hasan Ash-Shaybani who authored Kitab Al-Siyar Al-Kabir.7 Although 
sections of this work have been lost, sections of larger work, Kitab Al Asl, that concern Al-
Siyar survive.8 The classical jurists concentrated on the development of the doctrine of Jihad. 
This concept is of course used to refer to extremist and terrorist groups – and indeed has become 
the currency of terrorist studies discourse with the conjoined terms Jihadi terrorism. However, 
classical jurists, including Ash-Shaybani developed an Islamic doctrine on the use of force in 
a manner that is incompatible with the actions of groups such as Al-Qa’idah and ISIS. The 
doctrine which regulates both the justifications to use force and the restraints on that use of 
force (combining jus ad bellum and jus in bello) is highly restrictive on the occasions where 
force can be used and regulates the use of force itself with early humanitarian principles. As 
we shall discuss, Shariah Law does not legitimatize terrorism. 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also occupies the unique position of being a home to 
several renowned terrorists but also the subject of terrorist threats. Fifteen of the 9/11 
perpetrators had Saudi Arabian citizenship. Additionally, the nation is credited as being the 
location in which Al-Qa’idah was established. The Kingdom has also been subject to 
exploitation by terrorist groups as an avenue for financing and supporting their activities of 
 
7 Khadduri, M. The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’s Siyar (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), 43. 
8 Ibid, 70. 
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terror. Collectively, these activities may affect the outlook of the international community 
towards the nation as harbouring terrorists. However, the nation has also had a significant 
history with terror attacks. Since 1979, when Islamic-affiliated terrorism was first manifested, 
Saudi Arabia was involved, as the culprits had targeted the Grand Holy Mosque in Makkah. 
More terrorist attacks followed in the 1990s in the form of bombings, with yet more attacks 
following in the early 2000s after 9/11. Meanwhile, in an ironic twist, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia sees itself not only as a victim of fanatical terrorists, but also the victim of the collective 
international strategy in fighting terrorism. 
Given that the core of this project is to establish how well the Saudi Arabian counter-
terror laws and policy fit into the framework set forth by international law, it is vital to study 
the process of legislation that produces the Saudi Arabian law. The insights, therefrom, will 
help shape the understanding of prevailing procedural rules, regulations and laws in Saudi 
Arabia, from their pre-9/11 conditions, to adjusting to international standards. This discussion 
will lead to an exploration of the current counter-terrorism law and policy in the kingdom. This 
will help us consider any discrepancies between the national and international law. 
Consequently, the thesis will be better positioned to contribute to our understanding of this 
subject which has implications for our understanding of the relationship between international 
law and municipal law.  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an Islamic monarchy, whose primary source of law is 
the Shariah, based on the Holy Qur’an. This authority is embedded in the Basic Law of the 
nation, whose Article 7 declares that the ruling regime’s authority stems from the Holy Qur’an 
as well as Prophet Muhamad’s Sunnah (Establish Example), which supersede all other state 
regulations. In this sense, then, the Shariah is at the top of the hierarchy of laws in the Kingdom, 
after which other national regulations follow. Most of the other states that use Shariah Law 
have codified it, which is the determination of the implementable parts of the law, hence 
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making it relatively more suited for the evolved systems of governance for the 21st century.9 
However, Saudi Arabia still uses the Shariah in its uncodified state. Therefore, the 
implementation of any man-made laws must be limited to areas in which they do not conflict 
with the Shariah, with which there is no room for compromise. Given this state, interpretation 
is literal, and implementation is often brutal. This is the first potential source of tension between 
local and international laws as will emerge later in this chapter. 
According to the hierarchy of laws in the kingdom, the Basic Law is second to the 
Shariah, followed by Regulations, and, finally, regulatory rules. The Basic Law of Governance 
was the result of a 1992 Royal Decree. A Royal Decree expresses the written will of the King 
as the ruler of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which no other regulation can violate. It is 
comparable in status to a constitution in Western democracies. This regulation expresses the 
three key markers of a constitution, including the sovereign characteristics of the kingdom, 
regulation of the three primary authorities that govern the state (judicial, legislative, and 
executive), and the rights due to citizens and the civil society. This Basic Law establishes the 
kingdom as a monarchical system of governance, led in accordance with the Shariah. Since its 
formation, this law has only been subject to few changes, such as defining the system of 
inheritance of the power of governance as following a patriarchal system, strictly within the 
royal family. 
Normal Regulations (equivalent to laws in other legal systems) in the Saudi Arabian 
Kingdom are binding rules deriving their authority from the Kingdom’s Regulatory Authority. 
This Regulatory Authority is the means used by the Shura Council (Council of Ministers) to 
establish rules that then become normal regulations. However, this authorization is dependent 
upon ratification by a royal decree, which is the instrument via which the king expresses his 
 





will as the head of state in Saudi Arabia. Evident from the foregoing discussion, then, is a legal 
structure that is primarily driven by Shariah Law and the will of the incumbent monarch. It is 
under these prevailing conditions that the national legal and policy structure in Saudi Arabia is 
expected to have evolved its counter-terrorism measures to conform to the UNSC Resolution 
1373. 
This thesis, having established the complexity of the process of legislation in the 
Kingdom, will seek to explore the extent to which Saudi Arabia has succeeded in adhering to 
the guidelines of UNSC Resolution 1373. It will attempt to understand whether or not the 
responses of the decision-makers are in line with the letter and the spirit of the resolution and 
that these activities, taken to deal with terror acts, are reactive or planned. This may help to 
provide a set of recommendations to the current strategy of the Kingdom for counter-terrorism.  
The thesis will show how the legal strategy system in the Kingdom has gradually fallen in line 
with the international legal norms, in general, and the resolution in particular. It will show how 
the system was at first reactive to events. This meant that policies and law were developed 
without consideration of the need for a broader preventive strategy. UNSC Resolution 1373 
attempts to offer a solution to this issue. It requires the Kingdom to draft a comprehensive plan 
which will assess potential terror threats and institute measures to prevent their fruition. 
However, the state is yet to make such progress. For instance, the Kingdom initially intervened 
in the conflict in Syria. It provided support to rebel forces against President Assad, which saw 
many Saudi citizens travel to Syria to join opposition groups. However, as the conflict evolved, 
it became evident that some of these groups were part of terrorist networks. As a result, Saudi 
citizens who were members of these networks became a security threat for the Kingdom. In 
response, the government revised its laws to prohibit participation in such groups. The legal 
environment for counter-terrorism dramatically changed in Saudi Arabia with the issuance of 
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the Law of Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing (2017),10 generally referred to as the 
‘Law of 2017’, which has resulted in noticeable progress, accordingly, as the last chapter of 
this thesis will discuss. The Security Council’s Resolution 1373, has significant implications 
that complicate the circumstances of the Kingdom’s conformity with it. For instance, it 
necessitates cooperation between the police and the intelligence services in the nation. These 
are two wings of the national security apparatus which, in many nations, are adversarial 
towards each other. Often, these relations emerge from a lack of action by the former, often 
due to political considerations and interference. There is also mistrust across nations, which 
further extenuates the circumstances of international cooperation between them. Additionally, 
the issue of cutting financing to terror groups is complex. A principal challenge therein is the 
lack of a comprehensive universally accepted definition of terror. The obligations under 
Shariah Law places such nations in a worse position. For instance, many citizens of Saudi 
Arabia participate in Az-Zakaah (obligatory charity), which may be problematic if one of the 
beneficiaries appears to be affiliated to terrorist organizations. There is also the question of 
human rights in the punishment of offenders in Saudi Arabia and other Shariah states. For 
instance, some crimes have physical punishments, such as the decapitation and cutting off 
limbs, among others. Regardless of the crime committed, some of these actions are in breach 
of universal human rights, potentially creating another challenge. These are just instances of 
practical challenges that may inhibit the seamless integration of national legal systems into the 
framework of the internationally established laws.  
This thesis is informed by the policy-oriented (New Haven) approach to international 
law.11 This approach assumes as a fact that international law is not a system of rules but is 
essentially an agreement of the aims of the international community, such as creating minimum 
 
10 See: https://www.moj.gov.sa/Documents/Regulations/pdf/79.pdf. 
11 Higgins, R. ‘Problems and Processes: International Law and How We Use it’, (Clarendon Press Publication, Oxford,1994). 
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world public order. The legal norms are open to interpretation, as occurs in appellate courts 
and of course in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and that this imposes choices on jurists 
in deciding what is most conducive to world order. Rosalyn Higgins, former President of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), stressed the importance of the decision-maker realizing 
that justice is a process that takes the political and social context of the action into 
consideration. The decision-maker will only consider the established rules and will leave out 
other important factors such as the socio-political context of the controversy under assessment. 
The essence of her argument is also that the policy-oriented approach is the most effective 
method for the analysis of international law because it outlines a process that seeks to resolve 
international law challenges by affording decision-makers a range of viable solutions that are 
consistent with their objectives and values. Therefore, Higgins’ policy-oriented (New Haven) 
approach, shall serve as the foundation in our understanding of the relationship between Saudi 
Arabian counter-terrorism laws and policies, and international law. Within this framework, it 
will be possible to dissect the strategy employed by the Kingdom and the underlying policy 
considerations. Similarly, the researcher will deconstruct UNSC Resolution 1373, in the 
context of its adoption. Two issues will be apparent.  
I have drawn on Higgins in particular as her approach to international law has elements 
that are reminiscent of some Islamic jurists who emphasized the need in interpreting legal 
sources to bear in mind the broad purpose of the norms under consideration. The interpretation 
and application of any law requires careful evaluation of its purpose and benefits for human 
endeavour.  The Islamic doctrine of public interest, also known as Maslahah is an appropriate 
example. This doctrine has been the subject of study for multiple Muslim scholars, but was 
originated by Al-Shafi’i, and engaged with by others, including Al-Ghazali and Al-Juwayni. 
Al-Ghazali, in his efforts to systematize the theory of purposes of the law, named it Maslahah. 
However, other scholars associated with the four main schools of Islamic jurisprudence, have 
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echoed the theory but used different names for it. For instance, the Hanafis (of the Hanafi 
School) used it under the name of Istihsan (juristic discretion), while the Shafi`is, before Al-
Ghazali, used it under the term of Ikhalah (convincing opinion). Malikis used it under the name 
of Istislah12 (to deem proper). The main contention of these scholars is that deploying and 
applying laws means looking beyond a narrow definition so that the object of justice can be 
achieved within a society. The doctrine of Jihad, for example, can only be understood in the 
areas of the use of force and law of war through focusing on the twin objectives of mitigating 
circumstances for the use of force, and reducing the harm caused as a result of the use of force. 
Such classical Islamic views have elements of similarity with modern policy-orientated 
approaches to international law. These deductions offer helpful ways in assessing the response 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to terrorism, and the framing of its counter-terrorism policy 
and law in the context of UNSC Resolution 1373. 
Research Methodology 
This project is a qualitative study. It will primarily comprise of library-based research, 
reviewing primary and secondary sources on the subject laws and policies, as well as legal 
theory. The site of this research has been in the UEL, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Naif 
University, and the British Library. To supplement the information from the desk research, the 
thesis will also incorporate some first-hand information. This was data collected by the 
researcher via semi-structured interviews of officials in the government of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia government between December 2016 and June 2017. The subjects requested 
anonymity in order to protect their privacy and owing to the sensitive nature of their work. In 
line with the principles of ethical research, their identities will be protected. The data collected 
from them encompassed the process of decision making within the Kingdom, including the 
 




drafting of resolutions, laws, and provisions addressing the threat of terrorism. The interviews 
also sought to establish the nature of the decisions on which the government was focused, 
including whether they were planned and reactive, or whether they were in accordance with 
the letter and spirit of UNSC Resolution 1373. The data on the current positions and laws will 
be subject to analysis to assess the operation of the Saudi Arabian legal system within the 
purview of the aforementioned resolution. The thesis, then, will primarily compare the two 
foregoing legal regimes. It will offer a view of the contours of Saudi law and policy which will 
conclude with some recommendations to improve the compatibility between the Saudi Arabian 
legal system and UNSC Resolution 1373. 
The project breaks new ground as it is the first thesis to explore the counter-terrorism 
legal terrain in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. While, there may have been other researchers 
inquiring into other aspects of terrorism with regard to the Kingdom, such as the military and 
strategic issues, this is the first study dedicated to the legal aspects of counter-terrorism. It 
offers insights into the challenges of creating a national counter-terrorism framework that 
respects both the principles of Saudi Law and international norms. In so doing it stakes out a 
discussion of how Shariah deals with counter-terrorism. It is hoped that it will assist both the 
Kingdom and other states in the region to engage with both the positive and negative lessons 
of this experience. It should be stressed that counter-terrorism legislation in the Kingdom is 
very new, and scholarly study of it is scant. The latest set of laws and regulations issued to 
counter terrorism were promulgated at the end of 2017. This thesis will, therefore, attempt to 
offer an analysis of these set of laws and regulations and examine their relationship with UNSC 
Resolution 1373.  
This is the first thesis to explore the definition of terrorism in Saudi Arabian law and 
how this relates to the definition of crimes of terrorism encompassed in UN Security Council 
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Resolution 1566 (2004). It should be recognized at the outset that the definition of international 
terrorism has been much debated, often unsatisfactorily.13  
The thesis is also the pioneering enquiry into the tension between the local legal system 
in the Kingdom and UNSC Resolution 1373. The project appreciates that the resolution makes 
substantive demands of the counter-terrorism legislation on each UN member. Therefore, there 
are compatibility challenges, given the different inspirations and basis of the international and 
local laws. This includes discrete questions such as the manner in which Islamic Law (a source 
of law in Muslim countries) relates to UNSC Resolution 1373.  Another issue is that the law-
making procedures in the Kingdom do not conform to the democratic processes that apply to 
the majority of UN members as envisaged by the UN Security Council in the making of the 
law. Therefore, the Saudi Arabian case study will allow the thesis to explore the deepest 
potential areas of conflict between international and local laws.  
The thesis is divided into 5 chapters, each of which will contribute knowledge towards 
providing answers to the research question. The first chapter, for instance, establishes the 
theoretical framework within which the entire project is set. It delves into the origin and 
development of the policy-oriented (New Haven) approach as espoused by Rosalyn Higgins, 
former President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The chapter lays the foundation for 
the development of the essay. It explores the conceptualization of terrorism, including the 
varied definitions of the same. Further, it explores the development of the law in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia and the current disposition, giving rise to the tension between local and 
international laws. The second chapter explores the concept of Jihad, which is closely 
associated with modern day terrorism. It examines the concept of Jihad, its interpretation by 
various scholars over time, and its bearing on the war against terrorism. Consequent to 
 
13 Saul, B. ‘Defining Terrorism in International Law’ (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005). 
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explaining the origin and different views of Jihad, the thesis demonstrates the difficulty for 
counter-terrorism policy and law that results from the intertwinement of terrorism and Jihad, 
more so for such a Shariah based legal entity as Saudi Arabia. The third chapter explores the 
international legal environment and the circumstances surrounding the adoption of UNSC 
Resolution 1373, a pillar of this thesis. Therefore, it creates a clear comprehension of the 
international legal strategy against terror to which the research question refers. This provides 
the context in which to investigate the actual strategy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia against 
terror. Particularly, the tracking of the development of counter-terrorism legislation in the 
Kingdom before 2001, is vital, as is the description of the legislation mechanisms in the 
Kingdom. In the fourth chapter, the project commits to exploring the local counter-terrorism 
strategy in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It looks into the history of the evolution of the 
strategy. The chapter focuses on the strategy in the period following 9/11 and the passing of 
UNSC Resolution 1373. It also examines the local legal and policy strategy’s conformity to 
the Resolution and the various realms in which the fight against terrorism is taking place. These 
chapters collectively set the ground for the discussion in the fifth chapter, which examines the 
financial element of the fight against terrorism. It examines the role of financing in terror 
activities. Subsequently, it explores the laws in place to stop such funding. It also includes the 
legal decisions regarding the international cooperation and human rights as requisite 
components of the law in counter-terrorism. This chapter is vital as it shows the extent of 
implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373 that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has undertaken 
and the challenges thereof, especially regarding international cooperation. On the basis of these 
discussions, the thesis is in a position to make greater contribution on plausible further 
development that the local law can undergo to match the international strategy better. 
Evidently, the research question is at the heart of the thesis, acting as the guide for the 

























CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:  






















This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section will show us why the 
Saudi Arabia case is important and selected for this thesis. The second section will focus on 
the analysis of the policy-orientated (New Haven) approach to international law, and will 
conclude with a discussion of Rosalyn Higgins as an exponent of this approach. The third 
section will discuss the global challenges and difficulties of the definition of terrorism. 
In the last section, we will show how the Saudi Arabian legal system is structured and operated. 
The importance of understanding the legal framework of Saudi Arabia lies in the distinct 
position of Saudi Arabia within the Islamic world, and the otherwise different juridical sources 
of Saudi Arabian legislation.14 Saudi Arabia is considered, by many in the Muslim world, to 
be the main guardian of Islam and its most holy sites of Makkah and Madinah. This distinct 
identity of Saudi Arabia forms the basis for Shariah Law to be the main source of jurisprudence 
in the state. Even the political policy of the state is subject to this law.15 Against this 
background, we will see how the Saudi Arabian rulers have replaced some classical legal terms 
with ones that can only be seen in Shariah Law. Other sets of rules are mere regulations that 
explain and interpret the main source of legislation laid down by God. Even the practices and 
deeds of Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) are directed by God who informs His 
Messenger what to legislate. The rules and provisions of Shariah Law, however, are usually 
loose and generic. This allows jurists and scholars (only the qualified ones, as explained in 
Chapter Two) to exercise what is called juristic deduction to decree a provision when the main 
source does not provide a specific answer to a certain issue. The set of rules and provisions that 
result from this process are usually grouped in what is called in Islam as ‘system’, or literally 
nizam and cannot be named law. Sheikh Muhammed Rashid Rida defines ‘system’ or nizam 
 
14 Hegghammer, T. ‘Jihad in Saudi Arabia’ (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010), P.2. 
15 Baz, B. ‘Al Rushd Bookstore Al Rowdah Riyadh’ (Al-Rushd bookstore, 2015), P.164. 
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as ‘a set of legal and political provisions, and discretionary penalty, which are not in conflict 
with Shariah Law and issued by senior jurists.’16  
According to this background, all regulations and regulatory rules are issued after the 
consideration of Shariah Law. In addition, other regulations were issued after the consideration 
of UNSC Resolution 1373, such as The Regulation of Terrorism Crimes and Financing, and 
The Regulation of Electronic Crimes, as well as the establishment of ad hoc criminal courts 
assigned to adjudicate terror crimes. 
1.2 Saudi Arabia as a Case Study 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was affected by terrorism, long before the 11th of 
September, 2001. The horrifying events of 1979 were the beginning of the emergence of 
terrorist movements, when Juhayman Al-Utaibi, along with a group of his followers, barged 
into the Grand Mosque of Makkah, Islam’s holiest site. This began a wave of attacks that was 
the result of regional events, and the Kingdom was the epicentre. Saudi Arabia had been a 
victim of such violence in past decades, by the time of the 1979 seizure of the Grand Holy 
Mosque in Makkah by extremists.17 After intense fighting, the Saudi government was able to 
take control of situation, and the terrorists who survived were brought to justice. However, this 
incident was linked to the rise of political Islam in the region which saw the Iranian Revolution 
of 1979, and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in the same year. These were to 
mark the next period. A spike in attacks during the 1990s, resulted in Saudi Arabia suffering 
numerous bombings including major attacks in its capital, the city of Riyadh in 1995,18 and in 
Al-Khobar in 1996.19 These wanton acts of violence eventually culminated in three suicide 
 
16 Rida, M. ‘Interpretation of Manar’ (Cairo, Almanar Edition, 1924), Pp.4-11. 
17 Dahmani.L, 1979: When Juhayman al-Otaybi led the Grand Mosque seizure of the Masjid al Haram in Mecca, Yabiladi, 
https://en.yabiladi.com/articles/details/65386/1979-when-juhayman-al-otaybi-grand.html. 
18 Elliot, A, Community remembers 1995 Riyadh bombing, U.S. ARMY, (2015), 
https://www.army.mil/article/158924/community_remembers_1995_riyadh_bombing. 
19 Eitan, A. ‘Iran is behind the 1996 terrorist attack on the Khobar Towers in Saudi-Arabia by the Saudi Hezbolla’, 
International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, (2007), at 
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bombings in a housing compound in Riyadh on 12 May, 2003.20 As many as 34 innocent lives 
were lost in this single attack. Another explosion occurred in the Al-Mahiah Housing 
Compound in Riyadh on 10 November, 2003, killing around 17 people and injuring 116 others. 
I will now turn to discuss the international and regional developments that created the basis for 
these and other terrorist attacks. 
1.2.1 The Iranian Revolution of 1979 
In looking at why the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia took steps to introduce counter-
terrorism measures, it is important to address prior events which necessitated such measures. 
Such precursor events include the Iranian Revolution which took place in 1979. This revolution 
mainly aimed to take a hostile position against the then Iranian regime, which was loyal to the 
West and wanted it replaced by a radical Islamic rule. The culmination of this revolution was 
a turning point in the evolution of political Islam among Shi’a Muslims.21 These turning points 
directed both the Sunni and Shi’a Islamist movements towards the creation of a model nation 
state, while boosting morale and religious fervour along its path. Following the success of the 
revolution, Shi’a Islamic scholars from Saudi Arabia moved to Qom in Iran and established an 
organization, named the Assembly of the Hijaz Scholars,22 seeking to establish Khomeini’s 
juristic authority over the eastern region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which used to be 
loyal to Najaf (Iraq) in the past.23 Against this background, a political opposition organization 
was founded called the Islamic Revolution Organization in the Arabian Peninsula, which 




20 Kegley, C. ‘The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls’, ‘Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall’, (2003), P. 20. 
21 Strawson, J. ‘Islam and the Politics of Terrorism: Aspects of the British Experience’, in Miriam Gani and Penelope Mathew 
(eds) Fresh Perspectives on the War on Terror (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008), Pp 9-26. 
22 Toby, M. ‘Hizbullah al-Hijaz: A History of the Most Radical Saudi Shi’a Opposition Group’,” Middle East Journal, Vol. no. 2 
(Spring 2010). 
23 Ibrahim, B. and Al-Sadik, M. ‘Shiit Movement in Saudi Arabia, Politics’, Arab Network for Research, (2013). 
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Kingdom and called on all Saudi people to move to Iran to learn the Islamic sciences and 
receive military training.24  
The first activity of this organization was to exploit the occupation of the Grand Mosque 
of Makkah by Juhayman in 1979, by provoking a revolt against the ruling Royal family,25 
following a call by Khomeini to do so.26 This resulted in a military clash between them and the 
Saudi Security forces, accompanied with political slogans greeting Khomeini. In 1987, a 
military group was created called Hezbollah Hijaz with support of the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards as an attempt to have a military base in Saudi Arabia to carry out reprisals after the Hajj 
pilgrimage in 1987. The group was working as a military wing of the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution Organization in the Arabia Peninsula until the1990s when this group became 
independent and worked on their own.27 Hezbollah Hijaz believed that Khomeini was the 
legitimate leader of all Muslims in the world and pledged allegiance to him in all of life’s 
affairs. In addition, they believed that any insult, threat of violence, or any a threat of war 
against Iran is an insult against the entire Islamic world.28 This group targeted vital bases of oil 
installations in Saudi Arabia at the end of 1980s, as well as assassinating Saudi diplomats in 
Ankara, Karachi, and Bangkok. However, their most serious sabotage was the bombing of the 
housing towers of Al-Khobar city in 1996, which was inhabited by Americans. This attack 
resulted in the death of 19 Americans, and 372 other American wounded soldiers.29 This was 
the bloodiest attack in 13 years against Americans who lived abroad, since the 1983 bombing 
of US marine corps camps in Beirut, which resulted in the death of 241 soldiers. The Head of 
 
24 Ibid. 
25 Hegghammer, T. and Lacroix, S. ‘Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-Utaybi Revisited’, 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007), Available at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-
journal-of-middle-east-studies/article/rejectionist-islamism-in-saudi-arabia-the-story-of-juhayman-alutaybi-
revisited/294D1F95102BA3A5029F308523EB6074. 
26 Levitt, M. ‘Iran and Bahrain Crying wolf, or wolf at the Door?’ The Washington Institute, (2014). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Available at: http://www.alhramain.com.  
29 Hegghammer, T. ‘Deconstructing the myth about Al-Qa’idah and Khobar’, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, No.3 (2008). 
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the Bureau of Investigation at CIA claimed that Iran was responsible for this attack, and that 
the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Intelligence oversaw the planning, implementation, and 
training of the suicide-attackers in the Beqaa Governorate in Lebanon.30  
With the arrival of the Arab Spring upon the Arab world, some members of the Shi’a 
community in Saudi Arabia, who were supported by Iran, started to exploit the status quo and 
began an uprising against the Saudi government. For example, Nimr Al-Nimer, who received 
his education from Hawza in Qom, Iran, for ten years, exploited the Arab Spring and started 
making speeches in Qatif, Saudi Arabia, which was mainly inhabited by Shi’a people, against 
the Saudi regime. He even demanded secession from Saudi Arabia and the creation of a new 
state, based on the Iranian system of governance.31 In addition, in 2011, some Shi’a people 
started to launch several attacks against several security checkpoints and vehicles in the city of 
Awamiyah. The Saudi Interior Minister declared that these people were linked to the Iranian 
agenda.32 
1.2.2 Soviet Union’s Invasion of Afghanistan and The Chechnya Conflict 
Having examined the Iranian Revolution as a precursor terrorist event leading to the 
development of counter-terrorism measures in Saudi Arabia, the chapter now turns to examine 
another precursor terrorist related event involving the war of Russia against Afghanistan and 
Chechnya. In the beginning of the 1980s, there was an insignificant presence of armed and 
radical Sunni Muslim’s extremists in the Kingdom. Even the perpetrators of the occupation of 
the Holy Mosque of Makkah by Juhayman was merely a limited and isolated phenomenon 
within the political scene in the Kingdom. However, by the mid-1990s, thousands of Saudi 
fighters had engaged in several wars around the world, including Afghanistan, Chechnya, and 
 
30 Louis, J. ‘Freeh with Howard Means, my FBI: Bringing down the Mafia, Investigating Bill Clinton, and Fighting the war on 
Terror’ (New York: St: Martin’s Griffin, 2005). 
31 Hashim, A. ‘Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and Conflict: Shia Province Casus Billi?’ RSIS Commentary, no.22, (2016). 
32 Boghardt, L. ‘Iranian Aid to Fighters in the Gulf Peninsula’, The Washington Institute, (2014). 
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Bosnia.33 Also, during the 1980s, there was no existence of Al-Qa’idah, nor the idea of sending 
Jihadists to the Kingdom. The Kingdom at this time was not concerned about young people 
joining the Jihad in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the establishment of Al-Qa’idah in Afghanistan 
resulted in the creation of a branch in the Kingdom, which was the direct result of the 
participation of some Saudi citizens in the Afghanistan war. Following the end of the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan, the Saudis who returned to the Kingdom became time bombs who 
looked for any movement against the government to explode. Indeed, this was what happened 
during the invasion of Iraq into Kuwait, when these former militants rejected the intervention 
of foreign forces to liberate Kuwait. One of the main aims of these extremists was to sack the 
ruling Royal family in Saudi Arabia, on the pretext of the existence of American forces in the 
Kingdom.34  
The extreme violence of terrorism, however, started in the Kingdom in 2002, when the 
majority of Saudi Jihadists returned to the Kingdom. At the end of May of the same year, the 
US National Security Agency (NSA) objected to a letter sent by Usamah Bin Laden to Yusuf 
Al-Ayeri, the leader of ‘Al-Qa’idah in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques’, which ordered him 
to launch widespread attacks against the Kingdom. The Head of the CIA, George Tenet, 
informed the Saudi Ambassador in the USA that Bin Laden had changed his main goals to be 
directed against the Kingdom.35 
What is most interesting about the Saudis who had been recruited by Al-Qa’idah to 
fight in Afghanistan or Chechnya, is that they did not initially embrace the idea of anti-
Americanism or universal terrorist ambitions. Their targeted objective of Jihad was exclusively 
 
33 Hegghammer, supra n. 14. 
34 Letter from Abo Hudhayfa to Abo Abdallah, Harmony Database (AFGP-2002-003251) (20 Jun 2000). 




against the Soviet Union (commonly referred to as ‘Russia’).36 However, as time passed, Bin 
Laden managed to establish educational institutions, military training camps and a global terror 
network. Using this system, he also managed to deceive the recruits through a systematic 
method to tempt them to go to Afghanistan, declaring that the fight in Afghanistan was but a 
stop for the next war in Chechnya. Many of them thought that they would fight in Chechnya, 
but they found themselves, in the end, in Bin Laden’s military camps. He managed to exploit 
their real motivations and thoughts, and recruited them for his universal terrorist agenda, 
including fighting the USA and creating the idea of universal Jihad.37 For example, many of 
the hijackers involved in the September 11th attacks, beginning with Muhammad Atta, passing 
through the Hamburg cell and the two hijackers Ahmad and Said Al-Ghamdi, whose real 
motivation was to join Khattab38 in his war against Russia in Chechnya, instead of being 
universal Jihadists.39  
1.3 Theory and Substance 
This chapter now examines the theoretical and academic principles underpinning the 
concept of terrorism and the basis for the policy-oriented (New Haven) approach adopted in 
this research thesis. 
In the conclusion to Problems and Processes: International Law and How We Use it, 
Higgins sums up her argument, as suggesting that “International law is a process, a system of 
authoritative decision-making. It is not just the neutral application of rules,” rather she writes, 
the challenges of international law cannot be “satisfactorily resolved by the invocation of the 
‘correct rule.’ The problem exactly is that various, quite plausible, alternative prescriptions can 
 
36 ISN 682., Testimony of Detainees-CSRT,” 2073, and David Morgan, “Saudi Man Admits Enemy Role at Guantanamo Trial,” 
Reuters (27 April 2006). 
37 The 9/11 Commission Report, P.233; Sharon, C. ‘Generational Differences in Waging Jihad’, Military Review, Vol. 85, no. 
4 (2005), P.84; “Testimony of Detainees-CSRT,” 1274, 2655, and Chris Gourlay and Jonathan Calvert, “Al-Qaeda Kingpin: I 
Trained 9/11 Hijackers,” Sunday Times, 25/11/2007. 
38 The Primary commander of Arab nationals in Chechnya. 
39 The 9/11 Commission Report, Pp.160, 165 and 233. 
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be and have been argued for. The role of International Law is to assist in the choice between 
those various alternatives.”40 Higgins’ analysis of the difference between political decision-
making and legal decision-making submits that when individuals use their strength or brute 
force to make decisions because they lack the requisite decision-making authority, such 
decisions will be categorized as political decision-making. When the individual making the 
decision does so because he has the legal mandate to make such a decision, the resultant 
outcome will be legal decision-making. Advocates of the policy-oriented approach postulate 
that international law is a process through which players continuously make authoritative 
decisions.41  
Higgins was drawing on the research work of McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell who 
argued that the traditional rules-based approach to the study of international law is undermining 
scholars and practitioner’s ability to gain a clear appreciation of the essence of international 
law.42 McDougal and Lasswell argued that the rules-based approach was undermining 
scholars’ ability to appreciate how international law is an interconnected, dynamic, and 
universal process through which players working for different institutions and at varying levels 
in the community make authoritative decisions with the objective of finding permanent 
solutions to the challenging policies and conflicts that affect the world.   
These decision-making methods and practices have become the core considerations in 
analysing the effectiveness of the policy-oriented model. Thus, proponents of the policy-
oriented approach argue that it focuses on the process of authoritative decision-making rather 
than on the simplistic application of the laws that govern state conduct in the international 
 
40 Higgins, supra n. 11, P. 267. 
41 Lindblom, A. ‘Non-governmental organisations in international law’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), (2005), p. 
32. 
42 Harold D. L. and Myres S. m. ‘Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy’ (New Haven press, 
Martins Nijhoff Publishers), Vol. 7 (1992). 
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arena.43 The approach breaks down the controversies and links them to the authoritative 
decision-making processes and it is this link that eventually leads to the resolution of the 
controversies.  
1.3.1 Policy-Orientated Approaches to International Law 
The policy-oriented approach or the New Haven School conceives the law as a 
component of the entire social process of decision-making. The conception of the law as an 
empirical, well-defined decision-making process within society differentiates the theory from 
the traditional approaches that views the law as static body of commands that are politically 
inferior. Legal decisions such as treaties, statutes, regulations and court decisions have three 
inherent characteristics. These include a message’s policy content, which includes express or 
implied injunction, communicator’s authority and control intent of the sent message. An 
individual generates their authority to make legal decisions from the expectations of the 
community members’ belief that they will be the originators of such decisions. The idea relates 
to Hurt’s rule of recognition of norms generated from the social conventions and practices in a 
given society. Decisions can only be authoritative when they emanate from individuals the 
society has given mandate to make them, thus the conception of law as a social process is 
empirical rather than a normative issue. Besides authority, control intent is also a crucial 
element that characterises legal decisions, separating them from non-legal decisions in any 
given society. In this area, the positivists’ threat of enforcing sanctions often comes to mind 
against sovereign actors. However, inducement to comply with legal decisions is an alternative 
 
43 Hoof, G. ‘Rethinking the sources of international law’ (New York: Brill Archive), (1983), p. 40. See also: Jurgielewicz, L. 
‘Global environmental change and international law’ (New York: University Press of America), (1996), P. 27; Aspremont, J. 
‘Participants in the international legal system’ (New York: Taylor and Francis), (2011), P. 77; Weiler, T. & Baetens, F. ‘New 
directions in international economic law: In memoriam Thomas Walde’ (London: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011), P. 416; Cheng, T. 
‘When international law works: Realistic idealism after 9/11’ (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), P. 50; Wolfe, W. 
‘Winning the war of words: Selling the war on terror from Afghanistan to Iraq’ (New York: ABC-CLIO, 2008), P. ix; 
Orakhelashvili, A. ‘Research handbook on the theory and history of international law’ (New York: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2011), P. 337. 
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strategy to achieve law intent, which involves connecting benefits to compliance to a law-
message to promote adherence.  
The limitations of the realist theories led to the formulation of the New Haven School 
of Jurisprudence, which provides more comprehensive strategies for addressing societal 
problems through application of a disciplined task sequence to find solutions to them. The 
solution finding sequence entails analysis of the diverse parameters the law seeks to address, 
reviewing the conflicting claims and interests, analysing similar previous legal determinations 
and using the findings to predict the future and inventing alternative course of action before 
recommending better solutions that align with good order.44 The framework’s initial four steps 
are analytical while the final one is evaluative and prescriptive. It shows that stakeholders must 
start by conducting precise diagnosis of the problem before presenting most suitable 
prescription.   
Problems relating to the global order such as the adverse implications of climate change 
and global warming also share exclusive relationships to the local problems such as traffic 
regulation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Analysis of these issues require understanding of 
all the relevant disciplines to enable adequate grasp of their implications. The policy-oriented 
approach suggests the need to identify conflicting claims, including the involved parties, the 
basis of the conflicts and each side’s perspectives. Law is instrumental in resolving conflicts 
within society; thus, knowledge of the players and their spaces is crucial. For instance, any 
attempt to improve the United States healthcare system and infrastructure by the Congress is 
likely to result into emergence of powerful lobbyists from various industries including 
pharmaceutical, doctors and health insurance providers. Similarly, the policy-oriented 
approach unearths all the contentious issues, involved parties and their perspectives to the 
 
44 Wiessner, S. ‘The New Haven School of Jurisprudence: A Universal Toolkit for Understanding and Shaping the Law’, Asia 
Pacific Law Review, (2010), 18 (1), pp.45-61. 
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various stakeholders including the public. It believes that the foundation of getting the most 
suitable solutions in the public interest is comprehensive and careful analysis of issues affecting 
the decision makers.    
Besides, the third stage of the policy-oriented approach deals with the review of the 
past trends. It involves evaluation of the previous decisions rendered by the legal system in 
response to the conflicting claims, taking into consideration the conditioning factors. The phase 
deals with analysis of all legal decisions within the community under review. While the 
traditional approaches focused on neutral interpretation of the most recent valid text, the policy-
oriented theory arranges all previous decisions in a chronological order to assist with easy 
identification and analysis of differences across periods. Therefore, this also entails analysis of 
the decision makers backgrounds to identify the predispositional factors of their determinations 
such as environmental or issues related to time. 
The New Haven School or the policy-oriented approach provides a contemporary 
methodological and theoretical jurisprudence for application in analysing public international 
law through the policy-oriented approach. The perspective emanated at Yale Law School 
faculty in the middle-20th century, proposing international law to be the jurisprudence for social 
choices, applicable in the analysis of various decision-making processes. Besides, the New 
Haven School seeks reinforces understanding of the international law as a social process 
intending to craft minimal global public order on the basis of shared values and responsibilities. 
The foundation of New Haven School drew inspiration from legal realism tradition and 
sociological jurisprudence. It primarily focuses on values, social diversity and applicability to 
diverse areas and issues. Despite the numerous criticisms against this approach, it retains 
enduring attractiveness as it efficiently and flexibly addresses a broad range of policy issues. 
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Professors Myres Smith McDougal and Harold Lasswell are credited with the 
development of the New Haven School. During this period, McDougal had received formal 
legal history training from classics and Oxford. Similarly, Lasswell was already a renowned 
21st century political and social scientists when he met McDougal. The two accomplished 
experts created a jurisprudential school at Yale University, which adapted social sciences’ 
analytical techniques to the legal prescriptive purposes. The approach deploys several methods 
to design tools for transforming the civic and public order with the intent of enhancing 
approximation of human dignity objectives it hypothesizes. The New Haven School perceives 
law as an authoritative decision-making process that illuminates both predispositional and 
environmental conditioning factors while appraising decision trends for cohesion with 
specified objectives. Moreover, the approach offers prediction on potential alternative future 
decisions alongside their possible consequences, giving experts the essential conceptual tools 
for inventing and appraising competing decisions to determine the most appropriate courses of 
action.        
The New Haven School is a principal contender against the positivism view, which 
considers international law to be a policy-oriented decision-making process that involves 
shared expectations based on common values. Therefore, the New Haven School arose to 
challenge the positivists’ conception of international laws as a system of rules.45 Besides, even 
though it considers the law to be involving policy choices like the legal realists, the New Haven 
School demonstrates that the international law does not limit its purview to low-conflict 
situations when dealing with international conflict resolution issues, a concept not considered 
among the legal realists. Therefore, the policy-oriented approach transcends past the realists 
into the problem-solving jurisprudence. As such, it challenges legal scholars to undertake 
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among other things; developing a comprehensive theory, jurisprudence and suitable 
methodology for conducting inquiry to enable distinction public orders on the basis of law or 
human dignity, and inventing and recommending authority structures for enforcing world 
public order.46 Therefore, one can perceive the policy-oriented approach as a continuous 
process that develops the intelligence and appraisal tools for maintaining order within the 
global community. 
The policy-oriented approach to international law can be traced back to 1953, when 
Myres McDougal delivered an address to students at The Hague Academy of International 
Law.47 The objective of McDougal’s address was to critique Hans Kelsen’s normative 
approach to international law espoused in his treatise entitled Legal Technique in International 
Law.48 McDougal argued that the role of the jurist within the context of international law is to 
act as a conscientious analyst of the policy commitments embodied within the procedures and 
rules of international law.49 McDougal added that, in performing this role, the jurist 
underscores his/her position as the highly skilled specialist in the interpretation of the intimate 
workings of international law, rules and procedures.50 McDougal pointed out that this role 
prohibits the responsible jurist from portraying him/herself merely as the skilled analyst of the 
logical interconnections between different legal principles.51  
The policy-oriented or New Haven approach associated with international law is linked 
to inclusive critiques of political realism, as well as positivism, its capacity to raise critical 
questions and challenge established doctrines, while stressing the fundamental essential 
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linkages between law and policy.52 According to Professor Neil Duxbury, this approach 
elaborates the claims of policy science within international law.53 The New Haven school seeks 
to oppose legal positivism and formalism in global international law therein. This approach is 
committed to human dignity goals and maintenance and establishment of a world public order, 
emphasizing the role of international law in edification of grave matters of public law 
globally.54. A close collaboration between McDougall and Lasswell, two Yale professors, 
served to establish this school of thought within the framework of public international law. A 
novel policy-oriented approach has also emerged with respect to adaptation to the 
contemporary era by focusing on interdisciplinary studies.55 The original framework has been 
accorded the status of a Cold War product and a defense of actions of advanced capitalist 
Western nations.56 Professor B.S. Chimni argues this context is no longer relevant in 
contemporary times, when the rivalry between the capitalist and the socialist blocs has not been 
revived.57 The original policy-oriented approach does, however, offer a comprehensive 
perspective accompanies by epistemological and ontological premises and contentions.58 
This approach takes five logics into account namely logics of capital, territory, nature, 
culture, and law.59 The New Haven school continues to be relevant for present policy science 
as it shows a vitality of vision and method. However, Professor Chimni still alludes to the close 
of the Cold War as a means of articulating a jurisprudence breaking away from traditional 
understanding and notions revolving around human dignity propounded by McDougal and 
Lasswell.60 
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Therefore, while Professor Chimni argues for the need to place this policy-oriented 
approach within the context of a new framework, suited to the contemporary context, he does 
credit the school as being a critical perspective, although in need of reformulation on account 
of its excessive emphasis on global dynamics predicted on the Cold War. The policy-oriented 
approach also articulates the response to key issues and considers alternative approaches to 
international law. Just as the original school of thought focused on a critique of classical realism 
by McDougal based on six criteria, the present approach needs to be reformulated in light of 
current contemporary influences.  
The original policy-oriented approach focused on a critique of political realism, as 
working based on untested assumptions, overly focused on actors and ignoring other 
international relations players, such as non-state actors that shaped the legal and social 
process.61 Classical realism also misperceived the growing interdependencies between people 
thereby making nationalism a moot point in the debate on policy science, according to 
McDougal.62 Classical realism was also confined to law and rules and the sanction of force. In 
contrast, the New Haven school described legal processes inclusively while considering the 
global legal order in secondary terms. The perspective calls for a greater role of international 
morality in the field of international relations. Its excessive focus on the Western world, 
however, is considered a point of criticism regarding the New Haven school by some legal 
scholars.63 
Additionally, the New Haven school also criticized a positivist approach to 
international legal systems, in that the policy-oriented approach based its rule skepticism on 
American legal realism in a pragmatic sense and emphasized law should be a means, not an 
end. Secondly, the New Haven school has also viewed indeterminacy as a pervasive feature of 
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the rule and that the conceptualization of law through rules hold meaning, when viewed through 
the prism of semantic, syntactic or communication theories.64  
Such a dual source of rule skepticism led to the conclusion intellectualism of 
jurisprudence should not be limited to meaning or application of rules, but the postulation of 
policy goals for international decision-making processes.65 In this sense, the policy-oriented 
approach exceeded the boundaries of legal realism characteristic of American law. American 
legal realisms served as a basis of highlighting the deficits of positivism, for McDougal.66 
Revolting against formalism, McDougal critiqued positivism strictly through the New 
Haven perspective, emphasizing the social context of rule generation or social and political 
contextual factors regarding specific application instances.67 From the prism of a policy-
oriented approach, positivism remained fixated on past dynamics, rather than focusing on the 
future. Ironically, the very criticism of the original New Haven approach on grounds of 
ignoring contemporary contextual factors stands out in contrast to McDougal’s attempt to 
address weaknesses of positivist perspectives by proposing a multimethod, contextual and 
problem-oriented jurisprudence.68 
The New Haven School also analyses and interprets international law through the 
power and political perspectives. Proponents of this school of thought consider policy to be the 
basis of politics and decision-making to be the foundation of power. Therefore, they perceive 
international law to constitute a flow of decisions that assists in the formulation, application 
and invalidation of community prescriptions. Besides, they regard international law to entail a 
complex and comprehensive decision-making process instead of established, fixed rules. While 
 
64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid.  
66 Ibid, P. 114.  
67 Ibid, P. 115.  
68 Ibid, P. 117.  
41 
 
enforcing world public order, the policy-oriented approach majors on value-dependent policies 
and other factors that aid in decision-making. The theory concerns itself with behavioral and 
sociological issues while ignoring issues relating to the contents and validity of international 
law. McDougal and other founding experts sought to reduce the significance of rules of law, 
maintaining that the concept of international law does not account for most of the issues 
affecting the contemporary global society. The founders converged that policy is law, 
formulated through a similar process used in establishing and enforcing laws. Policy-oriented 
approach exponents consider international law as the expression of a state’s foreign policy. As 
such, the validity of international law is dependent on a nation’s foreign policy and the 
positions and decisions of the individuals and institutions tasked with formulating and 
controlling national foreign policy. 
1.3.2 Rosalyn Higgins Perspective on the Policy-Oriented Approach 
Although the foregoing discussions have portrayed the policy-oriented approach as a 
single coherent perspective on international law, the reality of the matter is that each of the 
leading scholars within the New Haven School has his or her application of the approach. 
Rosalyn Higgins is one such scholar, who has developed a unique style of applying the policy-
oriented approach. Her published work from the 1960’s onwards engaged with critical issues 
of international law and the emergence of the United Nations’ role within it. Problems and 
Process: International Law and How We Use It provides an overview of her contribution just 
before she was elected a judge of the International Court of Justice. In the introductory chapter 
of the work Higgins highlights the notion that international law is a series of norms that govern 
conduct between different states. Higgins argues that the conceptualization of international law 
as a series of authoritative decisions makes it easier for scholars and practitioners to assess how 
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international law copes with and contributes to a constantly changing international political 
environment.69  
Higgins argues that international law is not just a set of rules; it is a process that must 
involve a consideration of the principles that underlie any legal provision.70 Furthermore, the 
process must include the capacity to respond to the ever-changing needs of society. Higgins 
believes that the design of international law has the capacity to solve all problems.71 Thus, this 
view of international law creates the impression that Higgins views it as a self-contained system 
that does not mandate the enactment of a new set of legislation whenever challenges arise. 
Instead, international law has its own operational system that relies on established values and 
outcomes to reduce challenges. This is an approach more focused on outcomes versus 
adherence to strict rules.  
Higgins disagrees with those who are reliant on the rules-based approach to 
international law, which views international law as being effective when states apply existing 
rules impartially, and that there exists an entity or state that punishes the states that ignore or 
violate the rules.72 Higgins argues that such a view of international law ignores the necessity 
to interpret and apply the sources of law within the culture of international relations.73 This 
process of means that the determination of international law cannot merely be following rules. 
The existing rules should only be viewed as an important component of the international law 
function and not the only component of international law.  
She, therefore, proposes an approach in which she argues that international law is the 









roles that enhance their capacity to handle international law challenges.74 Higgins argues that 
when these decision-makers are making their determinations, they are not making or 
formulating any new international law rules. Instead, they are trying to choose between 
competing claims that have a certain degree of legal validity.  It is this concept of choices that 
forms the core component of Higgins’ perspective on the process-based approach to 
international law. Higgins sees the key role of the decision-maker as seeking to ground choices 
on values that should govern international society.  
Further, Higgins attempts to distance herself from the rules-based approach, by 
highlighting the need for the decision-maker to realize the differences between competing or 
complementary rules in certain circumstances.75 Higgins assesses this necessity from the 
perspective of competing norms that relate to the achievement of justice. She argues that the 
achievement of justice in international law rests on the decision-maker’s ability to identify and 
apply the objectives that will deliver justice in each circumstance.76 Higgins stresses the 
importance of the decision-maker realizing that justice is a process that takes the political and 
social context of the issue under discussion into consideration.77 The essence of her argument 
is also that the policy-oriented approach is the most effective method for the analysis of 
international law because it outlines a process that seeks to resolve international law challenges 
by affording decision-makers a range of viable solutions that are consistent with their 
objectives and values.78 
In the subsequent sections of her work, Higgins provides specific examples regarding 
the application of her arguments. This is vital because it provides the audience with tangible 
results from her arguments that can help improve social outcomes. For example, she addresses 
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the role of the law on the concept of apostasy under Islamic law and its relationship with 
international law.79 While there is some degree of interpretation needed to address the situation, 
it is better to take a policy-based stance rather than organizing a legislative response on an 
international scale. The concept of apostasy denotes the practice in certain states in the Middle 
East that recommend death for Muslims who renounce their faith. In this analysis, Higgins 
argues that many international law scholars have used the concept of apostasy under Islamic 
law to argue that international human rights laws do not apply to all countries.80 In particular, 
they argue that differences between the application of international human rights laws in the 
West and in the Middle East underscore the fact that international human rights laws are weak 
in so far as they do not apply to all states.81 Higgins, however, holds a different view by arguing 
that an analysis of the effectiveness of international law does not rest on an analysis of practices 
that violate international law and the consequences for those violations. This analysis rests on 
the general practice of states that are party to a particular instrument.  
Higgins demonstrates that wrongful social policies can remain protected under the 
rules-based approach. For example, the general practice of apostasy in the Middle Eastern 
states can be defended and protected under rules-based legal systems. Conversely, policy-based 
systems easily determine the wrong in such a set of laws such as apostasy. In fact, Higgins 
analyses the historicity behind each of the challenged conventions and argues that the states 
which participated in the formulation of the conventions were from diverse religious and 
cultural backgrounds.82 Of the represented states were nations from the Middle East where 
Islam is the predominant religion and citizens practice the Islamic culture.83 
 







Higgins provides further illustrations of the application of her policy-oriented 
perspective in Chapter 8 of her work. In Chapter 8, Natural Resources and International Norms, 
Higgins conducts an analysis of the concept of expropriation from the perspective of the policy-
oriented approach. Higgins argues that when a foreign investor sets up an oil exploration 
investment in a developing country, the investor always faces the risk that that investment may 
be expropriated through the process of nationalization.84 Such cases of expropriation have 
occurred in many countries, including Libya, Iran, and Venezuela. Higgins, therefore, wonders 
how an investor facing the real risk of expropriation can protect his investment in a manner 
that permits him to maintain his earnings and enjoy significant returns on his investments.85  
Higgins concludes that there is no way, under international law, that the investor can protect 
himself against the possibility of expropriation.86 Higgins contends that there is no law under 
international law that permits developed states to intervene on behalf of their corporations and 
invade the offending country. Such a move would violate the concept of state sovereignty, 
which is one of the cornerstones of the international legal order. Higgins argues that the most 
probable course of action for the investor would be to seek compensation equivalent to the 
capital and the earnings anticipated from the oil resources. Nonetheless, she points out that 
even seeking compensation would be difficult because there would be no means of compelling 
the infringing state to pay the compensation awarded. Thus, Higgins concludes that because 
international law recognizes and respects state sovereignty, the unlawful nature of the 
expropriation will have no consequence on its status and, as such, the investor’s right to seek 
compensation merely becomes a right that does not confer any remedy. Consequently, the right 
 





to property will become meaningless because none of the states will be willing to enforce the 
law.87 
1.3.3 Application of Higgins’ Approach to the Present Research Paper 
Higgins closely follows the precepts of McDougal, relying on his principal definitions 
of authority and conceptions of power and control. For instance, she utilizes McDougal’s 
definition of authority as expectation of appropriateness, which supposes appropriate 
endowment of personnel with decision-making capabilities. Higgins believes that decision-
making is only binding within the legal cycles when it emanates from authorised organs or 
individuals, within appropriate forums and framework of recognised norms and practices.88 
Higgins’ definition of custom unveils her theory of law. She claims that considering the 
constant changes that characterise decision trends and rules, the violation of international laws 
signifies rules to be dependent on power. Furthermore, she buttresses her theoretical 
underpinnings on the ideas of McDougal and Reisman who stress a more pronounced 
behaviourist perception that authorities are a set of conditioned subjectivities who indicate 
appropriate behaviors when tripped by external forces.89 Authority determines human behavior 
through providing a clear course of action that excites internal tension. 
Therefore, the present study will follow Higgins’ lead and examine Saudi Arabia’s 
counter-terrorism strategy and the UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001). Analysing Saudi Arabia’s 
counter-terrorism strategy will enable the researcher to assess the policy considerations that led 
to the development of that strategy. Similarly, breaking down UNSC Resolution 1373 will 
enhance the researcher’s capacity to analyse the range of choices that are available to the Saudi 
Arabian government and the UN Security Council. It will enhance the researcher’s ability to 
 
87 Ibid. 
88 Carty, A. ‘Theory of /or Theory instead of/ International Law’ European Journal of International Law, (1997), 8 (1), 
Pp.181-191. 
89 Ibid.  
47 
 
sort out the policy considerations that informed the Security Council’s decision to adopt the 
resolution. The task of disentangling Saudi Arabia’s counter-terrorism strategy and UNSC 
Resolution 1373 will also enhance the researcher’s capacity to assess the legality of the two 
decisions. This approach will eventually lead the researcher to determine how Saudi Arabia’s 
counter-terrorism strategy aligns with UNSC Resolution 1373. However, it should be noted 
here that the policy-oriented approach as viewed by Higgins assumes a liberal world order, 
which means that the meta-legal process that Higgins envisions has concrete values that would 
not necessarily fit well with the view of world order from Saudi Arabia - or perhaps Islamic 
values in general. Such discontinuities will show difficulties in negotiating the relationship 
between international law and national legal systems. Therefore, it is important to emphasize 
the compatibility challenges that arise between the demands of UNSC Resolution 1373 and the 
Islamic values. 
1.4 Challenges and Difficulties in Defining Terrorism 
In light of the foregoing examination of the approaches of international law vis-a-vis 
Higgins and other scholars, this thesis now discusses the challenges and difficulties in defining 
terrorism. Terrorism has proved to be one of the most challenging and difficult concepts in the 
field of social sciences, particularly in terms of arriving at a global consensus on its definition. 
According to erudite academic and erstwhile ICJ judge, Rosalyn Higgins, in her book 
Terrorism and International Law (1997): “Terrorism is without legal significance. It is merely 
a convenient way of alluding to activities, whether of States or individuals, widely disapproved 
of and in which either the methods used are unlawful, or the targets protected, or both”.90 
Higgins submits that there is no international law of terrorism and there is no international law 
about terrorism. Higgins opined that States cannot but use pre-existing institutional 
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mechanisms in international law in dealing with terrorism at the national level. Higgins submits 
that “terrorism is a pernicious contemporary phenomenon that had caused complicated legal 
problems at the national level, leaving States to take a pragmatic approach in dealing with the 
elephant in the house orchestrated by terrorism. Higgins submits that there is no universal 
jurisdiction as a specific principle adopted by the United Nations for dealing specifically with 
terrorism save for the universal jurisdiction which a national government exercises when 
dealing with any other acts such as war crimes or crimes against humanity.   
 On the other hand, the motives of terrorist organizations are another area that is 
disputed. As captured in the popular phrase “one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom 
fighter”, violent acts intended to secure freedom from a political entity can be branded as 
terrorism because the violent group targets a state as a strategy to attain its political freedom as 
evident in many cases of ethnic terrorism. However, from the opposite perspective, although 
such groups are in pursuit of political aims, such as attaining freedom, their actions are labelled 
unlawful, violent terrorism. On the other hand, some terrorist organizations or political groups 
have consistently accused states of being the actual terrorists, terrorizing populations in 
countries that they economically or physically destroyed. Randall Law notes that the main 
problem is that policy analysts, scholars, and laypersons alike often use the word terrorism in 
a mutually exclusive manner. On one hand, the word terrorism is used normatively, as a moral 
judgment against acts of violence that are inherently wrong. On the other hand, people imagine 
that they use the word terrorism analytically, as an objective descriptor. He notes that our 
human understanding of terrorism is entrenched in a moral revulsion and emotional reaction.91  
Additional examples of conflicting criterion in defining terrorism are analysed in subsequent 
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sections where a selection of criteria will be identified and applied to the debate regarding the 
existence of terrorists and the aims of terrorists.  
 From a basic dictionary perspective, terrorism is explained as the “systematic use of 
intimidation and violence” to attain political or some other goals.92 Related to this, the Oxford 
Learner’s Dictionary defines it as “the use of violent action in order to attain political aims or 
to force a government to act.”93 Bruce Hoffman contends that nearly every abhorrent act of 
violence perceived to be directed against society, whether it entails the activities of anti-
government dissidents or governments themselves, organized-crime syndicates, common 
criminals, rioting mobs, people engaged in militant protest, individual psychotics, or lone 
extortionists-is often dubbed “terrorism.”94  The use of the word “terrorism” is often regarded 
negatively, particularly after the Second World War. Before then, particularly among the 
Russian anarchists of 19th century, the word “terrorist” was used to indicate righteousness of 
cause to demonstrate their aims and tactics. David Rapoport maintains that the Russian rebels 
identified themselves as terrorists, as opposed to guerrillas, tracing their origin to the “Reign 
of Terror” following the French Revolution.95 As Hoffman contends, the word terrorism had a 
definite positive connotation during the French Revolution unlike its modern usage. In his 
book, Hoffman argues that the meaning of terrorism has changed several times between the 
late 19th century and today. He argues that terrorism gained different connotations depending 
on the political environment and context in which it happened. In fact, terrorism as a concept 
is subject to different perceptions particularly in line with the cultural and political environment 
of the period.96 The dynamic and changing nature of terrorism is one of the factors that explains 
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why there is still no single agreed definition of terrorism. Enhancements in communication, 
media, and propaganda coupled with industrialization have allowed the masses to challenge 
the existing political structures across the globe. This has led to numerous revolutions, national 
self-determination struggles, and anti-colonial movements. Similar to these changes, terrorism 
has evolved to become more efficient and dynamic as the world becomes smaller. Anthony 
Richards contends that the failure to develop a common definition of terrorism has left a 
vacuum for actors, whether non-state or state, to define terrorism in ways that suit their own 
perceived strategic and political interests, and, in the case of state responses, “counter-
terrorism” remits are often determined accordingly.97 In support of this argument, the U.S. 
“Global War on Terrorism,” for instance, has been subject to numerous debates across the 
globe with its implications for South Asia and the Middle East. Furthermore, failure to reach a 
consensus on a commonly agreed definition of terrorism has also prevented the development 
of international agreements against terrorism.98 In the next section, the elements used in 
defining terrorism will be examined in addition to the numerous definitions of terrorism in the 
academic literature. The objective is to determine the most appropriate definition of terrorism 
that will be used in this thesis.  
1.4.1 Problems in Defining Terrorism in International Law 
One of the most significant problems in international relations that has not yet been 
solved is the definition of terrorism in line with the principles of international law. The UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime paper clarifying frequently asked questions relating to countering 
terrorism and international law notes that “there is no international crime of ‘terrorism’ in the 
sense of a delicta juris gentium and terrorism as such is neither a war crime nor a crime against 
humanity. One reason for this is the fact that there is, as yet, no general international agreement 
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on a definition of terrorism.”99  Certainly, efforts to develop an internationally agreed definition 
of terrorism have so far yielded little success. Because of the difficulties in reaching an 
internationally agreed definition of terrorism, the approach adopted in international law has 
been to bypass a comprehensive and direct definition of terrorism. This inductive approach has 
resulted in laws that specifically address terrorism to exist in the broader framework of 
international law including international criminal law, humanitarian law, refugee law and 
human rights law.100 Under this approach, international legal scholars have not attempted to 
define terrorism as a general concept, rather, they have attempted to define specific events such 
as the taking of hostages, hijackings, bombings, and so on.101  However, this approach has led 
to the formulation of various conventions on the prevention of terrorism with respect to the 
various aspects of the phenomenon. Furthermore, the approach inescapably disregards the 
intent of the terrorist activities and is rather focused on the impact of terrorist attacks.  
 In contrast to the inductive approach, however, attempts to make use of a 
comprehensive, all-inclusive approach took place during the 1999 International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.102  In Article 2 of the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, terrorism is defined as “Any other act 
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking 
an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, 
by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”103  The UN Security Council 
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Resolution 1373 that was adopted on 28 September 2001 denounces the September 11 attacks 
and requires member countries to take measures to fight terrorism.104 Nonetheless, UNSC 
Resolution 1373 does not offer a clear definition of terrorism. Instead, the resolution provides 
the principles by which member countries shall fight terrorism.  The European Union provides 
yet another broad definition of terrorism. Article 1 of the EU`s Framework Decision on 
Combating Terrorism in 2002  defines terrorism as “Offences under national law, which, given 
their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization where 
committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a 
government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or 
seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or 
social structures of a country or an international organization.105  
 The two different definitions by two international organizations highlight the 
difficulties in having one universal definition of terrorism. The UNSC and the European Union 
have adopted two completely different paths in defining terrorism in order to prevent it. The 
UNSC`s inductive approach permits member countries to reach a written agreement on the acts 
of terrorism by identifying criminal activities conducted by terrorist groups.106 On one hand, a 
single and comprehensive definition of terrorism poses the risk of labelling individuals or other 
immaterial acts of crime as terrorism because the definitions provided have a wider range.  
Another difficulty relates to the type of actors involved. Whereas the major global 
powers maintain that terrorism crimes should be limited to private actors, excluding state actors 
from it, smaller powers maintain that state actors have to be included, while some of them want 
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“freedom fighters” to be excluded.107 For some, terrorism is in the mind of the beholder, based 
on a person`s national origins and political views. However, for others, terrorism involves 
criminal acts, based on the laws of any civilized society.108 The general acceptability of a 
particular definition of terrorism apparently depends on a particular homogeneity or ideological 
proximity.109 Consequently, the failure to arrive at a precise and objective definition of 
terrorism has been a result of: (a) terrorism assumes different forms; even though it is often 
equated with political subversion, sometimes it is employed by governments, and it is utilized 
as a tool of syndicated crime; (b) the criteria used in defining terrorism is largely subjective, 
because it is primarily based on political considerations; (c) most importantly, terrorism is 
provoked by a broad range of motives depending on the prevailing ideology and time.110 The 
difficulty of finding an appropriate definition is that “the spread of terror can be applied 
downwards, but also upwards. On the one hand, particular groups can make use of terror in 
their efforts to influence governmental decisions and sometimes even to destroy the structure 
of the state. On the other hand, some governments spread fear downwards against their own 
citizens as a form of governance and a strategy to remain in power.111 The differing political 
perceptions and attitudes that a state adopts toward a particular “militant” or “terrorist” group, 
as dictated by the state`s own political priorities and compulsions, underscored the work of the 
United Nations in tackling international terrorism.112 The issue of terrorism has always been 
linked to the calculations of realpolitik and alliances that are a major characteristic of the UN 
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voting practice.113 When the issue of terrorism was taken up in the United Nations General 
Assembly, it was evident that an agreement on the general definition would not be possible.  
Furthermore, the issue of whether the activities of the official forces of a particular state 
can be regarded as terrorist offenses has also created divisions among members of the 
international community, particularly between developing and developed countries. If one 
were to dig deep into the origins of terrorist activity to determine the objectives of the terrorists 
and why they resort to terrorist methods, the answer in most cases is likely to be some form of 
state authority and policy, legally enshrined in the sovereign power of the state in question. In 
most cases, governments are both the primary target of terrorist activity, but also the main 
actors in the process of enforcing rules against terrorism. This means that the terrorist quarrel 
is often one between governments and terrorist groups and starts as a reaction against 
government policy and proceeds as a government`s reaction against the first terrorist 
reaction.114  Those who look at the issues from the point of view of the state view state violence 
as legal, however much terror it may bring in the minds of the population. Those who view 
matters from the perspective of state opponents see things differently. To them, the state is the 
terrorist that makes use of the military arsenal at its disposal to terrorize its people. Therefore, 
those opposing the state through violent means are viewed as freedom fighters.115 In the Middle 
East, Israel refers to Palestinians as terrorists and Palestinians accuse Israel of waging a war of 
terror. Furthermore, while the West expressly categorizes Al-Qa’idah as a terrorist group, many 
in the Muslim world view Al-Qa’idah and its leadership as freedom fighters involved in the 
work of liberating the Islamic world from a corrupt and immoral West.116 Three questions come 
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to mind, firstly are Israeli Defense Forces involved in a legal military action or do its actions 
amount to state terror? Secondly, are Palestinian suicide bombers militant freedom fighters or 
terrorists? In addition, is the conflict governed by international criminal law or international 
humanitarian law?117 Given the actions of the Palestinian militants and Israeli Defense Forces, 
it is difficult to determine the potential author of terrorism.118 Such difficulties as to what 
actions constitute terrorism remain an obstacle in developing a universally accepted definition 
of terrorism.119  
An additional problem that confronts scholars in defining terrorism is the fact that it is 
usually confused or equated with “guerrilla warfare” or “insurgency.”120 Similarities in the 
tactics used by terrorists, insurgents, and guerrillas have made it difficult to determine which 
one is a terrorist act or a terrorist group. According to Hoffman, guerrillas tend to be larger in 
number and operate as a single military unit, and insurgents also share the same characteristics, 
but they often use hit and run tactics.121 According to Hoffman, what differentiates terrorists 
from guerrilla groups and insurgents is the fact that terrorists do not operate in the open as 
armed groups. In general, they do not try to seize or hold territory, intentionally avoid engaging 
enemy military units in combat, are constrained both logistically and numerically from 
implementing concerted mass political mobilization efforts, and lack direct control or 
governance over a population either at the local or national levels. Similarly, Ariel Merari 
argues that the primary difference between guerrilla groups and terrorist groups is that terrorists 
do not seek to establish physical control over a particular territory.122 With regard to territorial 
control, both Ariel Merari and Hoffman have a common point that terrorist organizations do 
not attempt to control a particular territory. However, this idea can be challenged in that there 
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are terrorist groups that currently claim control over particular territories in countries such as 
Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Following the uprisings and civil wars in the Arab World and North 
Africa, many terrorist groups such as the Islamic State, Jabhat Al-Nusra, and Ahrar Ash-Sham 
have taken control over different parts of Syria, Iraq, and Libya. As a result, some terrorist 
organizations pursue territorial control over particular territories. However, generally, terrorists 
differ from insurgents and guerrilla groups for the aforementioned reasons and the fact that the 
latter groups often target law enforcement and the military personnel of the target state as 
opposed to deliberately targeting civilian populations. It is important to note that the 
multidimensional interpretations of terrorism, have brought into existence a multitude of laws 
related to terrorism and counter-terrorism in various jurisdictions. In this consideration, it 
becomes difficult to criminalize the funding of terrorism, which in turn, acts as a major 
hindrance in the fight against terrorism. 
1.4.2 Various Definitions of Terrorism in Academic Literature 
Within the academic literature, there are many definitions of terrorism. However, the 
definitions vary from one scholar to another because of the complicated nature of terrorism. 
Terrorist groups across the globe have different tactics, aims, and structures by which to attain 
their goals. Consequently, their attacking practices and targets often differ from each other. 
Therefore, different academic definitions of terrorism exist based on the criterion used to define 
terrorism. State policies and political differences directly influence attempts to define terrorism. 
In some instances, some terrorism definitions may include several states to be branded as 
“terrorists” subject to their definition criteria. Additionally, James Lutz and Brenda Lutz 
contend that universally acceptable definitions are difficult to attain because some countries 
have tried to make sure that national liberation movements are not categorized as terrorism.123 
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Furthermore, Bruce Hoffman observes that different agencies/departments of even the same 
government will often find themselves having conflicting definitions.124   
A significant problematic point in defining terrorism is considered the “normative” 
nature of the debate. Verena Erlenbusch reasons that dependence on everyday speech has 
introduced a moral judgment of terrorism as evil or wrong within academic discourse. This 
judgment has, therefore, become one of the core characteristics of terrorism and is developed 
into a definition whose apparent purpose is to serve as the foundation of philosophical moral 
assessment.125 In her work, Erlenbusch criticizes the definition of terrorism noting that it is 
largely premised on objectionable terms proposed by daily speech, and this prevents scholars 
from developing an objective, clear definition of terrorism. Additionally, Adrian Guelke is also 
opposed to the normative nature of defining terrorism. Guelke criticizes the definition of 
terrorism by Alex P. Schmid over his use of the term “violence.” Certainly, violence is an 
important term in terrorism studies because the identity of the perpetrator(s) of violence is 
important in describing whether it is a terrorist attack or a case of legitimate use of force. 
Guelke notes that characterizing an action as violent also often involves disapproval and 
suggests that it is illegitimate.126 Guelke opines that “violence” is linked to illegitimacy, while 
“force” is a representation of legitimacy. Consequently, according to Guelke, any definition of 
terrorism that makes use of the term “violence” equally carries that normative presumption 
with it.127 Both the ideas by Erlenbusch and Guelke are important in understanding why some 
sections of society define terrorism in ways that are entirely different from others. In fact, in 
some societies, terrorists are regarded as “freedom fighters.” A normative approach toward 
terrorism directly influences definitional struggles in terms of defining and creating enemies 
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and labelling liberation movements or opposition as terrorists. This trend has gone a notch 
higher in some countries where any form of dissident, including professional journalists, have 
been dubbed terrorists and have been prosecuted under terror laws. 
1.4.3 Efforts to Develop a Scholarly Definition of Terrorism 
 Brenda Schultz and James Lutz combined the different works of scholars such as Bruce 
Hoffman, Martha Crenshaw, and David Claridge and developed a working definition of 
terrorism as follows: “Terrorism entails political motives and aims. It is either violent or 
threatens violence. It is designed in a manner that generates fear in a target audience and goes 
beyond the immediate victims of the violence. The violence is perpetrated by an identifiable 
organization. The violence entails non-state actor/actors either as the perpetrator of the violence 
or the victim or both. Finally, the violent acts are designed in a manner that they create power 
in situations where power had been lacking previously (the violence tries to improve the power 
base of the organization performing the actions).128 The most outstanding feature about this 
definition is that it does not incorporate the word “civilian” compared with other definitions. 
Bruce Hoffman opines that “terrorism is particularly designed to have extensive 
psychological effects that transcend beyond the immediate terror victims or object of the 
terrorist attack. It is meant to create fear within, and as a result intimidate a broader target 
audience, which may include a whole country, a political party or national government, a rival 
religious group, or public opinion in general. Terrorism is intended to create power where none 
exists or to consolidate power where the existing power is very little. Through the publicity 
that their violence generates, terrorist organizations seek to secure the influence, leverage, and 
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power they otherwise do not have to bring out political change either at the local level or at an 
international scale.”129  
Carsten Bockstette offers another definition that places more emphasis on the type of 
victims that terrorists select. He defines terrorism as a political violence in an asymmetrical 
conflict intended to induce psychic fear and terror through violent destruction and victimization 
of non-combatant targets. Such actions are meant to pass a message from an illicit clandestine 
organization. The objective of terrorism is to exploit the media in order to attain maximum 
possible publicity and consequently, influence the targeted audience in order to achieve short-
term and mid-term political goals and/or long-term end states.130 This definition has three 
important differences. Firstly, it labels “non-combatants” as terrorism targets. Secondly, 
terrorist groups are defined as “clandestine” and “illicit.” Finally, the definition suggests that 
the aim of terrorism is to attract the attention of the media, enhance publicity, and attain short-
term and medium-term political goals and/or desirable long-term gains and objectives.  
1.4.4 The Definition Adopted for the Thesis 
As is evident from the above definitions of terrorism, there are as many definitions of 
terrorism as scholars on the subject. Other than the definitions studied so far, a different 
definition of terrorism will be applied in this thesis in order to critically evaluate Saudi Arabia’s 
counter-terrorism strategy in light of Resolution 1373 of the UNSC. The United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1373 will be analysed within the purview of UNSC Resolution 
1566, to further help elucidate the processes and procedure the international community 
underwent, in order to provide a definitional guide on terrorism, and how member states of the 
UN should take steps or measures at the national level to counter terrorism. 
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In 1972, the UN General Assembly set up a Terrorism Ad Hoc Committee to discuss 
the issue of terrorism. The UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism was made up of 35 States. 
This Committee reported to the Assembly in 1973, 1977 and 1993 after they had met. In an 
effort to address the subject of terrorism, the Assembly continued to meet consistently every 
two years from 1981 to 1993 as well as 1994 to 2005. In all their meetings, the Assembly 
deliberated on the issue of terrorism.  These resolutions were adopted without a vote and the 
General Assembly accepted that the fight against terrorism could be effectively intensified or 
improved by setting up a consensus definition of international terrorism. Another committee 
was set up in 1996 by the Assembly to address the subject of the definition of terrorism. The 
Sixth Committee of the Assembly was tasked with the responsibility of meeting annually to 
thrash out a definition of terrorism. The task of this working group of the Sixth Committee was 
truncated because of the proposal of the OIC. There was a watershed moment in the efforts to 
find a functional definition of terrorism. The breakthrough came in 2004 when the Security 
Council adopted a resolution on the definition of terrorism. This resolution was called 
Resolution 1566131 and was the only Resolution that proffered the meaning of terrorism. These 
two resolutions, that is, Resolutions 1373 and 1566, are quite different for all intents and 
purposes. At the commencement of its preamble, there was a reaffirmation of UNSC 
Resolution 1566 in UNSC Resolution 1373. Javier Ruperez submits that UNSC Resolution 
1373 represented a major qualitative and quantitative advance in the new approach to terrorism 
that the United Nations sought to impose”.132  UNSC Resolution 1373 is binding on all member 
states, making it incumbent on member states to ratify and implement the provisions of the 
international instruments for countering terrorism. UNSC Resolution 1373 also imposes an 
extensive range of financial, legal and law enforcement cooperation measures. In fact, another 
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striking thing regarding UNSC Resolution 1373 is that of the establishment of the Counter-
Terrorism Committee, comprising 15 members and entrusted with the responsibility of 
monitoring the compliance of the resolution. Javier Ruperez submits that in adopting UNSC 
Resolution 1373, the Security Council was entering a virtually new area of political and legal 
life by imposing and criminalizing terrorism, its perpetrators, accomplices and financiers. 
UNSC Resolution 1373 mandated member states to take measures against terrorism but was 
unable to define terrorism or the offences of terrorism it sought to prevent, while UNSC 
Resolution 1566 gave a proper definition of terrorism and the acts which constitute terrorism. 
In Paragraph 3 of UNSC Resolution 1566, the Council: “Recalls that criminal acts, including 
against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of 
hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of 
persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from any acts, which constitute offences within 
the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, 
are in no circumstance justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, 
racial, ethnic, religious or any other similar nature… ’’133  A working group was established 
under paragraph 9 and 10 and tasked ‘to consider and submit recommendations to the Council 
on practical measures to be imposed on individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated 
with terrorist activities, other than those designated by the Al-Qa’idah/Taliban Sanctions 
Committee…’. The working group was also tasked with the responsibility of considering “the 
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possibility of establishing an international fund to compensate victims of terrorist acts and their 
families”. 
Furthermore, UNSC Resolution 1566 was similar to UNSC Resolution 1373 but 
provided a general description or plan of a definition of terrorism as well as condemning 
terrorism and any attempt to justify it.134 Wondwossen Kassa135 agrees that Paragraph 3 of 
UNSC Resolution 1566 represents the definition of the concept of terrorism. Kassa further 
asserted that Paragraph 3 of Resolution 1566 is not an attempt by the Security Council to give 
a new definition of terrorism.136 Kassa further avers that the Security Council’s use of the verb 
‘recalls’ is suggestive of the fact that Paragraph 3 alludes to a pre-existing definition of 
terrorism and not an attempt to provide a new definition of terrorism.  Kassa went further to 
suggest that in both Resolutions, the Security Council espoused the definition of terrorism. 
Kassa opines that while there is a tacit adoption of Resolution 1373, there was an explicit 
endorsement of Resolution 1566 and by so doing, reiterating the definition of terrorism under 
Article 2 of the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism.137 
At the World Summit held in 2005, a further attempt was made to define terrorism, but 
this proved futile. A detailed, all-encompassing and comprehensive definition of terrorism was 
achieved with the convening of two crucial international conferences in 2005. One of the 
conferences was convened by Saudi Arabia. It was a special counter-terrorism international 
conference held in Riyadh in February 2005. Another conference, the International Summit on 
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Democracy, Terrorism, and Security, was held in March of the same year, and was sponsored 
by the Club de Madrid. Both conferences discussed the question of the definition of terrorism. 
The report that emanated from the Riyadh Conference re-echoed the view that the continuing 
absence of agreement on a detailed and comprehensive definition of terrorism was truncating 
and jeopardizing international efforts to fight terrorism.138 The Riyadh Counter-Terrorism 
International Conference recommended the endorsement of the proposals contained in the UN 
High-Level Panel’s report. The Club de Madrid Summit also endorsed the High-Level Panel’s 
report. However, efforts to accept the proposals and definitions of these conferences were 
jettisoned by the General Assembly. The 2005 General Assembly World Summit could not 
take the necessary step expected of it, and so it dropped the definition of terrorism 
recommended by the conferences from its ‘Final Outcome Document’.139  
1.5 Saudi Legal System 
Therefore, this section explores the legal system of the Kingdom. This is very important 
to this thesis, as there are some special features that distinguish the legal system in the Kingdom 
and that constitute challenges when discussing conformity of the Saudi strategy to counter-
terrorism with international strategy (UNSC Resolution 1373). This section will cover the 
sources of legal rules, the explanation of some special legal terminologies, and the authorities 
of the Kingdom (judicial, executive, and regulatory).  
Saudi constitutional law has also been affected by this interrelationship, as the Kingdom 
is a body of international law and has entered into a relationship with other states and 
international and regional organizations via certain international agreements and 
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conventions.140 This sort of development can also be found in the methodology of the New 
Haven School, which stipulates that ‘there is interaction between international law and 
municipal law, so as to create a legal framework that can reduce threats and tensions between 
these two laws.’   
On this basis, Saudi Arabian rulers introduced into the nation’s constitution, several 
topics that have been part of several international agreements, into which the Kingdom has 
entered. For example, the right to grant the status of asylum to refugees, respect for human 
rights, the right to security for all people without any discrimination, the right of individual and 
intellectual property, and other rights have been all embodied within the Kingdom’s 
constitution (Basic Law of Governance - 1992).141 The implementation of international law 
norms at the domestic level, forms one of the main recalls points that Higgins claims, and 
which constitutes the core of this project. 
As can be seen, international law constitutes an important source to the legal system in 
the Kingdom, however only to the extent that it does not violate Shariah Law. On this basis, it 
is very important to note that one of the most sensitive implications of this status is that the 
conformity of domestic Saudi Arabian laws in the context of counter-terrorism to international 
law is limited to the issue of non-conflict with Shariah Law. This is an important consideration 
that should be taken into account when analysing the strategy of Saudi Arabia in relation to 
counter-terrorism. As explained, the legal system in the Kingdom has a special form, either in 
terms of its religious position or its traditional and customary perspectives. Saudi rulers are 
always required to commit to Shariah Law. This status was also confirmed by the Royal Decree 
issued by King Fahd Bin Abdul-Aziz in 1992, embodying the ‘Basic Law of Governance’, 
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stating that ‘these regulations were issued after a careful consideration by the elite of scholars 
and experts who took into consideration the position of the Kingdom in terms of its Islamic 
and Arab declarations and its cultural, social and traditional perspectives.’  This is the big 
challenge that this thesis faces.  
In fact, man-made laws, either within Islamic countries or others, do not often conflict 
with Shariah Law, particularly criminal law. In addition, the term law was not a new term to 
Islamic scholars, though the current Saudi rulers reject it. The term law has been used by most 
Islamic scholars, such as Ibn Taymiyyah,142 Al-Muradi,143 Ibn Khaldun, and Al-Razi, some of 
whom used the term law in the titles of their books, such as Ibn Jizi the author of ‘Juristic Laws 
in Summarising Maliki School’ and also Al-Ghazali the author of ‘Law of Interpretation’.144       
This is why there is no term law within the legal system of the Kingdom. However, due to the 
social and intellectual development within Saudi society, it may be noticed that this severe 
rejection of these terms has been less intensified, particularly when Saudi society realized that 
their fears of using these terms are exaggerated or have no logical bases. Saudi rulers will not 
issue any document or approve any international obligation that may conflict with Shariah Law. 
1.5.1 Sources of Legislation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
In this chapter, the researcher also explores the sources of legal legislation in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia before commencing a discussion on Saudi Arabia’s counter-
terrorism measures. The aim of this explanation is to show how the legislative process in the 
Kingdom operates and to familiarize the reader with certain terminology that the legal system 
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in the Kingdom uses. This will also provide the opportunity to assimilate the content and 
framework of the legal system in the Kingdom.  
         Article 7 of the Basic Law of Governance (1992) provides that ‘Government in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from the Book of God (Holy Qur’an) and the 
Sunnah of the Prophet (PBUH), which are the ultimate sources of reference for this and all 
other state regulations.’  According to this article, Shariah Law is the main source of provisions 
in the Kingdom, followed by other national regulations. Constitutional customs, which 
coincide with the establishment of the Saudi Arabian state, follow the above two sources. In 
addition to these sources, there are two more sources which can be described as new. These are 
constitution and international laws.145 The latter is of particular importance as the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia is part of the international community and a body of the subjects of international 
law. As can now be seen, the sources of legal rules in the Kingdom are diverse. It should be 
noted here that the Holy Qur’an and the Prophet’s Sunnah (Established Example) are 
unchanged and constant, while the other ones are variable according to changes of status and 
time. We explore these sources as follows: 
1.5.1.1 Shariah Law 
This law is the first and main source of legislation in the Kingdom.146 Nobody within 
the Kingdom is permitted to issue any regulation or a set of rules that violates Shariah Law. 
Rule-makers must formulate legal norms in accordance with Shariah legal norms, otherwise, 
such rules will lose their legal legitimacy. The Basic Law mentioned Shariah Law in 25 articles 
as the basic source of legislation. This recurrent emphasis of Shariah Law as a main source of 
legislation is due to the Islamic character of the Kingdom, which is home to the two most holy 
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sites of Islam,147 i.e. Makkah and Madinah. It should be noted in this relation that in addition 
to these two sources, there are several complementary sources of legislation, known as Fiqhi 
sources. This includes consensus, analogical reasoning, pure reasoning, seeking the public 
interest, and juristic discretion.148 These methods touch upon issues that have not been 
explicitly or directly addressed in the Holy Qur’an or Prophet’s Sunnah (Established Example). 
By using these complementary sources, the jurisprudence refers to the Holy Qur’an and 
Prophet’s Sunnah themselves to find the correct course of action.    
1.5.1.2 National laws 
Before we embark on exploring these regulations, which constitute the second source 
of legislation in the Kingdom, it is important first to explain some legal terminology that will 
be widely used in this thesis to familiarize readers with these terms. In addition, this will help 
to distinguish these terminologies from similar ones that are used in the legal systems of other 
countries which have different meanings.  
Royal Order: This is a written official document, issued by the King, and expresses 
the direct and individual will of the King. It is often issued in accordance with a specific 
formula and is recognized by the public and bears the signature of the King alone.149 This royal 
order represents the will of the King.  It is an individual will which means that it is unrestricted 
by legal reference to any institution within the Kingdom, such as the Shura or Ministers’ 
Councils. The King issues such orders according to his evaluation of the interests of the state, 
as he is the ruler. Royal Order is considered one of the highest regulatory instruments in the 
Kingdom. These are sovereign decision made only by the King and they cannot be appealed 
before any judicial authority. The King often issues such orders to, for example, assign a deputy 
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Prime Minister, ministers and their deputies, and members of the Shura Council, judges, 
security officers, or to issue basic legal regulations for the Kingdom, which is our concern in 
this thesis.150    
Royal Decree: This is a written official document which expresses the will of the King, 
as he is the leader of the state. The King issues royal decrees to endorse decisions made already 
by the Shura or Ministers’ Councils in relation to internal or external affairs of the state, to 
make them formal and effective. All regulations, except those which are referred to as basic 
regulations, are issued through Royal Decrees.151 
Ministerial Order: This is an official document which expresses the will of the 
president of the Council of Ministers. These orders can be used to assign ambassadors, foreign 
representatives of the Kingdom, and approve judicial decisions. The main advantage of these 
orders is their flexible character. These orders also can be issued by the King or one of his 
deputies.152 
Resolution of the Council of Ministers: This is an official document with a specific 
formula, which expresses the will of the Council of Ministers. It comes at the top of the pyramid 
of the administrative decisions made in the Kingdom. It often deals with the affairs of citizens. 
These resolutions express the will of all ministers and members of the Council.153  
Having briefly explained these legal instruments in the Kingdom, we explore the basic 
and national regulations that are issued through one of the above decisions. In addition to these 
regulations, there are also regulatory rules. Therefore, there are two types of legal rules: 
regulations and regulatory rules. The Basic Law, the System of the Shura Council, and the 
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System of the Council of Ministers use these two terms to regulate their systems.154 For 
example, Article 67 provides that ‘[t]he regulatory authority shall have the jurisdiction of 
formulating regulations and rules….’.155 Also, Article 15 of the System of the Shura Council 
states the authority of the Council in the ‘study of laws and rules’.156 Article 20 of the System 
of the Council of Ministers provides that the Council ‘examines the projects of regulations and 
rules.’ 
 Therefore, our next focus in this chapter is to analyse these regulations and rules157, 
from the higher ones to the lower in accordance with the principle of legality. This principle 
means that the higher law or rule is superior to the lower one, and that the latter cannot violate 
the higher one. According to this principle, the highest law in the Kingdom is the Basic Law, 
and then the regulations. These are followed by the regulatory rules. 
1.5.1.3 The Basic Law of Governance 
This law was enacted in 1992 via a Royal Decree issued by King Fahd Bin Abdul-
Aziz.158 It is the top of the pyramid of all regulations in the Kingdom and cannot be violated 
by any other regulation. Before we understand this law, it is important to note that this law can 
be equated to the status of a constitution, when compared to the legal systems of other countries. 
However, it can be differentiated from other constitutions in that the source of this regulation 
is Shariah Law only and the rulers do not label this set of rules a law, but instead, a ‘regulation’, 
as explained previously.159 The majority of states govern by constitution, which is at the top of 
the legal system and regulates the constitutional principles according to which the state 
functions, the relationship between all authorities is organized, and the relationship between 
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these authorities and citizens are set up, as this is one requirement of a state of law. As it is 
known, a constitutional law governs three main issues: 1- the state in terms of its nature, 
language, nationality and any other thing that has a sovereign character; 2- it regulates the three 
main authorities within the state, which are legislative, judicial, and executive; and 3- it 
regulates the issue of the rights of its citizens, civil society institutions and their rights, such as 
the right to freedom and movement.160 This is all embodied within the Basic Law. 
The Basic Law or literally as in the original Arabic ‘the basic regulation’, involves the 
main principles and constants upon which the Kingdom is built. It is divided into 9 chapters. 
Chapter one (4 articles) is devoted to the general principles of the state, its holidays, flag, and 
emblem. Chapter two (4 articles) states the system of governance in the Kingdom, which is 
royal and based on the Qur’an and Sunnah. Chapter three (5 articles) talks about the foundations 
of Saudi society. It regulates the family’s relationships, national unity, and education. Chapter 
four (9 articles) covers the economic principles in the Kingdom. Specifically, it regulates public 
and private property, capital, labour affairs, taxes, fees, Zakah, and economic and social 
development. Chapter five (21 articles) is devoted to rights and duties. It states that the 
Kingdom is the guardian of Islam. It is concerned about the system of security, the protection 
of human rights, the social security system, the right to education, public health, environment, 
the creation and equipping of the armed forces, citizenship rights, and so on. Chapter six (28 
articles) deals with the authorities of state. This includes the three authorities: executive, 
judicial, and ‘regulatory’ authorities. In addition, it regulates the declaration of the state of 
emergency and general mobilization. It also explains the role of the regulatory authority and 
its role in issuing regulations and rules. Chapter seven (7 articles) is devoted to financial affairs. 
It explains the system of revenues, the public treasury, the state budget, and provisions for 
governing monetary and banking matters. Chapter eight (2 articles) deals with auditing 
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agencies. It also regulates financial and administrative violations. Chapter nine (3 articles) is a 
general chapter regulating the system of international agreements and treatments. It also deals 
with the suspension and amending of the Basic law.161   
For the purposes of this thesis, we briefly analyse the most important aspects of this 
regulation. First, the system of governance in Saudi Arabia is monarchical,162 as can be seen in 
Articles 5 of the Basic Law (1992). Second, according to Articles 1 and 7, the constitution of 
the Kingdom is the Holy Qur’an and the Prophet’s Sunnah (Established Example) and the 
government in the Kingdom derives its authority from them. These two sources govern the 
Basic Law and all other regulations that are issued by any authority. These regulations also 
participate in the governance of the state, however only to the extent that they do not violate 
the two main sources. Third, Article 44 states that there are 3 authorities in the Kingdom: 
Judicial, Executive, and Regulatory authorities. The same article adds that these authorities 
shall cooperate with each other, however, the King is to be the final authority. 
We summarize the Basic Law as a set of rules which organize the form of governance 
of the state. In addition to this, it organizes the nature of the government, the three authorities 
and their specializations and relationship. It also regulates the relationship between the state 
and its citizens in terms of rights and duties of the Shariah Law. The Basic Law also emphasizes 
the Islamic and Arab identity of the Kingdom, as stated in several articles, such as Article 1, 
which links the term Arab to the name of the state: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.163 Article 3 
also emphasizes the Islamic identity of the country, as it puts the Islamic emblem ‘[T]here is 
no God but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah’ on the national flag. The Basic Law 
is flexible, as it can be cancelled, amended, or changed, but only via the issuance of a Royal 
Decree. There is no complex procedure for this process. However, some articles that are 
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directly linked to Shariah Law, the system of governance, and human rights cannot be 
prejudiced.164    
The Basic Law has been developed several times since it was created. For example, in 
June 2017, Article 5 (b) was amended to appear as follows: ‘[G]overnance shall be limited to 
the sons of the founder King ‘Abd Al-‘Aziz’ and the sons of his sons’. This dramatic change 
will move governance from the sons to the grandsons of the founder, which may pave the way 
for the emergence of what the researcher calls the fourth state of Saudi Arabia.  
1.5.1.4 Normal Laws 
This is equivalent to the level of a law, when compared to the legal system of other 
states in the world. These laws involve a set of general binding rules, issued by the Regulatory 
Authority (this is a legislative authority, which is exercised by the Council of Ministers or the 
Shura Council) and must also be approved via royal decrees. These regulations cannot be issued 
via royal order, as is the situation with the basic regulations. Saudi rulers have issued these 
sorts of regulations to provide a detailed explanation for each major affair in the Kingdom that 
has been referred to in the basic regulations. For example, Article 45 of the Basic Law provides 
that ‘[T]he Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah (Traditions) of God's Messenger shall be the source 
for fatwa.’ This article states that a regulation should organize Al-Fatawa related affairs. 
Therefore, the Saudi ruler issued a normal regulation that regulates the issue of Al-Fatwa, 
known as Al-Fatwa Affairs Regulation.165  
1.5.2 Technical Terms of Legal Terminology in the Kingdom 
As the Kingdom holds a special position within the Islamic and Arab world, as the 
guardian of Islam and the most holy places, Saudi rulers consider this a unique honour and 
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avoid labelling any set of legal rules as ‘law’. According to one Islamic tenet, there is no 
opportunity for man-made laws. As explained, the Qur’an and Prophet’s Sunnah constitute the 
main source of legislation.166 Based on this principle, Saudi Arabia’s rulers are committed to 
this tenet and there is no room for man-made legislation. Only rules derived by jurists from the 
Qur’an and Sunnah can amount to a level of law.167 Otherwise, the role of rulers is only limited 
to regulate the interests of the state and citizens by issuing what is called in the Arabia original 
‘regulation’.  
The Basic Law of Governance (1992): As previously discussed, this law resembles 
constitution laws when compared to other legal systems in the world. However, Saudi rulers 
insisted that it not be given the term constitution law due to the strict position taken by them 
against the term constitution law. This position, however, does not seem to be taken on 
legitimate evidence referred to in the Qur’an or Sunnah. This rejection of the term constitution 
law was based on the Islamic character of the Kingdom, where only Allah (the Qur’an) and 
His Prophet (Sunnah) can legislate. The term Basic Law, in the Arabic original, is ‘Basic 
Regulation’. Therefore, the Saudi legal system only allows rulers to issue ‘regulations’ that are 
not covered by Shariah Law. These regulations only govern the provisions of Shariah Law. 
They are also issued to deal with future matters. Perhaps the reason for this reservation is the 
lack of familiarity with the content of the Madinah treaty, enacted by Prophet Muhammad 
(PBUH), after entering Madinah and establishing the Islamic State. This charter is considered 
to be the first social constitutional contract in history, written with articles, and included aspects 
of a constitutional nature, such as organising the state’s affairs, the relationship between a state 
and citizens, the rights and duties of all residents both Muslims and non-Muslims in 
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Madinah.168 This charter refers to concepts and practices of a constitutional nature that were 
not familiar in the political rules which held sway in the Arabian Peninsula, such as central 
government, citizenship, personality of punishment, freedom of belief, the right to equality, 
and other concepts that can be seen in contemporary constitutions.169  
Regulations: As the term ‘constitutional law’ was rejected by Saudi rulers, the term 
‘law’, was also rejected. Saudi rulers decided to use the term ‘regulation’, instead. There is no 
room for the idea of secular law (man-made law).170 This declaration was further reaffirmed at 
the Scholars’ Conference held in Makkah (1340 Hijri/ 1921 CE), when they called on King 
Abd’ Al-Aziz to remove all laws at the time as they believed that foreign man-made laws were 
in conflict with Islamic rules and concepts. In addition, they claimed that Shariah Law had been 
significantly ignored within the Islamic states and were limited only to the law of family.171   
1.5.3 Mechanism of Implementing Security Council Resolutions Within the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia 
          Like other countries, Saudi Arabia has made tremendous efforts at implementing 
counter-terrorism UNSC 1373 in the Kingdom.172 Generally, there is a designated unit within 
the Saudi Arabian Foreign Ministry that is responsible for dealing with non-binding UNSC 
Resolutions. However, for resolutions issued under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, there is a 
reputable and permanent committee that is responsible for analysis and implementation of these 
resolutions, with the exception of resolutions related to counter-terrorism. This committee 
consists of 11 governmental bodies, such as Foreign Ministry, Interior Ministry, Labour 
 
168 HamidAllah, ‘Collection of political documents of the Prophet and the Caliphate’ (4th ed.) (Annafaes Publisher, Beirut, 
1983), P.59. 
169 Ibid, p.111. 
170 See The Basic System of Governance, supra note 11, articles. 44, 67 – 70. 
171 Muhammed, M, The Legislative Development in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Monchaa, (19770), P. 217. 
172 An interview I conducted with Bureau of Experts at The Council of Ministers on (2016). 
75 
 
Ministry, Finance Ministry, Agriculture Ministry, Industry Ministry, Higher Education 
Ministry, Presidency of the General Intelligence and so on.173 
On the other hand, another committee called the Standing Committee on Combating 
Terrorism (SCCT),174 which is subordinate to the Security State Agency is responsible for SC 
Resolutions in relation to combating terrorism. This body also scrutinizes or acts as oversight 
of the mechanisms for the implementation of these resolutions. It is also responsible for 
cooperating with the states and international and regional organizations, such as the UN, 
including its Security Council Committees and other subgroups of counter-terrorism.175 The 
Permanent Committee is also responsible for the effective implementation of the 
recommendations of the Financial Action Group. 
In fact, there is no precise way to implement UNSC Resolutions in relation to counter-
terrorism. Saudi legislature adopts a flexible approach to the implementation of the Security 
Council Resolutions. The Permanent Committee first examines the SC Resolutions before it 
decides on how to abide by them in accordance to the importance and relevance of each 
resolution. The process of incorporating the SC Resolutions into national laws may require 
different procedures, such as modifying some articles of a certain law, issuing a royal order, or 
recommending that the relevant authorities commit to the resolution. For example, Article 32, 
of the Law of Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing (2013) stipulates that “the 
Standing Committee on combating terrorism at the Ministry of Interior shall put in place 
necessary mechanisms for the implementation of Security Council Resolutions No. 1267 and 
1373 and other related resolutions. Such mechanisms shall be specified pursuant to a decision 
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by the Minister of the Interior”.176 However, the Saudi legislature adopted a different approach 
in relation to the implementation of SC Resolution 2170 (2014), with Paragraph 8 calling upon 
‘all member states to take national measures to suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters 
to, and bring to justice, in accordance with applicable international law, foreign terrorist 
fighters of ISIL, ANF…’  In this regard, the Kingdom has undertaken all necessary measures 
to prevent the flow of fighters to war zones and joining terrorist organizations. One of the most 
important measures was the issuance of the Royal Order in February 2014 which targeted 
members of conflicts area outside the Kingdom, either religious, intellectual groups, or those 
international, regional, or domestic organizations that had been classified as terrorist groups.  
This also includes people who adopt the ideology or principles of these groups. Therefore, it 
should be noted that the Saudi legislature aims at the acceleration of the implementation of the 
SC resolutions having enacted the Law of Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing 
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2.1  Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the concept of Jihad. It starts with the meaning of Jihad and the 
discussions that revolve around its meaning. It then explores the scope and content of this 
concept. An analysis of the use of force and the justifications that are given for the use of force 
are also undertaken. Although the term international law is not known to Islamic jurists, this 
does not mean that the Islamic jurisprudence does not recognise this type of law. The 
international law rules were familiar to this jurisprudence but through a different framework. 
Reference to Jihad has been widely addressed in the context of the relationship between an 
Islamic country and other non-Islamic countries. As-Siyar and Al-Maghazi books are the most 
illustrative books that have been written about the position of Jihad during wars. For this 
reason, this chapter traces the development of the concept of Jihad from the lens of Islamic 
jurisprudence which mainly started at the end of the Umayyad period (750 CE). The chapter 
explains how Islamic jurists have approached the meaning of Jihad. A focus point however will 
be on the main founder of international law in Islam, Ash-Shaibani, author of As-Siyar. 
This chapter focuses on addressing the question of Jihad. For the purposes of this thesis, 
there are three reasons for analysing and discussing the importance of the meaning of Jihad 
First, as previously stated, the examination of the legal strategy of Saudi Arabia is a case study 
in this thesis. The constitutional law in Saudi Arabia is completely based on Islamic laws and 
Jihad constitutes the most controversial part of Islam, as it is one of the main foundations of 
Islam. This term has been exploited by terrorists to justify their actions throughout the world, 
as is the case with Al-Qa’idah and ISIS. Therefore, it is important to elucidate and understand 
the meaning of Jihad, as perceived by Islamic jurists. Second, Islamic law includes domestic 
and international laws. Dr Hussni Jaber opines that Islamic law contains a rule that gives 
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international law precedence over domestic law in the case of a conflict.177 He cited Sura Al-
Anfaal, Verse 72, ‘As to those who believed but came not into exile, ye owe no duty of 
protection to them until they come into exile; but if they seek your aid in religion, it is your 
duty to help them, except against a people with whom ye have a treaty of mutual alliance.’ 
Therefore, the protection of a minority of Muslims who face religious persecution is a duty, 
based on internal Islamic rules. However, in the case of the existence of a treaty that prevents 
Muslims intervening in such a circumstance, then such an international treaty would be 
superior to the internal Islamic rules. Third, there is extreme disagreement between Islamic 
jurists about the exact meaning and scope of Jihad. This state of affairs has raised several 
convoluted issues that remain until now unresolved. The lack of a precise meaning of Jihad has 
pushed many actors to use it to gain specific goals, including political commentators. This 
status quo presents the problems and challenges of the definition of terrorism. The lack of a 
unified definition of Jihad (similarly applicable to terrorism) has allowed those who exploit the 
term to interpret it in an open way. For example, Germany utilised the concept of Jihad during 
the Second World War in a way that served its political agenda.178 The meaning that was given 
to this term by Germany was due to a lack of a precise and coherent meaning of the term which 
means the word Jihad is open to different interpretations.  
       The Arabic connotation and denotation of the word Jihad is ‘struggle’. There is both 
collective and individual notions to its application.179 According to Zawati Hilmi, a Jihad is a 
defensive war waged with the objective of entrenching or ensuring there is equity, justice and 
the protection of basic human rights. Zawati submits that it is misleading to see Jihad as a holy 
war because there is no approximation in any form or way of the equivalency in Islamic legal 
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parlance or discourse pertaining to the concept of Jihad in terms of a group or cooperative 
religious duty, and the Christianity conception of crusade. Therefore, Zawati Hilmi surmises 
that the categorisation of Jihad as a holy war is anomalous, inconsistent and misleading. There 
are also the spiritual and armed conceptualization aspects of the meaning of Jihad. In fact, both 
earlier and contemporary Muslim scholars as well as orientalists and detractors of Islam, have 
focused on the belligerency or bellicosity of Islam and have paid less attention to the social or 
spiritual aspects of Jihad, by all means that there is a spiritual doctrine of Jihad but that the 
thesis talking about Jihad in the sense of military doctrines of Al-Siyar. 
In his seminal work entitled ‘Is Jihad a Just War’, Islamic scholar Hilmi Zawati 
commented on the diversity of views on Jihad. Zawati postulated that a substantial number of 
contemporary scholars have obfuscated the way, manner and types of Jihad. According to 
Hilmi Zawati ‘Al Mawardi highlighted the bifurcation of Jihad into two categories namely: 
wars against apostates and polytheists and wars of public interest. On the other side of the 
spectrum, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya discerned or recognized four types of Jihad namely: the 
struggle against hypocrites, the struggle against non-believers, the struggle against evil and the 
struggle against self. Struggle here is meant to be in ‘the way of God’; or to seek a noble 
purpose or cause. Michael Knapp. opines that for Muslims, the word Jihad has retained its 
military and religious denotation into the contemporary period.180 In Islam, Jihad is founded 
on indispensable goals, judgments, and reasons, without which the term cannot be understood. 
Dr Ahmad Al-Tayeb, Imam and Mufti of Al-Azhar, said that for Allah, Jihad is certainly meant 
for the sake of justice, peace, and security. He added that the war in Islam cannot be for 
expansion, colonization, in the possession of other lands or resources of other peoples, or in 
the trade of peace. Islam as a religion does not seek Jihad for non-lofty aims. Therefore, the 
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word is not meant to allude to holy war. However, Jihad, for Muslims, has been invoked again 
in its military and religious meaning in modern times particularly following the 11 September 
2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, where the term Jihad has 
been widely used in connection with terrorism. Although much has been discussed and talked 
about the term Jihad since the start of Islamic jurisprudence in the late Omayyad period, the 
term is still not well understood by Muslims or non-Muslims. The term Jihad is still seen and 
construed from different perspectives, depending on the society that defines it.   
2.1.1 Terrorism in Islam  
The orientalist construction of Islam and its alleged nexus with violence circulates 
within Western discourses and has impacted both policy makers and the public. In his 
discussion of the ‘Images of Jihad’ (2003),181 Strawson   suggests that the Western media has 
played a significant role in constructing Jihad in a way that plays into the hands of terrorists. 
In addition, Muslims in the West have been forced to be defensive as they attempt to distance 
themselves from Jihad. Strawson argues that these processes disarm policy makers and the 
Muslim community from advancing the classical concept of Jihad as a military doctrine based 
on ethical and legal standards, which is at variance with the actions of Al Qa’idah, ISIS and 
their satellites. Strawson submitted that real adherence to the doctrines of Jihad can be a weapon 
against such terrorism. 
 In addition, Strawson further examined the role of the English media in generating the 
negativity that associates terrorism with Islam.182 The English press has often interpreted 
Islamic laws as being associated with the acts of terror that are occurring internationally. The 
English media has dedicated numerous efforts to tarnishing the religion of Islam using 
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individuals who do not even profess the faith as scholars who are well versed in the study of 
the Islamic religion. Strawson’s postulations present a clear perspective that the Islamic 
religion has no connection with the occurrence of terrorism and terrorist activities. 
2.1.2 Conceptualization of Jihad During the Life of Prophet Muhammad 
The Holy Qur’an condemns all acts of terror, especially those on innocent civilians. 
The connection between terrorism and Islam cannot be traced to the Prophet as the Prophet was 
against violence. Prophet Muhammad was very clear and emphatic on his stand against 
attacking innocent civilians, and the only acts of war he was associated with was when he was 
retaliating against an attack. The role played by the Prophet as a leader is divided into the 
Makkan and the Madinan periods. Through the analysis of Prophet Muhammad’s era, it can be 
noted that there were no laws that indicate that the Prophet advocated for terrorism. The 
terrorist acts that are being connected to Islam have no basis in the Prophet’s teachings, which 
is a factor that will be evaluated in the discussion of the modern era and its version of terrorism. 
There were various justifications of the wars that were conducted during Muhammad’s era. 
 Islamic religious leaders are divided on the definition of Jihad which shows the conflicts 
that arise when the scriptures in the Qur’an are misinterpreted. Jihad, which is a noun that 
means “struggle,” is a religious duty that Islamic followers have in relation to the Muslim 
religion. The concept of Jihad is noted in the Qur’an, which, according to the scriptures, is an 
expression that means “striving in God’s way” (Al-Jihad Fi Sabil Allah). Various Islamic 
leaders have struggled with the interpretation of the term, which may be a factor that has led to 
the conflict between various groups within the Islamic religion.183 The misinterpretation of the 
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concept of Jihad is one of the factors that has led to the conflicts that are arising between the 
people who understand the concept and those who do not. 
 The Qur’an and Hadith are important texts that help in understanding the concepts of 
Islam based on an understanding of the scriptures and the traditions in the text. The concept of 
Jihad can be seen in two different contexts during Prophet Muhammad’s Era. One of the 
concepts of Jihad is the greater Jihad,184 which is the spiritual struggle that individuals have 
within themselves. The Islamic religion, as established by the Prophet, interprets the greater 
Jihad as the struggle that one should lead a righteous life against the temptations that exist in 
the world. Prophet Muhammad identified the major Jihad as the struggle that only includes the 
aspect of being mindful in prayers, charity, and fasting.185 In the greater Jihad concept, Muslims 
are expected to be mindful of others and treat them with justice and kindness as a duty to fulfil 
the criteria of Islamic law.  
 The connotation of lesser Jihad is the armed struggle to protect the faith and defend the 
land and property of Muslims. Based on the Prophet’s interpretation, the lesser Jihad was used 
as a last resort after there had been negotiations of peace between the conflicting parties. The 
concept of Jihad was used defensively and not aggressively, as it may be interpreted in 
contemporary society, especially by suicide bombers.186 In this context, many wars during that 
time were conducted with the intention of defending the property of Islamic groups. Many of 
the Prophet’s followers fought in defense of the Prophet (PBUH) with the objective of 
protecting their families and the property they had acquired for themselves. The justification 
for their actions is grounded and rooted scripturally in the Holy Qur’an 22:39-40, which 
stipulates that permission to fight or defend property that they have acquired is given because 
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of the wrongdoing that has been done unto them, and they shall be given victory by Allah as 
He is the Most Powerful, as they have been ostracized from their homes without any 
wrongdoing, but on the basis of what they believe.187 
 The misinterpretation of the term Jihad has led to conflicts between Muslims and other 
religions in the contemporary world. The misuse, misinterpretation or misconstruing of the 
term, mostly by those who do not understand the concept of Jihad, has connected it with acts 
of terrorism. The strategic interests of various groups have led to the misinterpretation of the 
concept, and the media is not helpful in defending the rights of Muslims, as they present the 
perspectives that certain groups have of the concept. A culture of violence and terrorism has 
haunted and bedevilled the concept of Jihad, which is making some Muslims question and 
jettison their faith based on the perceptions of the world.  
 The interpretation of Jihad during the life of Prophet Muhammad varies with the views 
of contemporary society. The concept of Jihad was introduced in the Madinan period, where 
the Prophet took a more defined role as the spiritual and political leader of the Islamic religion. 
The basic concept of Jihad based on the meanings that were laid out by the Prophet meant that 
the people of Madinah would use the concept to defend their right to worship only when other 
religious groups attacked them. The military struggles of the Prophet were made in an attempt 
to defend the property that the Islamic groups had gained for their families and the religion.188 
The Qur’an in 22:39 shows the concept of Jihad as a sanction of those who had been wronged, 
which was the main concept that was used by the Prophet and his military to defend the wrongs 
made against them. The scripture further ascertains that fighting in Allah’s way is fighting 
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against people who fight against you, but not by beginning hostilities, as Allah does not love 
aggressors. 
 The attacks made against Prophet Muhammad and his followers made him retaliate in 
accordance with the laws, which may have been the cause of the spread of Islam. The constant 
attack of the Makkans on Madinah forced the Prophet to establish a strong army that helped 
defend the religion in all aspects such as worship and property. The Prophet was always willing 
to enter into negotiations if it helped maintain the peace between the Makkans and the 
Madinans. However, soon after the treaties were made, the Makkans broke the treaty and 
resumed their war against Prophet Muhammad. The lesser meaning of Jihad is what is currently 
being misused by misguided Muslims. The lesser Jihad was helpful in assisting the Prophet 
create a foundation of the Islamic religion. 
 There are various misconceptions regarding the methods that the Prophet Muhammad 
used to persuade followers to convert to the Islamic religion. The Prophet had no power to 
forcefully convert people to the religion, a factor that researchers have had conflict with. The 
conversion of people into the religion included an invitation to worship by the Prophet to the 
people, mostly the Makkans, who opposed the practices of Islamic individuals. To ensure that 
peace prevailed over war, the Prophet often engaged in talks with his opponents regarding the 
practices, which only led to war when the Prophet was attacked. 
 In an effort geared towards taking part in the wars that were mostly between the 
Makkans and the Madinans, it was perceived that the people of Madinah had to convert to 
Islam to take part in the wars. It is true to say that most of the wars that were embarked on were 
religious, which meant that the wars were between Islamic believers and those who were not. 
The conversion of people to the Islamic religion could be seen as a strategy that the Prophet 
used.  Taking part in the wars took both physical and mental preparation, which means that the 
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Prophet had to prepare the people for battle using the ways that he knew, which is in accordance 
with the Islamic religion. 
 In contemporary times, the forceful conversion of people to an Islamic faith that 
promotes terrorism instead of defensive wars has affected the way people view the religion.189 
The fact that mendacious religious groups are making people convert to the religion is based 
on the misconceptions that have been created by the religion. There has been a strain between 
the Islamic culture and cultures that do not support violence based on religious grounds.190 
Most acts of terror are linked to the promises that are made to young individuals who are given 
the wrong definition of acts of terror and they are misguided into believing that they are doing 
the right thing. During the era of the Prophet, there is a lack of evidence that shows the leader 
forced people to convert to the religion so as to take part in Jihad and not face judgment. 
 The legacy of Prophet Muhammad should be assessed as to whether he was a 
diplomatic or a dictatorial leader. Acts of diplomacy are one of the attributes that are connected 
to the Prophet. The available literature on the role that the Prophet played in the wars showed 
that his major rivals at the time were the Makkans, who practiced pagan worship. As the leader 
of Madinah, Prophet Muhammad191 instituted rules and laws that protected the rights of the 
Muslim believers and those of other faiths. Violence was only used as a last resort when 
peaceful negotiations failed between Muhammad and his opponents. The leader only turned to 
warfare when he believed there had been a failure in diplomacy. The Prophet believed that by 
conquering the enemies he had made, people would accept a conversion to Islam as a way of 
spreading the religion 
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 The Holy Qur’an does not advocate killing by whatever means, and the only 
justification for committing murder is in the case of repeat offenders of crimes such as rape 
and violence against believers. It should be noted that Islam advocates peace building and non-
violent acts.192 Prophet Muhammad followed the law of the Qur’an to the letter, which may 
mean that the Prophet did not use force in converting the people to the Islamic religion.193 
There are several misconceptions that are associated with Jihad, and terrorist acts are one that 
is currently being fought by believers of the Islamic faith in today’s society. 
 The concept of Jihad during the rule of the Prophet in Madinah can be justified from 
various aspects. Other factors for the justification of the Jihad when Muhammad attacked the 
Makkans were connected to the raids that were made against Prophet Muhammad and the 
Muslims. The Qur’an mentions that the Muslims were driven out from their homes, which 
caused them to fight back against those who attacked them. 
 One of the greatest battles of the time of Prophet Muhammad was the Battle of Badr 
which took place in the year 624.194 Based on its mention in the Qur’an and bibliographies of 
the Prophet Muhammad, the battle changed the perceptions that people had of the Islamic faith. 
The way Muhammad fought the war against the Makkans set the perception that individuals 
have of the Islamic faith.  The Doctrine of Jihad is seen to have originated from the Battle of 
Badr, considered to be the start of the many Jihad wars that were conducted by Islamic 
believers.195 The spread of Islam increased because the Muslim army won the war. From an 
analysis of the battle in the oasis of Badr, there is a clear trend that is evident from the battle 
undertaken. 
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 The attributes of the Battle of Badr have been misinterpreted based on the tactics that 
the Prophet used in fighting against the Makkans. False Islamic believers use the war as a 
mechanism to justify the acts of terrorism that they engaged in, which in the overall sense, 
shapes people’s perceptions of the religion. The concept of taking the loot that was captured 
from the Makkans was a way that the people indicated that they were fighting for Allah. 
Although the war was conducted for a different reason, many of the Jihadists who practice the 
lesser Jihad use the war as a way to justify actions made against people.  
 The crucial factor to note is that Muhammad had already signed a treaty with the people 
of Mecca, which constituted that no acts of violence would take place. The attack that the 
Makkans had planned for Muhammad is what prompted him to gather his army to defend 
themselves. In contemporary society, the battles that have taken place that involve the Islamic 
religion is a factor that has changed people’s perceptions of Jihad.196 The formation of extremist 
Islamic movements has resulted in other religions having a negative perception of the Muslim 
faith. The Battle of Badr changed the perception that other groups had of the Islamic faith, 
leading to war with other groups and conducting acts of terror based on the misinterpretation 
of the facts.197 
2.1.3 The Classical Conceptualization of Jihad  
It is in the classical period that As-Siyar (International law that governs Muslims) was 
developed and later expanded by Islamic jurists in the second century. The book is an important 
part of the literature concerning matters of Jihad because it provides a broader framework for 
this concept of war.198 As-Siyar can be classified as a comprehensive manual of the Law of 
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Islam.199 This law of nations is important to Shariah because of its pragmatic consideration of 
the relations, political or otherwise, with non-Muslims. After some time, the contents of this 
law became obsolete, leading to the need for change. As the changes were made, the new legal 
framework excluded the outdated and irrelevant laws. As-Siyar underwent some change, for 
example, most of earlier writings of Muslim scholars included matters relating to how the spoils 
of war were to be distributed. The legal universe under the As-Siyar was divided into four 
schools of thought referred to as Madhhabs (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali), named after 
the founders of the respective schools. 
The Arab influence on the Islamic religion has led to most Muslim communities 
realizing cultural affinities, despite the maintenance of specific characteristics for each one.200  
Jihad is a culture that is embedded in most Muslims and has been influenced by various socio-
historical contexts.201 The study of Islamic law should involve the Islamic religion without 
separation. Many believe that the three generations after Prophet Muhammad’s death in AD 
632 are the most important when it comes to the development of the Muslim culture and 
religion. This era is called the First Century of Islam. There is, however, much obscurity over 
this period because of the miniscule evidence available.202 The holy war was previously known 
to be a call to give up all things to serve God. One was needed to surrender property, their 
dignity, and even blood. It has, however, evolved over the years and has come to be perceived 
as more of a call in the spiritual sense.203  
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After the September 11 attacks in the US, Islam lay among the most misunderstood 
religions in the world.204 Most people have even associated the religion with terrorism because 
they believe that the people who conducted the attacks were all Muslims. Terrorism has become 
a prevalent occurrence with attacks being carried out by some Islamic extremists with great 
regularity. Such attacks are bound to make issues even more complicated than they already are. 
The attacks that have been occurring have all been claimed to be Jihad. After the 9/11 attacks, 
it was clear that the misunderstanding was more than had been thought, hence, there was a need 
to revisit the doctrine of Jihad and its true meaning under Islamic law.205  
The ideology of classical Jihad has raised doubts on the level of compatibility between evolved 
modern norms and the law that governs the international platform. Saeed argues that Jihad is a 
term most people do not understand and it should not be equated with terrorism.206  Jihad 
against oppression, as described by the Qur’an, defines precautionary war and defenses against 
oppressions and injustices. The classical period, as argued by the author, is an era that focused 
more on the Jihad of war. There is a paucity of evidence or revelation by modern scholars on 
the characteristics of Islamic law in the classical period.207  
       In the 1980s, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a Palestinian Sunni Islamic scholar, articulated a 
doctrine of classical Jihad. This doctrine became a powerful ideological justification for 
Muslims to be privately involved in fellow Muslims’ domestic liberation struggles. This 
doctrine provided a great deal of impetus to Saudi citizens in terms of mobilization and had 
great appeal to Pan-Islamists. It also resonated with theological Jihad orthodoxy. Azzam’s 
stance that participation in Jihad was everyone’s individual responsibility, did not go down 
well with the Ulama (Scholars) who were side-lined, and gave Jihadist’s carte blanche to fight 
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wherever they liked. Thomas Hegghammer submitted that what was initially the strength of 
Saudi Arabia, metamorphosed into their weakness and brought about radicalization.208 
Hegghammer argued that the classical Jihadist of the Saudi movement arguably came to its 
peak based on popular support and numbers around 1989. This period witnessed a reduction in 
the number of Saudis gravitating abroad for Jihad. Hegghammer submits that the retinue of 
Saudis in the movement were committed individuals who had the willingness to sacrifice all 
they had to the nation of Saudi Arabia. Hegghammer posited that Usamah Bin Laden’s global 
Jihadist campaign was not well received in Saudi Arabia, especially by the Wahabis because it 
used violence and extreme tactics.  
2.1.3.1 Islamic Scholars of the Classical Era  
Abu Hanifah 
 Abu Hanifah is one of the founders of the Sunni Schools of Law and stood for what 
was right and was known as very kind-hearted. This Imam had a handful of disciples such as 
Ibn Shaibani who formed the earliest School of Jurisprudence in Islam. The disciples are 
believed to be accurate interpreters of the Qur’an because of the way they re-examined the 
literature and rechecked their findings before accepting them. The jurist’s biggest contribution 
is in relation to the Fiqh, or the jurisprudence of Islam, because he formulated it in a scientific 
way. The Imam’s message was that Islam is merciful and that Allah’s Prophets have been sent 
to close the gaps and enhance intimacy. The Prophets had not been sent to provoke people 
against other people.  
Al-Awzai 
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 This jurist was born in 757 A.D. in Baalbak and died in Beirut in 774 A.D. His beliefs 
were contrary to those of Imam Shafi’l because he believed that Jihad was an individual 
obligation to the Prophet Muhammad. The jurists have been known to disagree with the 
opinions of each other or with the Imams. 
There are four great Imams who are regarded as the founders of the Sunni Islamic 
Jurisprudence also referred to as the Fiqh. These Imams are Malik, Shafi’i, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal 
and Abu Hanifa.  
Ash-Shaibani 
Ash-Shabani was an Imam, referred to as Imam Muhammad Ibn Hassan Ash-Shaibani 
who died in 854 A.D. This jurist was one of the disciples of Imam Abu Hanifah. Ash-Shaibani 
is best known for writing three famous books. One of the books is the Kitab As-Siyar Al-
Saghir, which means “The Shorter Book on International Law”. This jurist had great 
consideration for As-Siyar as the foundation for which the principles of the relationships that 
exist between non-Muslims and Muslims during the period of war. Additionally, this book also 
revealed the kind of relationship that the Muslims should have with apostates, that is, those 
who have decided to abandon the Islamic religion. As-Siyar has come to be recognized as a 
very crucial part of the jurisprudence and law in Islam, thereby making it an important part of 
Shariah Law.209 The book provided a set of rules on the conduct of the soldiers at war during 
the late Umayyad and Abbasid periods. 
Some scholars have interpreted that classical As-Siyar was an advocate for the spread 
of Islam through force as the basic expression of Jihad.210 This interpretation is based on several 
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verses such as 2: 191-194 which states that: Fighting should be done in the name of Allah 
against those who attack but you should not transgress. 
It can be argued that the classical period, especially with assistance from the jurists and 
scholars, permitted the use of force to enforce God’s word and implement the Shariah. The 
scholars further reveal that As-Siyar had been used until Dar-Al-Harb came to be under the 
jurisdiction of Islam. This domain has been argued to be affirming territorial jurisdiction and 
it is understood as the domain of war. Jihad should be a universal obligation. Jahada needs to 
prevail and the true meaning must be encouraged limitlessly. Unless domination occurs, the 
world should be divided in two parts, Dar Al-Islam, which translates to the house of Islam and 
Dar Al-Harb, meaning the ‘House of War’ which constitutes the rest of the world.  
Imam Shafi’i 
Collective and individual Jihad was a major issue in the classical period. This Imam, 
who died in 825 A.D., formed a jurisprudence school in the nation of Egypt.211 Imam Shafi’i 
declared that Jihad was to be conducted as a collective obligation not an individual one. He 
further stated that Jihad was to remain open until such a time when the opposing party 
converted to Islam or paid tribute to the religion. His main message was that the religion of 
Islam was to dominate the others because other religions are void.212  
Ibn Rushd 
      The full name of Ibn Rushd is Abu Al-Walid Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn Rushd, a 
philosopher and a scholar of Islamic law who explored what Jihad meant to some people. In 
the Christian setting, he is referred to as Averroes. This scholar wrote books that he believed 
would help impart skills to a student which would transform them into competent jurists, 
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commonly referred to as the mujtahid. 213Ibn Rushd wrote that scholars agreed that Jihad was 
more of an obligation to the Muslim community to fulfill the scriptures in the Qur’an and not 
an individual obligation. The verse states that: “Fighting has been ordained for you, even if you 
have it”. The philosopher, however, explains that the only condition that needs to be met before 
a declaration of Jihad against unbelievers is a preceding invitation to accept the Islamic 
religion.214 Ibn Rushd revealed that there had been disagreements among some of the classical 
jurists on whether this could be a defensive act, and that it could be used to halt an expansionary 
Jihad. There was a possibility of Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians (commonly referred to as 
the ‘People of the Book’) suing for peace. There was, however, a precondition to the 
declaration, and it involved conversion to the Islamic faith or submission to Muslim authority 
and payment of the jizya tributary tax. The disagreement was that unbelievers should be 
engaged in battle until they converted, while the other group insisted that unbelievers should 
choose between war, the tax or Islam.  
Ibn Taimiyyah 
This jurist is a favourite amongst the Jihadists. The doctrine of Jihad has undergone an 
evolution that goes back to a group of Salafi Jihadists who influenced it with their intellectual 
traditions. One of the group members was Taqi Al-Din Ibn Taimiyyah. Ibn Taimiyyah’s 
perspective, like those of other Salafi Jihadists, was influenced by circumstances of a political 
and secular nature. The jurists believed that those who prevented lawful warfare must be fought 
whereas Ibn Taimiyyah laid emphasis almost fully on defensive Jihad obligations. The jurist 
believed that there was no place for offensive Jihad in Shariah Law, arguing that such an act 
would be considered compulsion, which is a violation of the Qur’anic Prohibition. The Jihadists 
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seemed to be anti-Semitic and anti-American. The mythical idea behind Jihad was the doctrine 
of lex talionis, which applies the principle of ‘an eye for an eye’.215 This perspective led to the 
radicalization of the classical Jihad in the Muslim faith. Some of the ideas that were developed 
by the group of the Salafi Jihadists are that the Islamic religion had been marginalized and 
suppressed. In addition, they believed that Western Countries had the intention of colonizing 
Islamic states by introducing the ideologies of nationalism, socialism, and fake democracy.216  
The jurist believed that Muslims should engage in the fight even if they thought they might be 
killed in the process.217 In most of the statements of Ibn Taimiyyah, it is suggested by Sayyid 
Qutb, that the world is in a state of Jahiliyya. Jahiliyya refers to an era of paganism before the 
existence of Islam while exploring the defiance and ignorance of the period. Qutb suggested 
that a state of jahiliyyah still exists in the contemporary Muslim world, explaining that the 
contemporary world is still in religious and communal decadence. Ibn Taimiyyah argued for 
the Doctrine of Tawhid, which means the Unity of God.  This concept is a consequence of the 
Manichean Doctrine, which is an old notion that abides by dualism. Tawhid states that all 
Muslims need to accept the divine law that distinguishes God’s Party from the party of evil.218   
As indicated by the doctrine, any Muslim who does not use divine law as their source 
of guidance is a part of Jahiliyyah and is no longer part of the Muslim community. Such a state 
meant that the Muslim was now in apostasy or Takfir as referred to in Islam, despite them being 
born Muslims. According to Qutb, the only way this state of Jahiliyyah could be controlled 
was through the formation of a Muslim nation. Ibn Taimiyyah supported the declaration and 
pursuit of war against Muslim governments which he believed had rulers who were not 
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applying the use of legal Muslim codes. His justification for Jihad against other Muslim states 
that had not embraced the use of Islamic codes was that the war would lead to the establishment 
of an Islamic nation that used divine law. The jurist’s Mardin fatwa has been repeatedly used 
by Islamic militants who translated it to mean that they have the right to declare some Muslims 
as infidels, meaning that they could wage war against them. Some scholars argue that the 
jurist’s fatwa was erroneous because it violated some of the Ijmas of Sunni Muslims.219 Qutb 
embraced the doctrines developed by Ibn Taimiyyah. As such, there was violent Jihad against 
non-compliant nations which was allowed under the law.  
This school of thought on the Jihad during the Classical Period revealed that many 
Muslim scholars and leaders lost the meaning of what a Jihad should be in the Islamic religion. 
There had been a rise in the number of Jihadists and groups in contemporary radical Islam that 
showed no tolerance for others in the world. The classical rule of this concept is that it should 
only be allowed if non-Muslims trigger it because Muslims are not allowed to kill others in 
society because they are non-Muslims. The Holy Qur’an supports this, stating “there is no 
compulsion when it comes to religion”.220 They are only allowed to initiate Jihad if they are 
denied their religious freedom, or if they realize that there is an intention of the enemy to attack 
them or they experience oppression. The groups that endorse the wars, modified some of the 
concepts of the classical doctrine of Jihad and made it serve their ideologies of political 
resistance in the Islamic community. The sprouting networks of an international nature that 
have popularized the concept of terrorism and sought to justify suicide attacks against others 
are evidence of this claim. Jihad is a crucial part of the Islamic religion, and despite its 
importance, there have been many misconceptions about what it stands for, leading to the non-
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Muslim community unfairly judging this concept and interpreting it to mean that Muslims are 
violent and extremists. 
2.1.4 Conceptualization of Jihad in the Modern Era  
Muslims have retained the military and religious connotation of the term Jihad in 
modern times. Since the 19th revivalism,221 Jihad has played a role in shaping Islamic reactions 
to movements such as colonialism. Jihad formed a struggle against such expansions through 
different Islamic movements. Some of the movements in the 19th century included the Prince 
Abd Al-Kader Movement in Algeria, Senussi in Libya and the Insurgency Movement led by 
Ahmad Al-Urabi in Egypt. 
2.1.4.1 Islamic Scholars in the Modern Era  
The events of September 11, 2001, have had a significant influence on global opinion 
of Islam in general and the involvement of Saudi Arabia in terrorism.222 Of the19 persons, who 
were responsible for the attack, 15 were Saudi citizens.223 Al-Qa’idah organization was led by 
Usamah Bin Laden who was also Saudi. However, the current global view of Saudi Arabia has 
changed and the view of Saudi extremism has been reduced as Saudi itself was a target of 
several terrorist attacks. As the Islamic State (IS), commonly known as Daish, has recently 
emerged as a terrorist group, which is active in Iraq and Syria, the initial view of Saudi 
extremism has come to the surface again. The current accusation is based on the idea that IS 
represents Wahabism. The matter which helped to link terrorism and Saudi Arabia, occurred 
in the eighteenth century, led by Muhammad Ibn Al-Wahab (1703 - 1792). Wahabism, which 
emerged in the Arabian Peninsula, is one of the most important doctrines.224 The doctrine 
emerged as a response to the situation of Muslims at the time, which had deteriorated in terms 
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of beliefs and habits, such as ‘praying to saints, and believing that saints could guard blessings 
or perform miracles.’225 Unlike Wahabism, Natana J. Delong-Bas argued that the other 
doctrines emerged as a response to external interventions and aggressions, including European 
imperialism and a willingness for political independence during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.226  
It was often believed that Ibn Abd Al-Wahab used Jihad as a tool for proselytization.227  
However, this proved to be untrue as the original writings of Ibn Abd Al-Wahab have made 
clear that da’wah was the standard method that he used to recruit new believers. ‘According to 
his vision, becoming a Muslim was to be the result of an educational process, rather than a one-
time declaration of belief made under the threat of death.’228 His writings also called for a 
restricted Jihad, not an open one. In other words, Ibn Abd Al-Wahab adopted the defensive 
meaning of Jihad that could be only invoked when there is actual aggression directed against 
Muslims.229 He even opined that Jihad should not take on an aggressive character during a 
fight. Therefore, Jihad is not an open principle that is directed against all people and at all 
times.230 He also believed that martyrdom is not glorified as such, and that it is only acceptable 
when a person conducts Jihad with the intention to defend God and God’s community.231 
Martyrdom which is carried out on the basis of achieving personal aims or reward is not initially 
martyrdom.    
During the 19th century, Muslims were under the threat of colonialism and intellectual 
decline. In this period, Jamal al-Din Afghani struggled for the religious and political reform of 
 









Islamic territories.232 The Muslim scholar had an apparent interest in politics and constantly 
attempted to obstruct Western colonialism. The primary concerns for Afghani were liberation, 
unity, and reforms. On the concept of reformation, Afghani advocated for a time-sensitive 
analysis of the Sunnah and Qur’an and reopening Jihad. Regrettably, Muslim society was under 
the threat of moral decay as Afghani observed and recommended a genuine interpretation of 
the Sunnah. Notably, the scholar advocated rekindling the virtues and vices that were once 
characterized by the Ummah to redeem the lost glory of Islam. 
 On the idea of unity, Afghani encouraged a new sense of Muslim solidarity and 
patriotism.233 Notably, the Islamist felt that the Sunni-Shia division was not characteristic of 
Islam and was not harmful to the two distinct groups. On liberation, Afghani opposed Western 
influence and expansion in Islam, as a result he was accused of being anti-colonialist. 
Sovereignty and independence were essential according to Afghani, which inspired his 
thoughts on liberation. Afghani adopted the conservative expression of Jihad to counter the 
Western invasion of Muslim societies.234 This Muslim scholar believed that Islamic unity and 
solidarity would resist such a movement. Notably, Afghani was not in support of spreading 
Islam by force because he was more concerned with doing things diplomatically. 
There are a significant number of Qur’anic verses and traditions of the Prophet 
Muhammad that restrict a call for Jihad to situations of transgression and persecution by the 
opponents. In addition, it is evident that the wars fought by the Prophet Muhammad were 
peaceful and therefore defensive in nature. The verse that is primarily quoted to highlight the 
defensive nature of the Jihad is in the second chapter of the Qur’an, specifically verse 2:190, 
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which urges Muslims to fight in accordance with Allah’s way, to fight but not to transgress the 
limits because Allah does not love those who stray.235   
 The exponents of an offensive Jihad pay considerable attention to chapter nine of the 
Qur’an which posits that after the expiration of the sacred months, those who associate others 
with Allah and His Divinity should be slain, seized or besieged. However, if they are repentant, 
pay Zakah and pray, they should be left alone.236 
Associations affiliated with Islam such as the Europe’s Federation of Islamic Organizations 
have condemned terrorism aggressively and stated that its linkage to all terror activities to 
Muslims as unjustified. Saudi Arabia’s fight against terrorism is evident through the donations 
the country has been making to fight extremists. In 2014, Saudi Arabia gave the United Nations 
$100 million to counter terrorism.237 An article in the Saudi Gazette highlighted the view of 
the Kingdom that terrorism is a grave challenge facing the international community and 
fighting it requires the efforts of people globally.238 
In short, the current understanding of the Islamic religion is not, most of the time, 
moderate, as was the understanding of the majority of Muslims for several centuries, who 
adopted the following Statement of God, who says ‘And likewise we have made you a moderate 
nation’.239  In addition, the Messenger of God said, ‘Beware of extremism in the religion for 
that is what destroyed those before you’. At present, we can see the emergence of many political 
Islamic groups which proclaim themselves to be agents of God on earth and empower 
themselves with the authority of speaking on behalf of the religion. They mainly build their 
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strength on a lack of public rejection of their claims, although the reality of such claims is 
aimed at using the Islamic religion for their political and personal objectives. Accordingly, 
most of these groups have established political parties, as is the situation with the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, which set up the party of Freedom and Justice.240 The Salafist movement 
in Egypt, which set up the party of Al-Nour, the establishment of the Renaissance Movement 
by the Islamic Renaissance Movement in Tunisia, and the establishment of the party of Justice 
and Development by Islamists in Morocco are other examples.241 The common aim of these 
groups is to use the Islamic religion as a tool to reach power. 
Dr Khalid Ad-Dakheel opines that the slogan of ‘Islam is a religion and state’, 
unleashed by the Muslim Brotherhood since its creation, has no religious basis.242 He said that 
this claim is a political slogan, aimed at achieving their goals.243  He believes that their 
acceptance of political activities and civil principles of a civil state, such as the devolution of 
power and separation of powers in Egypt after Hosni Mubarak’s downfall, indicates that they 
abandon the above slogan when the matter is in conflict with their fundamental principles.244  
In light of the foregoing discussion, we distinguish between Islam as a religion, which 
promotes tolerance, peace, and love, and those political Islamist groups which seek to employ 
this religion to achieve their own aims and interests, aiming to reach power. We saw, for 
example, a change in the position of late President Muhammad Morsi on loans. Before he came 
to power, he was opposed to the notion of accepting a loan as he believed it to be forbidden in 
Islam, however, after coming to power, he agreed to accept a loan from the International 
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Monetary Fund to help the country out of its deep economic crisis.245 He even stated that such 
an activity is permissible and is in conformity with the Islamic principles when he was in office. 
These examples indicate that those political Islamist groups lack political maturity and 
experience, which can enable them to lead the public and help them achieve their aspirations. 
It, further, shows how the policy of such groups can radically change according to the aims 
they seek to achieve, even at the cost of compromising with their ideology.  Having examined 
the experiences of these extremist groups, it seems that the depiction of the Islamic world in 
the fifteenth century of the Islamic calendar (Hijri)/21st Century CE, by these groups, to a large 
extent, imitates the status of Europe in 15th Century CE, during the medieval period, where the 
Christian religion was also used as a tool to achieve political aims. Therefore, these groups 
pose a greater threat to Islam and the Muslim World than foreign enemies. 
2.1.5 Legal Literature on Jihad 
The legal literature on Jihad largely focuses on the compatibility of Jihad and international law. 
Specifically, is the use or threat of Jihad in self-defense consistent with modern international 
law as stipulated in the UN Charter?246 
 The first article of the UN charter stipulates that its purpose is to maintain global peace 
and security. Consequently, in their international relations, all member countries have to refrain 
from either threatening or using force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of other states.247 There are two major exceptions to the ban on the use of force in Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter: firstly, where force is authorised or used by the Security Council as 
stipulated in Articles 42-9 and 53 of the Charter; and secondly, where force is used in self-
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defense. Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes the right to self-defense against armed 
incursion indicating that “nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United 
Nations until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security”.248 Therefore, article 2(4) of the UN Charter is able to address the question 
of aggression. In this regard, the concept of Jihad and self-defense under the UN Charter can 
serve a similar purpose. Military Jihad in response to aggression can be exercised in a manner 
consistent with the United Nations Charter. 
 Article 1(3) of the UN Charter stipulates that one of the main purposes of the UN is to 
attain international cooperation in addressing international problems of an economic, cultural, 
social, or humanitarian character and in enhancing and encouraging human rights and respect 
for fundamental freedoms for all without discriminating because of language, religion, sex, or 
race.249 Therefore, respect for human rights is at the center of the UN Charter. These rights 
include the freedom of religion.250 All member countries of the Arab League are signatories to 
more than one of the UN human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR).251 Article 18 of the ICCPR emphasizes the right to freedom of 
religion and the fact that no one shall ever be subjected to coercion that would impair their 
freedom to adopt or have a religion or belief of their own choice.252 Peaceful Islamic Jihad, 
which entails the practice, teaching and observance of religion and worship in a peaceful 
manner is consistent with the Qur’an`s ban of “compulsion in religion” and respect for other 
religions.253 Modern instruments of human rights in Muslim countries safeguard freedom of 
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religion. Certainly, compulsion is inconsistent with religion because religion relies on 
voluntary faith and will, and this would have no meaning if induced through force.254 
Does Jihad as a concept provide a religious justification for indiscriminately attacking 
civilian populations who are not directly involved in hostilities, or does it justify attacks on 
civilian objects in contravention of international humanitarian law and the criminalization of 
terrorism? Under international law, there are two important principles.255 Firstly, the distinction 
principle requires that attacks should only be directed at combatants-civilians who are directly 
involved in hostilities and military targets.256 Secondly, the principle of proportionality bans 
otherwise lawful attacks if the expected civilian loss is not proportionate to the expected direct 
military advantage;257 and it is unlawful to employ means and methods of warfare that are 
unselective, that is, it cannot target particular military objects.258 Over the recent past, Jihad 
has been employed by non-state actors such as Al-Qa’idah and Ash-Shabab to justify attacks 
on civilian populations and civilian objects, and in justifying the use of force in fighting the 
“far” enemy (the United States and its Western allies,) and “near” enemy (Arab governments 
that are, in the view of Jihadists, pawns of the U.S.).259 Is the violence against civilians and 
civilian objects by extremist groups such as Al-Qa’idah and Ash-Shabab compatible with 
Shariah? No, these indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations contravene several principles 
derived from the Qur’an such as “kind and just treatment”,260 proportionality,261 humanity, 
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justice,262 and fraternity.263 Targeting civilians contravenes the standard of “just” and “kind” 
treatment of non-combatants as stipulated in the following passage from the Qur’an: “Allah 
does not forbid you to deal justly and kindly with those who fought not against you on account 
of religion nor drove you out of your homes. Verily, Allah loves those who are just.”264  Killing 
and causing bodily harm to civilians fails the test of ‘just and kind’ treatment. In fact, during 
Prophet Muhammad`s era, the application of force (jus ad bellum) was primarily in self-defense 
and was controlled by numerous humanitarian rules that regulated the conduct of hostilities 
(jus in bello). Specifically, violence against women, the elderly, the sick, children, clerics, and 
places of worship was prohibited.265 These limitations are consistent with the law of armed 
conflict and international humanitarian law. Based on these limitations, the indiscriminate 
killing of civilians is regarded as a crime against humanity in the Qur’an. 
2.1.6 Overlap between the Concept of Jihad and the Concept of Terrorism 
 Misunderstandings have always existed, particularly in the non-Muslim world, about 
the concept of Jihad. In the recent past, Jihad has been equated with terrorism, and both 
concepts have been interpreted to mean the same thing. This false narrative has been amplified 
by multi-faceted wars against terror, which involves the media as well as the war front.  It is 
true that Jihad and terrorism have some common characteristics such as death and other forms 
of collateral damage. Nonetheless, there is a significant difference between the two concepts. 
Jihad is mainly meant for the reformation of harmful trends and societal development, whereas 
terrorism results in destruction and damage to the entire fabric of society. Terrorism entails the 
carefully planned perpetration of crimes against humanity which include the mental and 
physical torture of non-combatant civilians as well as soldiers, the destruction of private and 
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public property, and the destruction of military and civil infrastructure to create fear and to 
harass the civilian population. None of these atrocities are part of Jihad. Unlike terrorism, Jihad 
is not initiated for the fulfillment of materialistic objectives and desires. The only objective of 
Jihad is to establish an Islamic social order in line with Allah’s commandments. Jihad is aimed 
at resisting forces that seek to destroy the prosperity and peace of human society. Therefore, it 
is incorrect and misleading to equate acts of terrorism with the concept of Jihad.266  
 Jihad from an original Islamic perspective implies making maximum effort to attain a 
specific objective. It has nothing to do with death, brutality, and the excessive use of force. 
Consequently, Jihad refers to the struggle and effort undertaken in the pursuit of pleasing Allah 
and which is directed at achieving the objectives ordered by Allah Almighty267 (establishing a 
just social and moral order in the world). The major difference between the objectives of 
terrorism and those of Jihad is that under Jihad, the objectives revolve around eliminating social 
evils including but not limited to exploitation, injustice, sedition aggression, and 
lawlessness.268  On the other hand, terrorism promotes these very evils. Therefore, it is evident 
that while Jihad is a virtuous and worthy concept, terrorism is dangerous to humanity. 
Secondly, Jihad is not for man-made objectives and personal gratification of any form, it is 
only launched to achieve the will of Allah. Thirdly, for terrorism, there is no restriction, no 
limit, and no difference between what is innocent and what is not. It is a brutal application of 
pressure tactics, including using arms and torturous methods even against innocent civilians. 
In Islam, such actions are neither permitted in theory, nor tolerated in practice. Under Islamic 
teachings, combat-based Jihad is only permitted as the last resort.269  
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 Based on the foregoing analysis, it is evident that terrorism and Jihad are different in 
terms of their modes of operation. Jihad, being a noble objective, directed at improving and 
bettering human society, does not involve inhuman behviour and is conducted in line with the 
civilized norms of warfare. However, for terrorists, their guiding principle is that “everything 
is fair in love and war”, and as such, they do not believe in respecting human values such as 
equity, justice, moderation, fair play, and respect for the innocent and weak. Certainly, 
terrorism is a cruel crime against humanity and should not be justified regardless of who 
commits it. For terrorists, the end justifies the means; however, for Jihadists, both the means 
and the ends must not only be justified but must also be lawful.  
Given the striking differences between Jihad and terrorism, why is Jihad associated 
more with terrorism than any other concept? Western countries have wrongly presumed that 
Islam, more than any other religion, has a strong motivation or link to violence and terrorist 
activity. One of the main factors that has shaped this perception is the negative depiction of 
Islam by Western media. For instance, when a Christian kills other people, as was the case in 
Australia’s Hoddle Street Massacre, the media did not refer to the perpetrator as a Christian.270 
However, when a Muslim commits the same offense, the media immediately identifies him/her 
as a Muslim perpetrator. This has put Muslims in an awkward position because on many 
occasions, they are expected to defend themselves over these blanket condemnations. Muslim 
communities are continuously accused of committing crimes of which they are oblivious. This 
express discrimination against Muslim populations largely explains why Jihad and by 
extension, Islam and the global Muslim community, has been linked to terrorism. 
Islamic extremism and terrorism are not new things; however, post 9/11 it appeared in 
the public imagination as a new phenomenon. The events of 9/11 were a significant turning 
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point, not just for governments, but also equally for Muslim communities in both the West and 
East, who felt that they were sabotaged and harshly judged. In Western countries such as the 
United States, 9/11 was a signal to governments and their associates that there is a possibility 
of terrorism and Islamic terrorism occurring again on their own soil. Additionally, after 9/11, 
the general perception of Islam in the West shifted from being considered as nothing more than 
a religion like the others, to that of the most dreaded of all religions. The fear of Islam was not 
only a consequence of the 9/11 and other subsequent attacks, but also a result of the religious 
motivations that Islamic terror organizations employ to exonerate their acts of terror. It is 
among the Islamic justifications of terrorism that the concepts of Jihad and Holy War aroused 
the West to the potential link between terrorism and Islam. Of the many Islamic concepts that 
have been applied by extremists such as Bin Laden to absolve Islamic terrorism, the most 
pressing concept that is linked to terrorism is Jihad. There is general confusion as to what Jihad 
implies, even among the Muslims themselves, and whether terrorism is instigated by Jihad. 
Before 9/11, Jihad was rarely heard of in many western countries.271 However, post 9/11, Jihad 
became a household concept but without a singular working definition. As a result, because of 
its ambiguity, people, particularly in western countries, gained their knowledge of Jihad based 
on public explanations by Islamic extremists, where Jihad is depicted as a violent religious 
instruction that allows Muslims to fight infidels through means of war and terrorism. 
Consequently, people in the West have developed a fear of Islam as a religion that recognizes 
terrorism. For the most part, the media has contributed to the linkage of Jihad and terrorism by 
publishing many reports on extremist Muslims declaring holy war (Jihad) against the west and 
its allies. These reports not only guide the people of the West to use the interpretations of Jihad 
provided by Islamic extremists, but it has also resulted in negative judgments of Muslim 
communities. Acts of Jihad are an Islamic affair, and as a result, those who assess any act as to 
 
271 Bjørgo T. ‘Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward:’ (Routledge, 2005), P. 5. 
109 
 
whether it is an act of Jihad or terrorism, including the media, must take into account of the 
original Islamic perspective not just the notions propagated by extremist groups such as Al-










































3.1  Introduction 
The September 11th attacks perpetrated by Al-Qa’idah is the deadliest terrorist attack 
in human history. The attack carried out by 19 Al-Qa’idah suicide bombers, 15 of whom were 
Saudi Arabian citizens, resulted in the demise of over 3000 civilians of 78 different 
nationalities. Records from investigations conducted by law enforcement agencies reveal that 
the Al-Qa’idah militants posed as passengers and used crude weapons to attack the pilot and 
passengers. After this, the hijackers took charge of the airplanes, marking the start of the 
horrific incident. The death toll and the diversity of the people who perished during the attack 
meant that the attack had a global effect, despite it having taken place in the US. Every country 
condemned the attack with the then-US president stating that ‘democracy and freedom were 
under attack.' The attacks affected every sphere of human life leaving a scar on the both the 
affected country and the entire world. 
The events of September 11th, 2001, posed a direct challenge to international order in 
ways rarely experienced before and was seen as a clear threat against international peace and 
security. The significance of 9/11 thus underlines the terrorist threat to international order and 
the major challenges that the international community faces in countering that threat. Terrorist 
attacks that predate 9/11 tended to be confined to bombing buses, tubes, or any public place 
that caused several deaths and civilian casualties. Other types of terrorism included the 
assassination of officials, kidnapping and taking peoples as hostages. Post September 11 events 
witnessed a development in the scale of terrorist acts. Terrorists now are differently organised 
and possess an ambitious ideology. 
For example, terrorists do not necessarily need modern weapons or military aircrafts 
to carry out their attacks. In the events of September 11th, 2001, the terrorists only needed to 
change the track of four civil airplanes to cause considerable damage that attracted the 
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attention of the international community. These attacks are equivalent to the power of the 
military armies of any state. In terms of the targeted buildings (the Pentagon, the White 
House, and the World Trade Centre), these were carefully selected and the acts caused 
international financial damage and civilian causalities 
In fact, the era of post 9/11, as will be shown throughout this chapter, confirms the 
policy of the international community in fighting terrorism. The international community has 
attempted to follow a policy of cooperation in fighting terrorism since the middle of the last 
century. From the 1960s, there was a great deal of cooperation around the development of a 
network of treaties.272 Even before 9/11, the Al-Qa’idah Sanction Committee was created in 
1999 by UNSC Resolution 1267. As will be discussed in this chapter, UNSC Resolutions 1368 
and 1373 are a continuation of this policy. However, the UNSC, through these two resolutions 
has put forth several new policies in the fight against terrorism. First, the new presumption of 
the right to self-defence in the face of a terrorist attack (the implication of Resolution 1368) is 
one of these new policies. Second, the compulsory harmonization of law and policy by member 
states (as stipulated in Resolution 1373). 
This chapter is devoted to studying UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and its 
contents, as many of its formulations are indeterminate and open to interpretation. For example, 
the resolution mentions several acts that are considered terrorism. As states have different 
points of view about which acts are to be considered terrorism, there is much disagreement as 
to what constitutes a terrorist act. Some states might rate the actions of the Palestinians against 
Israel as terrorism, while others might describe them as a resistance to occupation. 
Equally applicable, the resolution states that some organisations also engage in acts of 
terrorism. Again, an organisation that might be classified as a terrorist group by some states 
 




may be viewed differently by other states. For instance, organisations such as ‘Ahrar Ash-
Sham’ in Syria, Hamas in Palestine, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are classified as 
terrorist organisations by several states such as Russia and the US. However, they are viewed 
as non-terrorist organisations by others. Of course, the political interests of those states play a 
fundamental role in determining which acts or organisations are terrorists rather than non-
terrorist. Accordingly, as there is a lack of an internationally agreed definition of terrorism, this 
might open a political floodgate for policy-makers as well as law-makers when applying the 
different definitions as to which acts, or organisations are terrorist. For this reason, the policy-
oriented approach becomes extremely important and relevant to this thesis, as this approach 
also provides a framework for decision-makers to make the best decision when applying a law 
whose rules or articles are quite open to different and various interpretations for a certain 
reason, as is the case with Resolution 1373. Therefore, it is vital to the purpose of this thesis to 
investigate how decision-makers in Saudi Arabia understand international law through 
Resolution 1373 when countering terrorism. This chapter, therefore, examines the scope of this 
resolution and the implications that it raises, such as preventing the financing of terrorism, the 
non-violation of human rights, and cooperation between states in exchanging information to 
combat terrorism.  
3.2  The UNSC Powers 
The Security Council has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.” The framers of the United Nations Charter assumed that the task of the 
organization was to create an international framework that would eliminate “threats to peace, 
breaches of the peace and acts of aggression” between states. Chapter VII of the charter was 
framed as the centre of the system of collective security and gave the Security Council powers 
to take enforcement action against states when international peace and security were 
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endangered.273 Under articles 41 and 42, the Council was given non-forcible measures, such as 
economic and diplomatic sanctions and also forcible measures, originally envisaged to be 
undertaken by armed forces under the command of the United Nations. The latter ambitions 
were never realized due to the Cold War and mandatory powers under Chapter VII were not 
used between 1950 and 1990. The adoption of Resolution 678 in November 1990, which 
authorized states to use any means necessary to end the illegal Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, 
opened a new phase of activity by the Security Council.274 This included recognizing that 
threats to international peace and security also came from terrorist sources. The response to 
September 11th, 2001 has to be seen in this context.  
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter provides that the Security Council can adopt 
two classes of resolutions, recommendations and measures (see Article 39).  Most Security 
Council resolutions are of the former class, recommendations when the Council “calls” on 
members to adopt a particular course of action. They create international obligations, but would 
not lead to legal sanctions if they are not followed. Measures, however, are mandatory and 
member states must conform to them. There has been much debate since the 1990s over the 
scope that the Council has in adopting such measures. The creation of two International 
Criminal Tribunals in the 1990s was regarded by some practitioners and scholars as a novel 
interpretation of non-forcible measures under Article 41.275  In the wake of 9/11, the Council 
went further in expanding the understanding of its powers in the adoption of UNSC Resolution 
1373 which was the first time it had attempted to create a common legal framework to be 
implemented by member states.  
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    This recognition by the Security Council that acts of terrorism are threats to international 
peace and security is now well established and was recorded in the notes of the meeting of the 
five permanent members held in January 1992.276 From the 1990s, the Security Council has 
adopted many resolutions dealing with terrorism, and several are mandatory resolutions. It is 
helpful to review some of these examples so that the modus operandi, post 9/11, can be placed 
in context. 
The first example is the ‘Lockerbie Bombing’ case. In December 1988, Pan American 
Flight 103 which departed from London, England on its way to John F. Kennedy Airport in 
New York City, was destroyed by a bomb that was planted on the aircraft by a terrorist, or a 
group of terrorists. The bomb exploded only seven minutes after the flight’s departure and 
completely destroyed the plane. Citizens of Lockerbie, Scotland were rained upon by debris 
and what was left of the bodies of the passengers and crew aboard the flight. The total death 
toll included 16 crew members, 243 passengers, and 11 residents of the town of Lockerbie. 
Two Libyan nationals, Abdelbaset Muhammad Ali Al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah, 
were found to be guilty of committing this terrorist attack. Three years later, the two accused 
faced indictments for murder, and conspiracy to murder, by a Grand Jury in the US, and similar 
indictments by the Lord Advocate of Scotland.277  
The US, UK, and France fought to not include the extensive amount of evidence that 
was collected during the three-year investigation when they presented the case before the 
General Assembly and the UN Security Council (UNSC). Two Resolutions, 731 and 748, were 
adopted by the SC in early 1992. Resolution 731 required Libya to respond effectively and 
fully to requests made by the US, UK, and France. However, when this was not forthcoming, 
the Council adopted Resolution 748 which mandated economic and transport sanctions against 
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Libya for non-compliance.  A key feature of this resolution is that it considered a terrorist act 
as a threat to international peace and security. The Libyan government challenged the validity 
of Resolution 731 at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), arguing that the UN Security 
Council had exceeded its powers and interfered with the parties’ rights and obligations under 
the Montreal Convention of 1971. Libya asserted that it fully complied with Articles 1, 5 and 
7 of the Convention. Libya stated that there was no extradition treaty between its government 
and the other parties, and that accused offenders would have to be prosecuted by the Libyan 
State, in conformance with the Convention. Libya contended that the US and the UK were 
rejecting its efforts to resolve the matter within the framework of international law, by 
disregarding the Montreal Convention. The ICJ took the view that the Security Council was 
acting within its powers as article 103 of the Charter expressly provided that:  
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, 
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail. 
As a consequence, Libya was denied the provisional measures it sought.278 The case, 
thus confirmed that the Security Council possessed wide powers which the Council itself could 
determine. This case should be seen in the context of the re-assertion of Security Council 
activism as a consequence of the end of the Cold War. It is also predictive in dealing with the 
question of terrorism which was to be become an increasing international concern in the new 
political landscape. The case, however, dealt with a different form of terrorism that was to 
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become a threat as the 1990s progressed, as it increasingly became non-state actors that were 
to be the source of violence. 
 Other and particularly relevant examples are the Security Council’s activities over Al-
Qa’idah and the Taliban. In the 1990s, the Council adopted a series of resolutions condemning 
support for terrorism and terrorist acts connected to these two organizations. In 1998, Al-
Qa’idah attacked the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. UNSC Resolution 1189 (1998) 
condemned the attacks and called on states and international institutions to cooperate to 
suppress such breaches of the peace and to bring the perpetrators to justice. The resolution 
recalled the note issued by the President of the Security Council in January 1992 and the 
Council, “expressed its deep concern over acts of international terrorism and emphasized the 
need for the international community to deal effectively with all such criminal acts.”  A year 
later, it adopted UNSC Resolution 1267(1999) which stated:  
Strongly condemning the continuing use of Afghan territory, especially areas controlled 
by the Taliban, for the sheltering and training of terrorists and planning of terrorist acts, 
and reaffirming its conviction that the suppression of international terrorism is essential 
for the maintenance of international peace and security, to deplore the fact that the 
Taliban continued to provide safe haven to Usamah Bin Laden and to allow him and 
others associated with him to operate a network of terrorist training camps from 
Taliban-controlled territory and to use Afghanistan as a base from which to sponsor 
international terrorist operations. 
Acting under Chapter VII the Resolution insisted that the Taliban cease these activities and 
required it to hand over Usamah Bin Laden without further delay to appropriate authorities in 
a country where he has been indicted, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will 
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be returned to such a country, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be arrested 
and effectively brought to justice. 
The Resolution then imposed a ban on all flights to and from Taliban controlled-territory and 
froze its assets. 
 The Security Council adopted 1269 (1999) soon after the last Resolution. This 
Resolution was significant as it anticipated the principles that were to be elaborated in 1373 
two years later, as it emphasized, the necessity to intensify the fight against terrorism at the 
national level and to strengthen, under the auspices of the United Nations, effective 
international cooperation in this field on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and norms of international law, including respect for international humanitarian law 
and human rights. 
This turn to the relationship between international norms and the legal provisions of 
member states was to be monumental. It was to take the shock of September 11th, 2001, and to 
turn that idea into a detailed plan of action.  
Early in the new century, the terrorist attacks continued and were becoming more 
serious and dangerous not only to the states that were targeted, but also to international peace 
and security. The worst terrorist attack perpetrated by Al-Qa’idah was against the USA, when 
the World Trade Centre towers, and the Pentagon were attacked. This event pushed the whole 
world and in particular the UN Security Council to address the growing threat that terrorism 
has started to pose to international order. To this effect, the SC issued Resolution 1368 
immediately after these attacks as a first step to combat terrorism in a more planned and 
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strategic way. This was followed immediately by the issuance of Resolution 1373, which marks 
a new era of combating terrorism where several new policies were finally adopted by the SC.279  
The next document worth discussing in the framework of this study is the UNSC 
Resolution 1368, taking into consideration that this resolution formalizes the initial response 
of the international community to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States (hereinafter 
referred to as UNSC Resolution 1368).280 Notwithstanding the fact that UN Resolution 1368 
is quite brief, it contains important facts concerning the incentives of the United Nations in the 
field of counter-terrorism. 
In an analysis of UNSC Resolution 1368 (2001), it is essential to point out that the 
drafters of the resolution placed a special emphasis on the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations that constitute the basis for the issues raised in the framework of 
UNSC Resolution 1368. Furthermore, in the preamble, the drafters of UNSC Resolution 1368 
recognize the intrinsic right to both collective and individual self-defence under the provisions 
of the United Nations Charter. This implies that the right to individual and collective self-
defence is considered by the drafters as a legal basis for elaborating a response in the framework 
of UNSC Resolution 1368. 
To continue, Article 1281 of the UNSC Resolution 1368 strictly and unambiguously 
accuses the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States of being “a threat to international peace 
and security.”282 That is, the drafters of UNSC Resolution 1368 provide two reciprocal 
considerations with regard to the events of September 11th, 2001. First, the 9/11 attacks are 
recognized as acts of international terrorism and second, the 9/11 terrorist acts are considered 
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a threat to international peace and security. It can be presumed that this recognition of the 9/11 
terrorist acts as a threat to international peace and security is not incidental as by doing so, the 
drafters of UNSC Resolution 1368 intend to justify and legitimize the subsequent military 
measures taken in response to the 9/11 attacks in accordance with the UN Charter.283  
Furthermore, it is also deemed judicious to analyse Article 3 of UNSC Resolution 1368 
(2001). Thus, in the text of this Article, the drafters accentuate the common responsibility of 
all states to cooperate in an urgent and expeditious manner in order to remedy the existent threat 
by bringing to justice the perpetrators, sponsors and organizers of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In 
other words, the drafters of UNSC Resolution 1368 do not restrict the 9/11 terrorist attacks to 
the U.S. boundaries, but rather impose the responsibility of restoring justice on all countries.284  
Resolution 1368 stresses the obligation of the international community to prevent and 
suppress international terrorism through collaboration and the systematic implementation of 
international counter-terrorist legal instruments, including Security Council resolutions, “in 
particular Resolution 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999.”285  
The resolution ends with a commitment by the Security Council to “express its 
readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, 
and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter 
of the United Nations.” This indicates that there was extensive discussion among the members 
of the Security Council on how to ensure that this objective becomes a clearer program of 
action. 
There are several implications in relation to the adoption of the resolution. Fry’s 
argument that the criminalization of terrorism before and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
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significantly differs is important. According to the author, the 9/11 terrorist attacks have raised 
the collective “abhorrence” of the international community in respect to international 
terrorism.286  
In other words, the researcher aims at showing that the 9/11 terrorist attacks have caused 
the international community to reconsider its strategic paradigm in relation to counter-
terrorism. In this light, UNSC Resolution 1368 may be viewed as both the formal reflection of 
the aforesaid reconsideration and the turning point in the construction of a new anti-terrorist 
doctrine at the international level. 
In the framework of U.S. politics, the new doctrine is frequently known as “the war on 
terrorism.”287  Referring to Young’s theorizing on the evolution of terrorism as a legal concept, 
it is deemed prudent to highlight that the states do not share a common understanding of 
terrorism, especially at the international level. Each state utilizes the definition it can retrieve 
from its domestic legislation. 
3.3  The UNSC Resolution 1373 
UN discussions on the critical importance of a common international approach to 
countering terrorism produced Resolution 1373 (2001) some 17 days after the attacks. It was 
to be a detailed and comprehensive resolution which not only created international obligations, 
but also created a template for national legislation. At the same time, it created an institutional 
framework to monitor compliance with it. 
The resolution consists of a preamble and nine articles. In its preamble, UNSC 
Resolution 1373 (2001) articulates that the resolution is a logical continuation and 
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reaffirmation of preceding UNSC Resolutions, such as Resolution 1269 (1999)288 and 
Resolution 1368 (2001):289 
The Security Council reiterates its Resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999 and 1368 
(2001) of 12 September 2001, and  
Reaffirming also its unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks which took 
place in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001, and 
expressing its determination to prevent all such acts,  
Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of international terrorism, constitute a 
threat to international peace and security,  
Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by 
the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368 (2001),  
Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts. 
The preamble, therefore, sets the scene of the new state of affairs. In particular, it 
reiterates the issue of self-defense. However, what is significant is that this resolution, while 
not undermining the option to use force against terrorist attacks, turns to another response by: 
Calling on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, 
including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant 
international conventions relating to terrorism,  
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Recognizing the need for States to complement international cooperation by taking 
additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their territories through all lawful 
means, the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism. 
The resolution, thus, affirms a two-track approach which sanctions both forcible and 
non-forcible measures at the same time. Put another way, the use of force and international 
criminal law will coexist side by side.  
3.3.1 Article 1 
Article 1 of the Resolution formalizes the intent of all states by obligating them to carry 
out the following functions: 1) to cease and avert the financing of terrorist attacks; 2) to 
recognize the wilful financial facilitation of terrorists by citizens as criminal offenses; c) to 
immediately cease all funding and assets of individuals or legal entities involved in terrorist 
acts; D) to restrain citizens or any persons and organizations from fostering terrorists’ access 
to any financial resources or economic benefits.290 
3.3.1.1 Financing Terrorism 
Article 1 of Resolution 1373 advanced by the Security Council asserts that member 
states ought to pass regulations that curb the financing of terrorism. As part of its strategy to 
prevent the funding of terror, the Security Council proposed the establishment of a joint body 
to oversee the war against terror. This strategy resulted in the creation of the counter-terrorism 
task force in the year 2005.291 Furthermore, Resolution 1373 facilitated the formation of the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global body tasked with abating and fighting the 
financing of terror groups as well as curbing money laundering.292 The FATF Report provides 
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forty recommendations aimed at defining the extent of money laundering and outlawing 
terrorism financing activities. 
3.3.1.2 Criminalizing the Financing of Terrorist Groups 
UNSC Resolution 1373 classifies every form of financial activity geared towards 
facilitating terrorism as being both unrelated offenses as well as a predicate crime to money 
laundering. The resolution establishes the criminalization precedents by the objectives of the 
global conference for the containment of terrorism financing.293 
3.3.1.3 Freezing Financial Assets of Terrorists 
This mandate forms one of the primary obligations of Resolution 1373. UN member 
states have the authorization to instantly freeze assets and funds linked to any terrorist 
organization. Furthermore, the SC resolution requires the application of Article 17 composed 
by the global conference for the containment of the financing of terrorism.294 
3.3.1.4 Preventive Measures for Terrorism Financing 
SC resolution in line with international law bars financial institutions from hosting bank 
accounts with unknown ownership. Also, the resolution makes use of the FATF standards and 
norms as the benchmark for acceptable financial practices. 
3.3.1.5 Institutional Measures to Combat Terrorism Financing 
International organizations such as the Financial Intelligence Unit play a crucial role in 
curtailing terrorism. The unit has the responsibility of collecting, analysing, and publishing 
reports on any dubious financial activities reported by financial institutions.295 
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3.3.1.6 Alternative Money Transfer Systems 
Numerous avenues exist through which funds are transferred across the globe. SC 
Resolution 1373 requires that all governments regulate and provide the requisite oversight on 
these platforms to prevent terrorism financing.296 
3.3.1.7 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
According to Resolution 1373, states ought to oversee and regulate all the activities 
carried out by non-profit organizations. Hence, nations ought to ensure that the legal 
frameworks available provide the required level of protection to prevent the proliferation of 
terrorism through NGOs. Furthermore, the recommendation necessitates the need for nations 
to conduct thorough audits297 on NGOs to identify terror groups posing as legal entities.298  
3.3.1.8 Criminalizing Assistance to Terrorists 
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the term assistance 
pertains to aiding terrorist activities either explicitly or implicitly.299 SC Resolution 1373 
requires all states to outline all activities purported to aid the operations of terrorist 
organizations within their jurisdiction. In line with the legality principle, nations ought to 
provide detailed definitions of all acts considered to be criminal offenses.300 
3.3.2 Article 2 
In addition to this, members of the UN Security Council formalized their will in Article 
2 of UNSC Resolution 1373 to take all the necessary steps and measures in order to prevent 
the furtherance of terrorist acts and terrorists.301 In other words, it is incumbent on the members 
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of the UN Security Council to take an active part in restricting terrorists from having access to 
or benefit from any service that may consequently help them to carry out terrorist acts. 
3.3.2.1 Suppressing Terrorist Recruitment 
Terrorists use recruitment drives as one of the strategies that facilitate their continued 
existence and operationalization. As part of the implementation process of Resolution 1373, 
the Security Council recently passed Resolution 2214 with the aim of curbing terrorist 
recruitment.302 One of the strategies embraced by SC Resolution 1373 involves outlawing 
terrorism recruitment. The illegalization of terrorist recruitment activities makes it difficult for 
terrorist groups to sign up new militants. Furthermore, security apparatus established by nations 
have the mandate of tracking the movement of foreign fighters aspiring to link up with terror 
groups. Foreign fighters form an important source of both manpower and capital hence 
prohibiting their movement plays an important part in fighting terrorism. 
3.3.2.2 Eliminating the Supply of Weapons and Ammunition 
Another mandate of SC Resolution 1373 revolves around limiting terrorists’ access to 
firearms. Resolution 1373 posits that all member states ought to ratify the law against the illegal 
trafficking and manufacture of weapons.303 In regard to weaponry manufacturing, Resolution 
1373 requires the appointment of designated arms manufacturers tasked with the mass 
production of both weapons and ammunition. Furthermore, the UN requires the establishment 
of verification protocols as well as the creation of entities tasked with the audit of weapons. In 
regard to possession, Resolution 1373 prescribes the formulation of laws involving the 
acquisition of arms and ammunition by civilians. This law ought to specify the rules of 
acquisition, licensing of dealers, transportation, tracking, and record keeping of weaponry. 
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Similarly, the resolution provides the requisite framework necessary to regulate the process of 
arms dealing by both brokers and sellers. This regulation pertains to the relevant registration 
and licensing protocols formulated by countries. Lastly, Resolution 1373 compels nations to 
oversee the importation and exportation of weaponry. Regulating the weapons trade plays a 
pivotal role in staving off the arming of terrorists, which adversely affects their operations. The 
United Nations notes that the failure of regional authorities to offer the requisite oversight and 
regulations on the arms trades leads to conflicts and instability. The proliferation of illegal 
firearms into war-torn regions exacerbates conflicts as well as hinders UN peacekeeping 
endeavours.304 
3.3.2.3 Prevention and Deterrence of Terrorist Acts 
Nations react in various ways to impending terror threats and in the case of a real terror 
attack. For instance, the September 11th terror attacks that occurred in New York ushered in a 
new age in the anti-terrorism battle. These terror attacks necessitated the US government to 
take proactive measures rather than reactive measures. As a result, the US Army has, in the 
recent past, attacked the Taliban terrorist group in their Afghanistan background. Also, it 
participated in the Iraq war that led to the capture of Saddam Hussein.305 SC Resolution 1373 
also advocates for the formation of an international intelligence agency tasked with 
coordinating the sharing of vital terrorism information. 
3.3.2.4 Special Criminal Protocols and Safeguards 
UNSC Resolution 1373 does not require the formulation of special investigative and 
prosecution procedures. Instead, it allows for the use of exceptional investigative approaches 
which refers to strategies applied by law enforcement authorities in investigating terrorism 
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threats. However, the UN discourages the use of such techniques as they allow for the 
infringement of fundamental freedoms and rights. Resolution 1373 also sets the foundation that 
facilitates the formulation of witness protection protocols. According to a UNODC report, 
witness protection facilitates the success of various criminal prosecutions and investigations.306 
Due to the immense influence wielded by terrorist groups, there is a need for governments to 
protect witnesses. 
3.3.2.5 International Legal Collaboration 
Legal agreements take the form of bilateral, multilateral, regional, or sub-regional 
agreements. Article 3 of Resolution 1373 calls for the implementation of all the relevant 
protocols and conventions on terrorism. It also requires increased cooperation between states 
in the anti-terrorism battle.  
3.3.2.6 Extradition 
UNSC Resolution 1373 proposes several measures that outlaw the harbouring of 
terrorist dissidents within a certain jurisdiction. It also provides legislative measures to 
facilitate the extradition of terrorists to countries where they face terrorism charges. The 
resolution recommends the criminalization of all activities that propagate terrorism activities 
aimed against another country.307 
3.3.2.7 Joint Legal Assistance 
International legal collaborations involve the partnership and symbiotic functioning of 
law enforcement and judicial agencies between countries. Joint legal aid allows for the 
execution of searches and seizures within another country’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, such 
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partnerships enable the sharing of vital information and evidence that results in the conviction 
of suspected terrorists. Joint legal assistance takes the form of cross-border investigations and 
joint exploratory teams. 
3.3.3 Article 3 
In like manner, Article 3 of UNSC Resolution 1373, stipulates that all States should 
augment their cooperation to speed up and facilitate the exchange of operational information, 
particularly information regarding the movements and actions of terrorists or terrorist 
networks.308 It needs to be highlighted that UNSC Resolution 1373 does not obligate the states 
to cooperate, but calls upon them to do so. 
3.3.3.1 Sharing of Information 
Article 3 of Resolution 1373 calls for member countries to intensify and accelerate the 
sharing of operational information.309 Hence, nations have formed national counter-terrorism 
frameworks that constitute the sharing of intelligence, international cooperation, and 
coordination. Furthermore, the Article promotes the establishment of globally accepted 
institutions such as Interpol to facilitate the worldwide anti-terrorism battle. 
3.3.3.2 Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements 
Sections B, C, and D in Article 3 of Resolution 1373 provide the platform through 
which nations enter into mutually beneficial partnerships. Such partnerships aim at suppressing 
criminal activities that contribute to the war against terror.310 For instance, the joint military 
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incursion into Afghanistan by American and British forces exemplifies the formation of 
partnerships to fight terrorism.311 
3.3.3.3 Measures in Regard to Asylum and Refugees 
Section F of Article 3 of Resolution 1373 aims at ensuring all nations conform to human 
rights treaties.312 Furthermore, all member states need to uphold all the international laws 
before granting asylum or refugee status to an immigrant. Numerous terrorists and militants 
travel to foreign countries posing as refugees. Section G of Article 3 of the Resolution asserts 
that conformity to international laws and treaties ensures that extraditions occur. This provision 
allows for the deportation of facilitators and perpetrators of criminal acts. 
3.3.4 Other Articles 
A series of significant inferences can be made by having recourse to Article 4 of UNSC 
Resolution 1373.313 By taking a closer look at the legal prescriptions of the Article, it is 
apparent that UNSC Resolution 1373 illuminates the linkages between international terrorism 
and other crimes that can be carried out in a global context.314 Thus, the drafters of the 
Resolution appear to be preoccupied with the interconnections between international terrorism 
and other global criminal phenomena, such as transnational organized crime, money 
laundering, illicit drugs, the illegal movement of chemical, nuclear, biological and other 
hazardous materials, and illegal arms-trafficking. 
Article 5 of Resolution 1373 declares that methods, practices, and acts of terrorism 
violate the core principles and purpose of the United Nations.315 Hence, parties guilty of 
planning, inciting, and financing terrorism acts directly intrude upon the primary function of 
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the United Nations. Similarly, Article 6 formulated in line with Rule 28 provides the guidelines 
for the formation of the Security Council Committee.316 The Security Council Committee 
provides the requisite oversight during the enactment of Resolution 1373. In contrast, Article 
7 instructs the Security Council Committee to delegate duties to its members within the first 
month of its formation.317 The Secretary-General of the United Nations provides legal counsel 
during the delegation process. Article 8 of the resolution declares the commitment of the 
Security Council to implement all the aspects of Resolution 1373.318 
The question is why the drafters of UNSC Resolution 1373 underlined the nexus 
between terrorism and other criminal offenses. The answer is that the success and 
implementation ability of terrorist acts depends on other criminal activities that cannot come 
out as terrorism. Therefore, the treatment of other global criminal phenomena is expected to 
help decrease the risk of terrorist attacks.319 
The key legal provisions of UNSC Resolution 1373 have been overviewed, hence, the 
major legal issues brought about by these provisions are now briefly discussed.320 Thus, the 
first significant issue to be inferred from the key legal provisions of UNSC Resolution 1373 is 
the question of the thematic areas that has been put forth as a result of the adoption of the 
Resolution.321  
An analysis of UNSC Resolution 1373 shows that it is possible to discern the following 
major thematic areas: a) effective and efficient mechanisms of international and national 
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counter-terrorism;322 b) effective and efficient means of international cooperation among 
nations in the field of counter-terrorism; c) effective and efficient ways of implementing UNSC 
Resolution 1373 in practice; and d) effective and efficient means of enforcing and observing 
the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001).323  
The major thematic areas of the resolution rest on specific legal provisions.  Thus, the 
first group of laws encircles those regulatory prescriptions that articulate mandatory measures 
against the financing of terrorism.324 The second group of laws embraces those legal statements 
that pertain to an intense fight against terrorism as a criminal phenomenon. Finally, the third 
group of laws dictates a conglomeration of common counter-terrorism measures that are ‘called 
upon’ by the states to bring them to life.325  
One of the possible ways of expanding knowledge on how UNSC Resolution 1373 can 
be instrumental in practical counter-terrorist activities is to explore the causes and 
circumstances under which the resolution was issued. 
To elaborate further, not only the grievous nature of the 9/11 terrorist acts, but also the 
ensuing atmosphere of panic, extreme emotional tension and social perplexity, can be viewed 
as the prerequisites to the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1373. It is considered good judgement 
to agree with Hinojosa-Martinez that post 9/11, social factors had a crucial influence on the 
issuance of UNSC Resolution 1373.326  
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To this end, based on the criteria for the adoption of international legislation, the UN 
Security Council succeeded in enacting Resolution 1373, unanimously.327 A review of the 
history of Resolution 1373 should start with an analysis of the process of negotiation as the key 
procedural step on the road towards the ratification of this Resolution. 
This notwithstanding, it is still possible to infer some implicit knowledge about the 
nature and particularities of the procedural steps taken by the negotiators and drafters of UNSC 
Resolution 1373.328 To start with, it needs to be acknowledged that there is a standard procedure 
of negotiating and drafting resolutions to which the UN Security Council adheres, irrespective 
of the fact that, in the case with UNSC Resolution 1373, the UN Security Council took a 
substantial step back from the general procedure. Thus, UNSC Resolution 1373 exemplifies 
that the procedure of negotiating and drafting resolutions in the framework of the UN Security 
Council has undergone a crucial evolution.329  
In this light, it is necessary to emphasise that none of the previous resolutions of the 
UN Security Council imposed on all member states of the United Nations specific counter-
terrorist obligations and responsibilities. UNSC Resolution 1368 is not an exception. 
Thus, prior to September 11th, 2001, the adoption of UN SC resolutions demonstrated 
a certain pattern, that is, the next resolution repeated and reaffirmed the previous one. However, 
this pattern cannot be traced in the relationship between UNSC Resolutions 1368 and 1373. 
There is no doubt that the two resolutions are connected thematically, both of them being 
directed at the prevention and suppression of international terrorism. Nevertheless, the nature 
of the prescriptions in the two resolutions is substantially different. 
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On the one hand, UNSC Resolution 1368 declares a strong intention to fight 
international terrorism without prescribing any procedural steps in this field. The declaratory 
nature of UNSC Resolution 1368 manifests itself through the following wording: 
“unequivocally condemns”, “expresses”, “calls”, and “decides”.330  On the other hand, UNSC 
Resolution 1373 prescribes specific actions and measures to be taken in order to actualize the 
objectives of counter-terrorism in the global context. The nature of UNSC Resolution 1373 is 
manifested through the following wording: “decides”, “directs”, “notes”, “acting”, “shall”, 
etc.331  
Another important difference between UNSC Resolution 1368 and UNSC Resolution 
1373 originates from the fact that the former merely imposes on states the moral imperative to 
create pressure, whereas, the latter creates two sets of obligations relating to the criminalization 
of international terrorism. In this sense, Fry writes that UNSC Resolution 1373 obligates states 
to enact effective domestic legislation (first obligation) that will criminalize specific acts in 
order to subsequently use domestic law to fight terrorism under the auspices of this resolution 
(second obligation).332  
In fact, UNSC Resolution 1373 has more practicability in terms of counter-terrorism 
because it is instrumental both in prosecuting terrorism globally with the help of the existent 
old means and creating new mechanisms of prosecution. However, Fry admits that the creation 
of criminal laws and the proliferation of prosecutions under the criminal statutes are subject to 
scrutiny and diligent inspection by the international community, “and may be the reason why 
the United Nations has stayed with this piecemeal approach to the criminalization of terrorism 
since 9/11.”333  
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Regardless, UNSC Resolution 1373 should be considered much more progressive 
compared to UNSC Resolution 1368, particularly due to the fact that the former is directed at 
altering the current state of affairs in the domain of international counter-terrorism. It is 
undisputed that UNSC Resolution 1373 provides all states with a very broad discretion on the 
meaning of terrorism, whereas UN Resolution 1368 does not set forth the meaning of terrorism 
at all. Last but not least, it needs to be asserted that, while UNSC Resolution 1368 aims at 
disciplining all states in terms of counter-terrorism, UNSC Resolution 1373 gives specific 
orders to states to take specific measures and steps in the field of counter-terrorism. 
3.4  The Obligatory Nature of the Decision 
The general aspects of the creation and utilization of UNSC Resolution 1373 have been 
discussed; hence, it is vital to explore the specific details of the legal actualization of UNSC 
Resolution 1373 in practice. This question pertains to the status of UNSC Resolution 1373 as 
an international legal decision. In order to provide a clear answer to the aforesaid question, it 
is essential to gain insights into the obligatory legal nature of UNSC Resolution 1373 as an 
international legal instrument. For this purpose, it is suggested that we have recourse to 
Rosand’s study. 
According to Rosand, the obligatory nature of UNSC Resolution 1373 should not be 
questioned or diminished. The author urges that the underlying idea of UNSC Resolution 1373 
is to give birth to uniform obligations for all member states of the United Nations in order to 
prevent and suppress terrorism in a global context.334 Hence, it follows that UNSC Resolution 
1373 does not merely declare or execute the specific counter-terrorist obligations of the 
drafters, but rather creates new obligations which go beyond the existent international counter-
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terrorist protocols and conventions that tend to bind only those countries which have become 
parties to them. 
It is possible to prove the binding nature of UNSC Resolution 1373 through a detailed 
analysis of the factors indicating the mandatory prescriptions of this resolution. In this light, it 
needs to be stated that the most important factor revealing the mandatory nature of UNSC 
Resolution 1373 lies in the fact that it is explicitly prescribed in the text of the resolution that 
this resolution is adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.335  
The mention of Chapter VII in the text of UNSC Resolution 1373 is not accidental. It 
should be clarified that there are two chapters of the Charter of the United Nations which 
directly regulate the functions and powers of the UN Security Council. Thus, Chapter VI of the 
UN Charter regulates that the UN Security Council is empowered to settle all disputes arising 
in the field of international law by peaceful means. On the other hand, Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter clearly articulates that, under specific circumstances, the UN Security Council is 
entrusted to respond to threats and breaches of international law, particularly through the 
concerted action of the entire organization. 
Taking into consideration that UNSC Resolution 1373 has been enacted under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, it is possible to concede that the aforesaid resolution 
is obligatory in nature and has a binding effect not only on members of the UN Security 
Council, but also on all member states of the United Nations. 
In addition to this, the mandatory nature of UNSC Resolution 1373 is manifested in 
other significant provisions of the resolution. Thus, it is extremely important to note that UNSC 
Resolution 1373 gives birth to a counter-terrorism committee of the Security Council 
(hereinafter referred to as the CTC) which consists of all members of the Council. The overall 
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purpose of the CTC is to monitor the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373. This goal 
conveys the impression that UNSC Resolution 1373 is mandatory in nature in terms of 
imposing on all member states of the United Nations a set of obligations and responsibilities 
that are to be supervised by the CTC.336  To sum up, there is no doubt that UNSC Resolution 
1373 is obligatory in nature and has a binding effect not only on its drafters, but also on all 
member states of the United Nations. 
In view of the fact that the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373 is mandatory in 
nature, it obligates sovereign states in accordance with the principles of international law, 
taking into account that the binding nature of the resolution cannot contradict the principles of 
international law. Therefore, in order to better grasp the requisite nature of UNSC Resolution 
1373, it is necessary to shed light on those principles of international law which are triggered 
in the text of the resolution by placing a special emphasis on the principles of international 
cooperation and assistance in the field of international counter-terrorism. 
To start with, it is reasonable to agree with Vermeulen et al., who claim that all 
principles of international cooperation in criminal matters should be categorised into general 
principles and special principles.337 As far as the first group of principles is concerned, 
Vermeulen et al., state that the types of general principles of cooperation are closely related to 
situations of direct cooperation between different countries in the fields of international 
criminal law. In the context of this project, it needs to be construed that the general principle 
of cooperation is dictated by UNSC Resolution 1373 because the resolution manifests itself as 
the current international legal framework which designates the desired point of the future policy 
options in the field of international counter-terrorism. 
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Following the reasoning of Vermeulen et al., it is possible to discern the following 
general principles of cooperation in the domain of international counter-terrorism which 
originate directly from UNSC Resolution 1373: a) the principle of augmented cooperation for 
the purpose of complete implementation of the pertinent international conventions concerning 
terrorism; b) the principle of international cooperation for the purpose of taking additional 
measures to avert and suppress the instances of terrorism in the territories of the member-states; 
c) the principle of intense cooperation on judicial and administrative issues in order to prevent 
the commission of terrorist acts; d) the principle of direct cooperation through the enactment 
of bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements directed at the prevention and 
suppression of terrorist attacks, as well as on taking serious actions against the perpetrators of 
terrorist acts; and e) the principle of increased cooperation and complete implementation of the 
pertinent international protocols and conventions pertaining to terrorism and the UN SC 
Resolutions 1269 and 1368.338  
Apart from the above, it is advisable to extend the aforesaid list of the cooperation 
principles by adding a series of general principles that were identified by Vermeulen et al. The 
authors point out four general cooperation principles that are utilised by sovereign states in 
terms of their cooperation in international criminal matters. 
These principles are as follows: 1) double criminality; 2) horizontalization and 
decentral communication in conjunction with decentral decision-making processes; 3) 
increased stringency in cooperation, which involves consultations and discussions concerning 
consistency issues, consent, grounds for refusal, capacity, deadlines, etc.; and 4) mechanisms 
of correction, including trust-building measures, flanking measures, minimum standards and 
the practical application of the “lex mitior” principle.339  
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Taking into consideration that the aforementioned principles are relevant to any context 
of international cooperation in criminal matters, they are also relevant in the context of the 
applicability and enforceability of UNSC Resolution 1373. As far as the principle of double 
criminality in international cooperation in criminal matters is concerned, it needs to be 
explicated that the effective enforcement of UNSC Resolution 1373 is dependent on the 
concept of double criminality, whereby criminal conduct, namely a terrorist act, is punishable 
in both home and host states.340  
Viewing this principle through the prism of UNSC Resolution 1373, it should be added 
that it is impossible to ensure the effective enforcement of UNSC Resolution 1373 merely by 
means of criminalizing terrorism in one or several countries. The key rationale of the principle 
of double criminalization stems from the rule that the effectiveness of the prosecution of 
terrorism at the international level may be attained only through the identical or similar 
criminalization of terrorist acts in all member states of the United Nations. Certainly, this 
objective is not completely attainable. 
The next principle, the principle of horizontalization, calls for decision making and 
communication to be done at a decentral level instead of central level. This principle implies 
that the effectiveness of UNSC Resolution 1373 will only be fully realised if member states of 
the United Nations cooperate under the principle of decentralization and horizontal decision-
making, whereby each member state takes an equal stance and say in the process of 
criminalization and prosecution of international terrorism. 
In like manner, the third principle of cooperation stipulates that UNSC Resolution 1373 
is a binding document and, therefore, it is incumbent on all member states to fulfil their 
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obligations under the resolution in a stringent and coordinated manner. This implies that a 
member state of the United Nations is not allowed to act differently or discretely.  
The last but not least principle clearly prescribes that genuine cooperation always 
entails additional mechanisms of correction and rehabilitation that are to be triggered in case 
of emergencies and unexpected challenges. In relation to this, the “lex mitior” principle, or in 
other words, the milder law principle, should also be taken into consideration in the 
actualization of UNSC Resolution 1373, when it is inadequate to apply the ex-post-facto 
doctrine to persons guilty of terrorism. 
The SC claims that the obligatory nature of its resolutions and its power to intervene in 
conflict resolution from the same Charter of the UN, in accordance with the Articles, means 
that the UN Security Council does have specific powers and authority to settle the above cases. 
These powers and authority originate from Articles 39, 40, 41 and 103 of the UN Charter. Thus, 
in order to understand how the UN Security Council may address the issues relating to the 
failed implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373, it is essential to analyse the pertinent Articles 
of the UN Charter. To start with, Article 39 of the UN Charter prescribes that it is incumbent 
on the UN Security Council to determine the presence of “any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression.”341  
That is, the UN Charter imposes a very strict and concrete obligation on the UN 
Security Council to inquire into the nature of all global disturbances or incidents in order to 
ascertain whether these disturbances or instances constitute a threat to peace, a breach of peace, 
or an act of aggression.342 It is extremely important to note that Article 39 of the UN Charter 
highlights the duty of the UN Security Charter to address any threat. 
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This implies that the nature or specificity of threat must not be viewed as a justification 
to refrain from determining the existence of a threat. The next important point made by the 
drafters of Article 39 of the UN Charter is that the threat at issue must be directed at peace or 
security.343 A mental note should be made that Article 39 of the UN Charter does not articulate 
on international peace or security. 
Therefore, it is possible to infer that any infringement of peace at any level 
(international, regional, sub-regional, or national) must be examined by the UN Security 
Council in order to verify its menacing nature. Hence, it should be presupposed that a state’s 
failure to implement UNSC Resolution 1373 may be viewed as a threat to peace and security 
in cases when such a failure has led to a terrorist emergency in a country, region, or globally. 
An analysis of the legal provisions of Article 39 of the UN Charter shows that it is 
important to note that this Article refers directly to Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter by 
granting the UN Security Council the power to decide what measure must be taken in case of 
a threat to peace and security.344 However, in contrast to the first part of Article 39, the second 
part of Article 39 describes the restoration of international peace and security. To this end, it 
needs to be clarified that, although the UN Security Council is obliged to determine all threats 
to peace and security at different levels, it is still empowered to decide on the measures 
applicable to the restoration of peace and security exclusively at the international level.345 
Shifting the focus of research to Articles 40 and 41 of the UN Charter, it is well advised to note 
that Article 40 empowers the UN Security Council to call upon any country which fails to 
implement UNSC Resolution 1373 to comply with the provisional measures, “without 
prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned.”346 Furthermore, the last 
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sentence of Article 40 of the UN Charter prescribes that “the Security Council shall duly take 
account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.”347  
The legal wording of this sentence is obscure and overgeneralised because this legal 
provision does not make it possible to understand how the UN Security Council will take into 
account a state’s failure to implement SC Resolution 1373. It is difficult to predict what legal 
consequences will ensue should such a situation arise. At this point, it becomes important to 
take Higgins' theory into account, as it helps states to reach the broadest and most practical 
interpretation of the UNSC Resolution, when it comes to implementing it. This can be 
imagined, for example, if the state, in the given situation, determines what is in the best interests 
of the public, when interpreting the UNSC resolution. On the other hand, Article 41 of the UN 
Charter articulates that the UN Security Council is entitled to make decisions on what 
measures, with the exception of the use of military forces, are to be employed to enforce its 
decisions.348  
In view of the above, it should be emphasised that Article 41 of the UN Charter best 
articulates how UNSC Resolution 1373 can be enforced in case of a state’s failure to implement 
it.349 To be more precise, Article 41 of the UN Charter entitles the UN Security Council to 
apply any possible measure to coerce the enforcement of UNSC Resolution 1373, with the 
exception of the use of force. 
Another important feature of Article 41 of the UN Charter is that the article prescribes 
that the UN Security Council calls upon member states of the United Nations to apply the 
measures directed at the enforcement of UNSC Resolution 1373on the country which has failed 
to implement the aforesaid resolution. Last but not least, Article 41 of the UN Charter specifies 
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exactly what measures may be taken in relation to the countries which have failed to implement 
UNSC Resolution 1373.350 These measures include complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations, and the severance of diplomatic relations. As a result, the world witnessed 
a surge in the number of treaties which were geared towards stemming terrorism and organized 
armed conflicts.351 
Another avenue commonly used by terrorists for funding involves the use of non-
governmental organizations operating within certain jurisdictions. According to a report 
prepared by FATF in 2013, a majority of terror organizations in West Africa made use of NGOs 
to access funding.352 Terrorist groups operating in the Middle East make use of informal 
systems for value transfer to source funding,353 and in regard to illegal trade, terrorism networks 
take part in drug trafficking and smuggling as an avenue for raising revenues. For instance, the 
Taliban and Al-Qa’idah terrorist groups depend on the poppy trade in the region to generate 
income to fund their activities.354 Alternatively, terrorist groups partly rely on contributions 
from their members to fund organizational operations and administrations.355 
3.4.1 The Role of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) in the Commitment of 
States to the Resolution’s Orders 
After the chief principles of international cooperation to counter-terrorism have been 
discussed, it is the right time to focus on the role and function of the CTC in ensuring that all 
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member states of the United Nations are fully committed to the commands and prescriptions 
of UNSC Resolution 1373.356  
An analysis of the legal wording of UNSC Resolution 1373 shows that the CTC is the 
principal mechanism of the implementation of this Resolution in practice. According to 
Rosand, the basic idea underlying the adoption of the CTC is to enable the UN Security 
Council to effectively monitor the states’ efforts to implement UNSC Resolution 1373.357  
For this purpose, the CTC constitutes a “whole” body which consists of all fifteen members of 
the UN Security Council. In another publication, Rosand unveils that the CTC is an offspring 
of the UN Security Council, which has been established to utilise and rationalise the powers of 
the Security Council.358  
In view of the above, it is extremely interesting to note that the CTC is considered 
successful in coercing member states of the United Nations to take adequate steps in the 
implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373. In this sense, Rosand writes that due to the work 
of the CTC, the majority of countries have already undertaken the required measures in 
promoting the international counter-terrorism machinery. 
The same conclusion is made in the publication by Cortright et al., who point out that 
the CTC has succeeded in making most of the states adopt pertinent counter-terrorism 
legislation, augment their border controls, practically participate in terrorism-related 
international treaties, and become proactive fighters against the proliferation and maintenance 
of a safe haven to terrorist perpetrators and their aides.359  
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Further elaborating on the role of the CTC, it may be appropriate to note that the 
practicability of the CTC in terms of international counter-terrorism is dictated by its structure. 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the CTC consists of all members of the UN Security 
Council, while all member states of the United Nations are required to report to the CTC on 
the steps taken in implementing UNSC Resolution 1373. 
The CTC consists of three subcommittees which are empowered to review the reports, 
“with the assistance of a group of experts hired by the UN Secretariat on short-term 
contracts.”360  Also, it is significant to mention that the CTC has ten experts, eight of whom are 
authorised to review the reports provided by member states of the United Nations and two are 
entrusted to coordinate the CTC’s technical assistance program. 
Despite the fact that UNSC Resolution 1373 established the CTC, the text of the 
resolution does not provide insight into the means by which the CTC should utilise its activities. 
It is insufficient to actualise the CTC only through the legal provisions of the resolution, 
because the resolution does not actually provide comprehensive guidance on how the CTC 
should operate and “what role it should play in combating terrorism.”361  
Moreover, Rosand underlines an important feature of the CTC which makes it possible 
to understand the intrinsic role played by this structure. According to Rosand, the CTC acts as 
a mediator seeking to establish a dialogue between the members of the UN Security Council 
and the UN member states on how best to create global capacity in the framework of 
international counter-terrorism. To this end, it is possible to infer that the CTC focuses on the 
promotion of relationships with other organisations in the global, regional and sub-regional 
context.362  
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Scrutinising the existent functions of the CTC, such as its global oversight over the 
implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373 or mediating between the members of the UN 
Security Council and member states of the United Nations, it can be deduced that the CTC is 
not a sanctions committee, nor is it a global prosecutor’s office. Notwithstanding the fact that 
UNSC Resolution 1373 imposes specific uniform requirements and obligations on all member 
states of the United Nations, the CTC adopts an individual approach to every state at issue in 
terms of helping it implement UNSC Resolution 1373, particularly because the CTC is highly 
sensitive of each state’s ability to implement the dictates of UN Resolution 1373 at its highest 
possible speed, taking into account that there is a disparity in the countries’ capacity in this 
respect.363  
In other words, the factor of relativity plays a fundamental role in the CTC’s 
actualisation of its functions. The fact is that the CTC is preoccupied with not making countries 
feel threatened by the provisions of UNSC Resolution 1373. In this vein, Rosand writes that 
the existent imposing requirements reveal that there is significant potential for specific 
countries to experience the menace of threat from the implementation of UNSC Resolution 
1373.364 In this light, the role of the CTC is not to enforce the implementation of the resolution 
on all countries of the world through targeting or condemning individual states, but to focus 
instead on the issues of technical capacity building. 
Furthermore, it needs to be pointed out that dialogue and consensus constitute the two 
major techniques utilised by the CTC in practice. The CTC frequently engages in dialogue with 
all countries which are members of the United Nations, pertaining to the implementation of 
UNSC Resolution 1373 at the national levels. It should be noted that the CTC intends to 
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continue this dialogue as long as it is essential to ensure that every country at issue has taken 
effective measures in relation to all the issues highlighted by the resolution.365  
However, the problem is that UNSC Resolution 1373 prescribes no deadline for the 
implementation of its measures. This implies that the process of ensuring the practical 
actualisation of the resolution by the CTC and member states of the United Nations may not 
result in the desired outcomes. 
Despite this, the CTC makes strenuous efforts to ensure the implementation of UNSC 
Resolution 1373. To this end, the CTC maintains its nonconfrontational approach to achieve 
cooperation with different international, regional, and sub-regional organisations. It is well-
established that the CTC recognises the substantial role and benefits of different organisations 
which may play an important role in battling terrorism at the international level. Therefore, the 
CTC has been proactively and actively engaged in creating and sustaining dialogue with such 
organisations.366  
The reason why the CTC deems it well advised to maintain excellent relationships with 
various international, regional, and sub-regional organisations lies in the fact that these 
organisations are capable of playing a significant role in implementing UNSC Resolution 1373. 
To be more precise, various international, regional, and sub-regional organisations have a real 
potential to provide a regional or local forum of action, interchange, assistance, or 
encouragement. Furthermore, international, regional, and sub-regional organisations can 
actually help the CTC to monitor the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373 in practice. 
As an added benefit, the aforesaid organisations can help promote international support for the 
implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373. 
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In view of the above, it can be said that the CTC’s overall message to various 
international, regional and sub-regional organisations manifests itself in the following: 1) all 
organisations should be determined in fighting against terrorism through advanced mechanisms 
and in conformity with their mandates; 2) the organisations at issue should foster a discussion 
of counter-terrorist measures in order to share best practices and expertise; and 3) it is desirable 
that all organisations at issue elaborate and implement their own counter-terrorism assistance 
plans.367  
In summary, it can be said that the CTC plays a very important role in the 
implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373. Despite this, the CTC is incapable of ensuring the 
comprehensiveness and effectiveness of the actualisation of the resolution’s provisions in 
practice, unless all member states of the UN, in conjunction with relevant international, 
regional, and sub-regional organisations, take an active part in facilitating the CTC’s role. 
3.4.2 The Process of CTC Observation of the Application of UNSC Resolution 1373 and 
the Issue of International Cooperation and the Problem of Non-cooperation of States 
The preceding discussion has made it clear that the CTC plays a key role in the 
supervision of the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373. However, the question is how to 
ensure that the CTC carries out its supervisory and conciliatory functions in accordance with 
UNSC Resolution 1373 and other international instruments. In other words, it is also vital to 
ascertain how the CTC deals with the non-application of UNSC Resolution 1373 by certain 
parties, especially when particular states explicitly refuse to cooperate with the international 
community in the field of counter-terrorism. 
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North Korea is one such problematic state which must be taken into consideration. It is 
undisputed that the United States is the present leader in the field of international counter-
terrorism. The tensions and controversies in the relationship between the United States and 
North Korea are detrimental to the cause of international counter-terrorism. Furthermore, the 
United States is a member of the CTC and thus, its presence in the main supervising body over 
the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373 undermines North Korea’s willingness to follow 
the prescriptions of the resolution. 
There are many reasons for and factors involved in North Korea’s non-cooperation in 
terms of implementing the provisions of UNSC Resolution 1373, but it is incumbent on the 
United States and other members of the UN Security Council to adopt a specific approach to 
North Korea to convince it that the existent strategy of counter-terrorism is universally 
beneficial for all countries. However, it seems that neither the UN Security Council, nor its 
offspring (the CTC), currently utilize a specific approach to North Korea. In relation to this, it 
is useful to refer to Cotton’s publication on the effects of global security issues on North 
Korea’s international position and standpoint.368  
In his article, Cotton states that the US-led anti-terrorist coalition is particularly 
interested in the obstruction or prevention of weapons proliferation.369 The fact is that the so-
called Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is directly applicable to North Korea. This implies 
that the global strategy of weapons non-proliferation primarily targets North Korea. On the 
other hand, the strategy of weapons non-proliferation constitutes one of the cornerstones of the 
contemporary global counter-terrorist strategy. 
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Hence, this results in a very controversial and unpredictable situation wherein the global 
strategy of counter-terrorism calls upon universal cooperation between all countries of the 
world, whereas on the other hand, a significant element of this strategy (the element of weapons 
non-proliferation) is directly applicable against North Korea.370  In other words, the CTC is 
tasked with the problem of ensuring cooperation with North Korea in the domain of counter-
terrorism when part of the global counter-terrorist strategy targets North Korea itself. The 
intrinsic contradiction within the international counter-terrorist strategy has resulted in North 
Korea’s non-cooperation in this domain. In this light, Cotton correctly acknowledges that after 
the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the problem of weapons non-cooperation has become the most 
important global concern.371  
However, on the other hand, the CTC is tasked to ensure the ubiquitous implementation 
of UNSC Resolution 1373, especially through the process of international cooperation between 
states. In this vein, the CTC is actually incapable of ensuring the cooperation of North Korea 
in terms of implementing UNSC Resolution 1373 as long as North Korea remains a target of 
the international non-proliferation strategy. 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, there is a clear contradiction in the international 
counter-terrorist strategy in relation to North Korea. Thus, on the one hand, UNSC Resolution 
1373 requires the total cooperation of all countries concerning the implementation of the 
resolution at the national level, whereas on the other hand, North Korea is inherently non-
cooperative in this field due to the adverse effects of the global weapons non-proliferation 
strategy targeting this country. 
Despite this, the problem of non-cooperation should not be reduced to the situation of 






to ensure collaboration among various states in the field of counter-terrorism. These reasons 
include but are not limited to discrepancies in the countries’ cultures, political views, religious 
issues, personal positions and interests of the political elites, etc. In order to better understand 
the underlying reasons for non-cooperation between various states in terms of bringing the 
provisions of UNSC Resolution 1373 into life, it is essential to explore the situation in different 
countries. 
In relation to cultural diversity, Bianchi and Naqvi state that cultural issues may either 
be facilitative or detrimental to the global efforts of counter-terrorism, highlighting that the 
existence of strong cultural and political linkages may be instrumental in carrying out less 
burdensome action.372 This implies that the more developed the cultural ties between different 
countries, the easier it is to ensure UNSC Resolution 1373 is implemented there, because 
cultural and political ties constitute important prerequisites to the implementation of the 
resolution at the regional level. 
In agreement with Bianchi and Naqvi, Samuel also believes that cultural factors play a 
fundamental role in the promotion of cooperation or non-cooperation in the field of 
international counter-terrorism. Samuel states that the issue of cultural relativism has a serious 
effect on the domain of UN law-making. To put it briefly, it is widely recognized in the 
framework of international law that no legal norm can operate independently within a vacuum, 
but instead manifests itself through particular cultural contexts.373  
Following Samuel’s reasoning, it can be inferred that due to the diversity of cultural 
contexts, there exist unequal, competing and sometimes, contradictory civilizational 
perceptions, interpretations, and expectations of internationally agreed norms, rules, and 
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principles from the side of various countries and international actors. Similar to Samuel, Wyler 
and Papaux point out that cultural influences constitute the prisms through which it is possible 
to measure the degree of cooperation or non-cooperation between various countries, while all 
norms can be viewed from the aforesaid prisms as either univocal or universal.374  
Cultural disparity undoubtedly explains the lack of immediate and uncontroversial 
cooperation between countries in terms of implementing the precepts of UNSC Resolution 
1373. However, the factor of culture is not the only determinant in relation to cooperation and 
non-cooperation in the field of international counter-terrorism. There are others, such as the 
diversity of political views. Williamson writes that political, as well as religious, motivations 
are the driving forces not only for the terrorists but also for the counter-terrorists.375 This 
suggests that different political motives can bring different actions. 
Focusing on the reciprocity between the diversity of political views on the one hand 
and cooperation between countries in the field of counter-terrorism on the other hand, it is 
essential to take into account that different countries pursue different political objectives by 
applying the same provisions of UNSC Resolution 1373.376  
According to Williamson, the formation of political views is frequently shaped by the 
specificities of a political environment. In other words, antidemocratic political regimes may 
give rise to political views which oppose or handicap the implementation of UNSC Resolution 
1373, whereas, democratic political regimes may give rise to political views which advocate 
the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373. Similar controversies can be projected onto the 
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3.5  The Security Council’s Legislative Power 
Wouters and Odermatt state that, as per Article 103 of the UN Charter, should conflict 
arise with regard to the obligations of UN member states outlined in the current Charter and 
those obligations outlined in other international agreements, the obligations in the current UN 
Charter take precedence.377 There has been debate regarding the authenticity of how the SC 
carries out its decisions. The authors also argue that Article 103 allows the SC the power to 
make adaptations to existing international laws. It can also be argued that SC resolutions can 
modify treaties that already exist although obligations that are binding in SC resolutions also 
take precedence over obligations of international law.378 The authors state that the SC should 
not be underestimated when it comes to modifying current international agreements and the 
SC has the power to get rid of, or rewrite any current international law depending on the 
situation. 
Wouters and Odermatt discussed Stefan Talmon’s theories and viewpoints with regard 
to the SC’s power within the legislation. They mention that Talmon provides several examples 
of the SC’s modifications to a treaty or international law principle. One of the more well-known 
examples of this is Resolution 748 which was adopted in 1992. The SC demanded that the 
nationals of Libya be turned over to the United Kingdom and the United States which overruled 
the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation.379 Another example that was introduced by Talmon with regard to modifying 
international law is the situation in which the SC made the decision that the US and the UK 
were the only powers to occupy Iraq, as was decreed through Resolution 1483. 
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It appears that the articles by Talmon, and, Wouters and Odermatt are in agreement in 
relation to the SC’s obligatory nature to be able to override international law. However, Talmon 
argues that Resolution 1483 modifies any current armed conflict with regard to international 
law where the question arises as to whether or not a party occupying power is enough 
motivation for constituting fact-based tests. The opinions of Wouters and Odermatt appear to 
be situated around the ideas of Talmon as his theories are the primary focus in their paper. 
However, with time, the authors’ evolving opinions and positions become more distinct. 
There are many examples showing the legislative power of the SC and its abundant 
capacity to modify or adapt any international law with respect to treaties and obligations 
because of the UN Charter and its binding resolutions. These examples have shown that the SC 
has exercised restraint rather than demonstrating a propensity in the direction of the abolition 
of treaty law. There are very few examples of the SC adapting a treaty regime permanently and 
when it does, it stays to the relevance of already existing obligations internationally. Another 
key example to support this is that of Somalia. The Security Council extended UNCLOS 
provisions to eliminate piracy in Somalia’s territorial waters. However, the SC continues to 
affirm that this applies only to Somalia and does not affect the obligations of other UN member 
states or international law.380 In addition, it stands by the claim that this resolution does not 
claim to establish or develop additional customary international law. Although the UNCLOS 
has been modified as a result of these resolutions, the SC contributed to this only to the extent 
required by the piracy threat in Somalia. Wouters and Odermatt extend an opinion that the SC 
limits itself to only the immediate needs of the situation rather than modifying a treaty 
permanently or dismissing the state’s will. 
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Talmon notes that many writers use the term ‘international legislation’ in a broader 
sense which can be defined as the product and process of consciously making changes or 
additions to national laws.381 This term can also be used to describe the development of 
customary international law, the end of law-making treaties, and the adoption of binding 
decisions that employ international organizations. One of the biggest differences in opinion 
between the authors of these two articles, is Talmon’s discussion of the ad hoc crimes of the 
war tribunal for Rwanda and Yugoslavia. The SC’s resolutions that established these war 
crimes and the UN Compensation Committee-forced obligations on Iraq solidified the Iraq-
Kuwait border, declared the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention to Palestinian 
territories, and imposed economic sanctions which have been defined as legislative acts or 
international legislature in previous literature. However, member states have used these terms 
upon the implementation of Resolutions 1373 and 1540. 
The practice of member states appears to follow Krzystof Skubiszewski (1926-2010), 
former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, who states that the term ‘international legislation’ 
should be defined as law-making which mirrors national legislation. However, the basic 
features of international legislation are constantly being questioned as the literature has yet to 
identify those basic features and international legislation does not necessarily need legislative 
activity on the member states. There is a contradiction though; most resolutions set forth by the 
UN SC which impose sanctions on a country’s economy require some level of legislative 
activity making them applicable to an individual or a group of individuals. The measures seen 
in these resolutions have been aimed towards individuals at not at member states although not 
the primary feature of international legislation.382 However, by the middle of the 1990s, the SC 
developed targeted sanctions aiming its measures towards specific individuals or groups of 
 




individuals that had been identified as the ones posing a threat to peace by primarily using 
travel bans and financial sanctions?383  
Talmon believes that the foundation of international legislature is the abstract, general 
character of those obligations that have been imposed which could potentially be triggered by 
specific events, situations, or conflicts although they are not exclusively restricted to the 
aforementioned. These obligations are worded in neutral language and can be applied to many 
different types of cases and situations. While Resolution 1390 provides specific language, 
Resolution 1373 is more generalized and uses simpler language. Wouters and Odermatt saw 
this slightly differently, however, believing that the language used in Resolution 1373, 
regarding international legislation and the powerful force driving the SC was very specific and 
provided more detail than most other resolutions in the UN Charter.384  
There has been a large amount of debate and questioning of the legislative power of the 
SC with regard to UN SC resolutions and obligations of international law. The establishment 
of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is the most 
primitive example of how the SC uses legislative power. Many writers and people in general 
believed that, as per the ad hoc Tribunal, the SC does in fact have an extensive amount of 
legislative power although Article 42 of the UN Charter prevents the SC from using its power 
as a form of punishment. However, the SC does in fact have this power leading to legislative 
domination over situations related to counter-terrorism. 
Article 42 of the UN Charter385 stated that the Security Council has the authority to take 
action under its own recognizance sea, air, or land forces to regain or maintain international 
peace and security should it feel that Article 41 obligations have been shown to be inadequate. 
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Such action could include blockades, demonstrations, and other means that involve forceful 
missions by way of sea, air, or land. The argumentative debates that have come about 
surrounding the SC and its legislative power to be able to ignore previous resolutions and go 
with what it feels is right at that point in time have been plentiful and quite strenuous. The SC’s 
original purpose was to be the central international organ that was given the great responsibility 
of maintaining international peace and security. Debates date as far back as the situations of 
the travaux preparatoires and the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, and were revived after the Cold 
War when the Security Council started to be more active. Additionally, it was seen as an 
important component in increasing efforts to encourage international relations law. While the 
SC’s legislative power is typically discussed by both Talmon, and Wouters and Odermatt in 
correlation with judicial review, the two areas of discussion are completely separate from one 
another.386  
The main question that has arisen from these debates is whether or not the SC is bound 
by the law or unstoppable and legibus solutus. The answer is simple: the SC is not in any way 
above the law, or at least that statement is part of these debates. Despite its high level of 
excellence in terms of its political character and how it functions, the SC pulls its authority 
from treaties concluded by member states. The best example of the SC’s ability to use its 
legislative power as previously mentioned and which also brought about more significant 
debate is UNSC Resolution 827, which was adopted on May 25, 1993, and was the statute of 
the ICTY. In October 1992, it was brought to the attention of the SC that a substantial number 
of violations of international humanitarian law had been committed by former Yugoslavia. The 
SC passed Resolution 780, requiring the Secretary-General to investigate these violations as 
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per previous resolutions which affirmed that individuals should be held responsible for their 
crimes.387  
By establishing an ad hoc international tribunal, the SC is allowed to persecute those 
who commit criminal acts such as the atrocities of former Yugoslavia, making it consistent 
with the direction of the SC and this resolution. In fact, the Secretary-General proclaimed its 
high-level support for the ICTY to establish a tribunal that would focus on how to manage 
significant breaches of humanitarian law. It was in February 1993, when the Secretary-General 
presented his report to the SC although it was determined that the state of affairs in the former 
Yugoslavia was a threat to international security and peace.388 This led the SC to initiate and 
implement Resolution 827 and an international tribunal which would be used as a deterrent for 
crime, bringing those individuals responsible for committing these crimes to justice and 
restoring international security and peace. 
The ICTY has elaborated extensively on specific crimes that fall under this statute. 
These include the concept of significant breaches, the definition of genocide and the protected 
group within this definition, subjective and objective elements of humanity crimes, and the 
definitions of specific offenses such as extermination, torture, deportation, and slavery. The 
Tribunal’s territorial, personal, and temporal jurisdiction for punishing individuals for these 
crimes appears in Articles 6 and 8 of the Tribunal. These two Articles allow jurisdiction over 
natural citizens who committed crimes after January 1, 1991 in the former Yugoslavia. Even 
though the ICTY and courts on a national level hold jurisdiction over these crimes, the ICTY 
has primary say in requesting national courts to comply with its capabilities and a binding 
 




obligation has been placed on member states as per Article 29 to cooperate with all 
investigations and prosecutions of these individuals.389  
3.6  The Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 
In accordance with UNSC Resolution 1373, the SC is now following a rather 
comprehensive and remedial approach to these events. It seeks, through this resolution, to 
establish an international regime of cooperation between states to counter-terrorism. Thus, the 
response of the SC to terrorism now is collective and based on a planned and calculated 
approach. There is no individual response to every single event of terrorism, as the SC now is 
demanding states to have their own legislation to fight terrorism by endorsing the international 
regime of cooperation. However, the application of this resolution raises several implications. 
These, in turn, raise difficult challenges for the application of this resolution on the national 
levels. 
There are three implications raised by the resolution: 1. intelligence and police 
cooperation; 2. human rights law; and 3. cutting terrorist finance. These three implications also 
raise several problems, such as the international sovereignty and the principle of the non-
intervention in other states’ affairs, and the existence of unified national legislations to counter-
terrorism. The respective implications of Resolution 1373, and the challenges faced by the 
aforementioned implications are discussed in detail in this section of the thesis. 
3.6.1 Human Rights Law and Terrorism 
Section F of Article 3 of Resolution 1373, posits that every member country ought to 
observe the pre-established benchmarks of human rights law before providing asylum.390 
Furthermore, section G of the article asserts that jurisdictions ought to ensure that perpetrators 
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of terrorist acts do not manipulate the refugee status provided for by the resolution.391 These 
two articles provide the basis for the application of human rights statutes as prescribed by the 
United Nations and international law. However, the application of these two provisions of the 
resolution by member nations has come under intense scrutiny in relation to the violation of 
human rights. According to a survey published by the SC in 2011, various nations have 
amended their legislation on terrorism to uphold human rights provisions.392 
Also, these states have empowered their respective judicial systems to tackle terrorism 
threats in a manner that does not refute the human rights standards established by the United 
Nations. Every nation has felt the adverse effects of terrorist attacks in the form of lost human 
capital in the wake of terrorist insurgency in various parts of the world. These continued acts 
of terrorism have had dire consequences for regional stability as well as for human rights in 
many regions. Terrorism attacks directly impact various aspects of human rights such as liberty, 
physical wellness, as well as the ‘right to life’. Consequently, governments have come up with 
stringent legislative measures to counter these effects of terrorism. Despite these measures, 
numerous challenges involving human rights violations exist in regard to the application of 
Resolution 1373. 
3.6.2 Challenges Facing Human Rights 
Human rights law is one of the biggest challenges to that effect. Combating terrorism 
through Resolution 1373 might conflict with human rights law. Upholding every individual’s 
right to life is one of the greatest obstacles in the anti-terrorism war. Every state has the mandate 
to protect and safeguard every person’s right to life regardless of their social standing. These 
rights have very few exceptions. However, the advent of terrorism has adversely affected the 
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right to life in numerous ways. Firstly, terrorist attacks result in many fatalities through 
deliberate killings of hordes of people by terrorists.393 On the other hand, law enforcers, through 
the use of certain judicial precedents, adversely affect an individual’s ‘right to life’ while 
conducting counter-terrorism operations. Both local and international human rights legislations 
ensure that states provide for the safety and well-being of their citizens. 
However, the legislative protocols put in place by some states have gravely undermined 
the right to life as spelled out in UN’s Universal Declaration. In certain circumstances, law 
enforcers make use of ‘targeted killings’ that involve eliminating terrorist suspects rather than 
bringing them to face justice.394 The implementation of legislation that give provisions for 
‘shoot to kill’ directives have dire consequences on the individual’s right to life. According to 
a report by the special rapporteur on arbitrary executions, various states have wholeheartedly 
embraced ‘targeted killings’ as an anti-terrorism tool.395 
According to Article 3 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, 
upholding the right to life of any individual forms the very basis of justice, peace, and freedom 
across the globe.396 However, the continued threat that terrorism has had on humanity has 
necessitated the adoption of more stringent policy measures to counter this constantly evolving 
threat. The adoption of such policy measures that include the use of ‘targeted killings’, pre-
trials, and ‘shoot to kill’ directives by various nations pose a threat to the very foundations of 
Resolution 1373. 
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Human trafficking is also one of the pertinent challenges facing the anti-terrorism war 
in this century. Terrorist groups have increasingly made use of trafficking and kidnapping 
strategies as a way of terrorizing society as well as raising finances for their operations.397 
Terrorists also utilize human trafficking as a recruitment strategy in which they utilize 
kidnapped individuals as suicide bombers or as carriers. In the recent past, terrorist groups such 
as ISIS have utilized human trafficking to recruit foreign militants from the West.398 The ISIS 
has made use of various platforms such as social media to recruit vulnerable minors from 
Europe and North America. ISIS have primarily made use of deceit to lure young school girls 
with the aim of using them as Jihadi wives.399 Human trafficking curtails an individual’s 
freedom by limiting his or her movements, as well as coercing the said individual into carrying 
out particular actions against his or her will.400 The Boko Haram and ISIS are two terrorist 
organizations notorious for human trafficking. In 2015, the Boko Haram abducted and 
committed despicable atrocities to over 200 school girls in the northern localities of Nigeria as 
a ploy to spread fear into the populace.401 The weak legal frameworks put in place in the region 
have enabled the terror group to impose their rule in the border regions of Nigeria and Chad. 
Also, the use of torture in the counter-terrorism movement is one of the ways in which 
universally accepted human rights are contravened. Similarly, state agencies make use of 
torture in the war on terror to extract vital information as well as confessions from 
uncooperative terrorist suspects.402 Despite the legitimacy of the use of torture mechanisms in 
counter-terrorism operations, human rights activists have questioned the morality of using 
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torture to fight terrorism. Despite the constant clamour by human rights activists, numerous 
jurisdictions still uphold the use of torture as a counter-terrorism approach. 
Notwithstanding the existence of freedom, counter-terrorism policies and strategies 
embraced by nations have adversely affected the liberty clause. As a part of counter-terrorism 
measures, nations have permitted pretrial processes such as denial of bail and pretrial detention 
of terrorism suspects.403 Furthermore, a majority of terrorism laws implemented by nations 
deny suspects the right to appeal which represents a violation of an individual’s right to liberty. 
Article 4 of the universally accepted Declaration of Human Rights posits that every 
individual has the right to protection against any form of arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
their liberty.404 Many nations have responded to the ever-growing terrorist threat by 
implementing various policies in line with Resolution 1373. One of the common strategies used 
by governments involves detention.405 
Article 5 of the Declaration of Human Rights forbids any individual to be subjected to 
torture or any form of degrading treatment.406 However, terrorist organizations have embraced 
the use of various torture techniques as a strategy of spreading fear amongst civilians.407 The 
drastic measures being employed by terrorist groups with the aim of continuing their agenda 
as well as countermeasures undertaken by the government continue to pose a serious threat to 
human liberty and freedom. As the anti-terrorism war continues in the 21st century, so do the 
impediments to fundamental human rights of freedom and liberty. 
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Civil strife and uprisings experienced in the Middle East and North Africa have also 
contributed to the deterioration of border controls in the region. The recent civil unrest that 
affected countries in the Middle East has adversely affected peace and stability in the area. The 
civil strife in neighbouring countries has greatly increased the number of asylum seekers 
fleeing war torn countries such as Syria and Yemen. The influx of these asylum seekers to 
Europe has brought significant problems in regard to the effective inspection and screening of 
people entering the peaceful jurisdictions in the Middle East. The high number of refugee 
seekers fleeing conflict zones has heightened the region's susceptibility to proliferation by 
terrorists.408 The spread of terrorist dissidents masquerading as asylum seekers has significantly 
increased the terror threat in European countries and it has become difficult to identify terrorist 
impersonating refugees without undermining their rights. For instance, France recently 
experienced a spate of terrorist attacks in its capital that resulted in 129 fatalities and more than 
350 casualties. The attackers belonging to the ISIL terrorist group had entered the country as 
asylum seekers fleeing the Syrian war.409 Furthermore, the instability affecting the region has 
reduced the capacity of its neighbouring countries to verify the authenticity of travel documents 
issued by asylum seekers from the MENA region. 
This particular implication raises one of the greatest challenges in putting in place the 
requirements of UNSC Resolution 1373. The application of its requirements will be impeded 
by such acts that could amount to a level of human rights violations, as explained above. 
Therefore, due consideration must be given to the balance between the legal requirements of 
Resolution 1373 and the practices of states when considering issues related to human rights. 
3.6.3 Cutting Terrorism Financing 
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Section A of UNSC Resolution 1373, reiterates the need to cut the supply of financial 
support to terrorist organizations as a way of curtailing their operations.410 According to a 
report published by the IMF, there exist various strategic options for jurisdictions wishing to 
formulate the requisite legal framework to curtail terrorism financing.411 The need to block the 
revenue channels used by terrorist groups to spread terrorist acts across the globe first emerged 
during the SC’s general meeting in 1999.412 The advent of terrorist activities as a growing threat 
to world peace directly violated the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. The Security 
Council proposed the adoption of preventive strategies to limit access to financial support by 
terrorist organizations.413 
As a result, the world witnessed a surge in the number of treaties geared towards 
stemming terrorism and organized armed conflicts.414 As part of Resolution 1373, the UN 
Security Council proposed several strategies to aid in the anti-terrorism movement.  Another 
commonly used avenue by terrorists for funding involves the use of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) operating within certain jurisdictions. According to a report prepared by 
FATF in 2013, a majority of terror organizations in West Africa made use of NGOs to access 
funding.415 Terrorist groups operating in the Middle East make use of Informal Value Transfer 
Systems (IVTS) to source funding,416 and in regard to illegal trade, terrorist networks take part 
in drug trafficking and smuggling as a means for raising revenue. For instance, the Taliban and 
Al-Qa’idah terrorist groups depend on the poppy trade in the region to generate income to fund 
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their activities.417 Alternatively, terrorist groups partly rely on contributions from their 
members to fund organizational operations and administration.418 
3.6.4 Challenges in Criminalizing the Funding of Terrorism 
One persistent loophole in the criminalization of terrorism funding involves the use of 
informal systems for transferring money such as Hawala. Many reports have persistently linked 
this informal transfer schemes with the financing of terrorism. For instance, a report published 
in 2002 by the United Nations linked financial transactions between the perpetrators of the 
September 11 attack on the Hawala system.419 The prevalence of Hawala as a financial service 
provider in South Asia and the Middle East has continued to inhibit the criminalization of 
terrorism financing in the region. The informal nature of the monetary transfer networks makes 
them highly vulnerable to be used as a conduit to transfer funds to terrorist groups.  The 
difficulty encountered in regulating informal money transfer systems is one of the challenges 
inhibiting the criminalization of terrorism financing. In an attempt to regulate the informal 
monetary transfer platforms, governments in the Middle East and South Asia have 
implemented policies that legalize the use of such networks.420 
However, the high costs of registration and licensing associated with Hawalas has 
jeopardized the integrity and transparency of the informal money transfer sector.421 The mode 
of operation during transactions makes these informal systems highly susceptible to usage by 
terrorist groups.  Informal systems such as the Hawala and Fei Chien do not necessarily require 
the physical transfer of money from one geographical region to another. Furthermore, the high 
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transaction costs associated with other forms of transfer schemes have only served to increase 
the popularity of the informal monetary transfer sector. The low costs of operations using 
Hawala coupled with the anonymity of the transfers make such transfers a preferred channel 
for facilitating financial aid to terror networks.422 
Section A, of Article 1, of UNSC Resolution 1373, posits that every nation ought to 
limit the accessibility of funding by terrorist networks.423 These provisions of the resolution 
have formed the basis of the terrorism laws being formulated by nations. However, the 
existence of informal monetary transfer systems entrenched in the financial sector of some 
countries continues to create loopholes in the war against terrorism. The existence of informal 
money transfer frameworks promises to continue to be an obstacle in the concerted efforts 
being made by nations to starve terrorist networks of funding. 
Distinguishing between terrorism financing and other forms of money laundering 
activities is one of the many problems facing the criminalization of terrorism financing. One 
of the crucial steps in criminalizing terrorism funding involves distinguishing between money 
laundering and terrorism financing. Financing terrorism activities manifests itself in various 
ways that bear semblance to the methods adopted by international criminal syndicates.424 
Despite the fact that terrorists make use of money laundering techniques, the utilization of this 
illegal method varies in that criminal syndicates use money laundering as a way of legitimizing 
revenues collected. In contrast, terrorist organizations solely use money laundering strategies 
as a way of advancing their terrorism objectives. Despite the effectiveness of the strategy, the 
complexity of the global financial network and the sheer volume of transactions makes the 
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strategy less effective.425 Every financial transaction from any region across the globe triggers 
a ‘money trail’ that enables the details of the specific transaction to be tracked. However, the 
different financial laws adopted by various jurisdictions coupled with confidentiality protocols 
observed in the financial sector lessen the effectiveness of financial monitoring. A report 
published by the Financial Action Task Force provided a set of forty recommendations geared 
towards the eradication of all financial activities that propagate terrorism.426 
Section B, of Resolution 1373, posits that every type of wilful provision of financial 
aid to a terrorist organization, either implicitly or explicitly, constitutes a criminal activity.427 
Criminalizing the provision of financial assistance to terrorist organizations first appeared 
during the international convention held in 1999, aimed at suppressing the growth of terrorist 
groups. The complexity of the global financial system and the advent of globalization has 
continued to limit the effectiveness of anti-terrorism laws adopted by countries since numerous 
transactions occur at an international level curtailing the effectiveness of national laws. 
Freezing the financial assets tied to terrorist organizations is one of the primary 
challenges in the criminalization of terrorism funding. Another widely used scheme in 
curtailing a terrorism network’s access to monetary support involves the freezing of financial 
assets linked to terrorist networks.428 The complexity and ever-changing nature of funding and 
support networks embraced by terror networks makes it difficult to bar such groups from 
accessing funding.429 The sixth recommendation of the Financial Action Task Force mandates 
every nation to develop the necessary legislations to aid in the implementation of financial 
sanctions aimed at terrorist entities. The effective prevention of terrorism activities requires the 
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establishment of a universal criminal justice system tasked with investigating incidents of 
terrorism funding. Various states have fulfilled this requirement by the United Nations by 
developing mechanisms that enable the detection and freezing of funds associated with terrorist 
financing. For instance, the US created the foreign assets control office responsible for 
overseeing the confiscation of financial assets linked to extremist organizations.430 The 
establishment of efficient financial freezing protocols provides a proactive avenue for deterring 
access to funds by terrorist groups. Reliable freezing protocols facilitate one way to fight 
against terrorism by curtailing the sympathizers of terrorist groups from funding their 
operations.431 It also aids in the exposure of terrorist funding money trails that facilitate the 
tracking of terrorist dissidents. Furthermore, this strategy increases the costs of transactions 
incurred by terrorist entities as well as diminishing their scope of operation. 
Section B, of Article One, in Resolution 1373, mandates every member state to instantly 
block access to financial or economic resources associated with terrorists.432 This provision in 
the resolution also extends to individuals suspected of facilitating the spread of terrorism by 
availing funds aimed at propagating terrorism.433 The advent of novel money transfer networks 
such as internet-based transfer networks such as PayPal and the anonymity of the transfers 
makes it difficult to wholly curtail terrorist access to finance. More legislative measures at the 
international level ought to take effect so as to increase the effectiveness of the laws developed 
by member states. 
The sovereignty of nations acts as a major hindrance in the fight against terrorism. The 
varying laws applied in different jurisdictions in relation to terrorism and anti-terrorism laws 
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make it difficult to criminalize the funding of terrorism. However, as highlighted in the third 
section of Chapter One of this thesis, McDougal’s policy-oriented (New Haven) approach to 
international law could aid governments and judiciaries in the fight against terrorism. For 
example, it would be fair for a jurist to consider the difference between a Muslim who indulges 
in terrorism activities and a non-Muslim who is also a terrorist. Although the underlying factor 
is that in the two cases both persons are terrorists, the level of danger that the non-Muslim 
terrorist possess is grave. It is only through the analysis of existing situations as suggested by 
McDougal that a jurist can give fair opinions on these two types of terrorism. It is, therefore, 
worth concluding that McDougal’s policy-oriented approach to international law could aid in 
the fight against terrorism since it has the capability of producing an effective international 
regime of cooperation among states regardless of the existence of varying laws applied in 
different jurisdictions in relation to terrorism.  
Another aspect that obstructs the criminalization of terrorism, revolves around the rapid 
spread of technological advancements.434 The utilization of the Internet framework, as well as 
mobile money transfers, has adversely affected the criminalization of terrorism funding. The 
existence of alternative money transfer channels away from the traditional banking system has 
also increased terrorists’ access to finance.435 The constantly evolving financial sector makes 
it increasingly difficult to link the numerous financial transactions conducted by terrorist 
organizations. Hence, administrations in collaboration with the UN Security Council need to 
put in place measures to curtail the terrorists’ use of technology to access funding. 
In short, the aforementioned challenges in fighting terrorism make it quite difficult to 
produce an effective international regime of cooperation among states. The reason there are 
several challenges in relation to cooperation is that no agreement between nations about the 
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meaning of terrorism neither the meaning of Jihadi terrorism has been realized, which will be 
examined in Chapter 4. Applying Resolution 1373 seems quite challenging in this regard. There 
must be a great deal of cooperation and coordination between nations to produce as much as 
possible a unified or similar legal system to cut the financial support received by terrorist actors. 
3.6.5 Intelligence Sharing and Police Cooperation 
The gathering and dissemination of intelligence between law enforcement agencies 
plays a crucial role in the anti-terrorism war. Intelligence helps in understanding the 
administrative and organizational structure of terrorist organizations. Similarly, intelligence 
facilitates the unravelling of impending terrorist attacks before they occur.436 As a result, 
various nations have entered into agreements and treaties that allow for the exchange of 
sensitive information aimed at fighting terrorism. Intelligence relations between nations such 
as the UK, and the US, exemplify the existence of collaborative efforts against terrorism.437 
NATO is another agency that plays a crucial role in counter-terrorism. NATO has a mandate 
to increase awareness of pre-eminent attacks as well as developing the capacity to counter a 
terror attack. Another form of intelligence sharing manifests itself in the form of issuing travel 
advisories, which are notifications warning of pre-eminent terror attacks and advising people 
against visiting certain regions during certain periods.438 Another facet of the global anti-
terrorism war involves the formation of joint operations between law enforcement agencies 
between nations. Interpol arguably is the largest joint police force operating on a worldwide 
scale. Interpol has the mandate to provide support to law enforcement units within the UN’s 
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jurisdiction.439 Interpol plays a crucial role in offering logistical support in the war against 
terrorist organizations and criminal cartels. 
3.6.6. Challenges of Intelligence and Police Cooperation 
The failure to act upon arrest warrants issued by nations against suspected criminals, as 
well as extradition refusals, is of one of the key challenges facing international police 
cooperation. Political prejudices have often obstructed the execution of arrest warrants as well 
as extraditions that have had adverse effects on the anti-terrorism war.440 Section G, of Article 
3, of Resolution 1373, posits that nations ought to ensure that perpetrators of terror attacks do 
not abuse asylum protocols.441 The United Nations developed a model treaty to facilitate the 
extradition of criminal dissidents from member states. The structure and contents of the 
extradition treaty developed by the secretary general facilitate collaborative efforts between 
nations during extraditions. The treaty stipulates the responsibilities and obligations of the 
involved nations in the event of an extradition.442 The resolution bars any nation from hosting 
any individual or organization that has perpetrated any manner of terrorism against other 
countries. 
Another obstacle hindering international police cooperation and the sharing of 
intelligence involves the issue of law enforcement.  Many states have formulated policies that 
spell out the strategies used in detecting and responding to terror threats. These policies vary 
from one nation to another depending on the preferences and the threat level posed by terrorism 
in specific regions. The varying terrorism legislations adopted by different nations hinder both 
bilateral and multilateral efforts by law enforcement agencies to respond to a terror threat.  
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Despite the fact that the sharing of intelligence between countries has steadily increased in the 
21st century, the varying capacities to establish counter-terrorism units still inhibits 
information sharing. Furthermore, differing political ideologies and the battle for economic 
supremacy between nations still act as a deterrent in law enforcement. 
The resolution depends on sharing intelligence information among states. This, in 
practice, seems difficult and sometimes impossible depending on which states are involved in 
the given event of terrorism. To solve the problem of terrorism or to counter a certain event, 
intelligence information needs to be shared between the given states. But, most of the time this 
does not happen. Therefore, this is a serious challenge.  The cold war which pit Russia against 
the USA is one of the many instances where nations failed to share information. In recent times, 
the US and China have embroiled themselves in a bilateral supremacy battle that has hindered 
the sharing of intelligence between the two powers. Policy differences between nations have 
culminated in tensions and the failure to disseminate multilateral intelligence. After the terror 
attack that hit the US in 2001, China failed to offer full logistic and intelligence support to the 
US in the war against Al-Qa’idah443 and this escalated into full-blown diplomatic tensions 
between the two countries. These diplomatic tensions have greatly inhibited counter-terrorism 
efforts between the two nations through the failure to share information.  The Boston bombing 
atrocity was committed by a person from Chechnya who came from Russia to America, thereby 
implicating Russia in this event, but how can Russia and USA share any intelligence 
information when they do not trust each other?  
In addition to this, there is another problem that constitutes a significant challenge, 
which is, the divergent views of states about what is meant by terrorism on the national and 
international levels. So, what may be considered a non-terrorist act, and therefore, an internal 
 




affair for a state, could be a terrorist act and an international matter as well. The problem of 
Tibet is considered to be an internal affair to China and they view their acts against this country 
as not being terrorism, whilst these have been considered, otherwise, by the international 
community. So, here, we have two problems: one is related to intelligence sharing as China 
will not share information with any state and also the divergent views among states about what 
is meant by terrorism. The same can be applied to the Soviet Union’s (USSR) invasion of 
Afghanistan, where the former considered that their actions were not acts of terrorism, as 
Afghanistan was considered to be a threat to them, whilst the latter considered these actions to 
be crime and acts of terrorism, and that they had the right to defend themselves. 
Also, UNSC Resolution 1373, advocates for the use of collaborative legal assistance as 
a way of promoting counter-terrorism. This form of cooperation involves the formation of a 
joint task force between countries with the aim of facilitating the sharing of intelligence 
information. Such arrangements facilitate searches and seizures within another country’s 
jurisdiction. These collaborative measures also facilitate the execution of judicial duties on a 
global scale. The International Criminal Court based in the Hague exemplifies international 
legal cooperation that culminated in its formation. The court has a mandate to preside over 
cases involving people charged with committing crimes against humanity such as cyber-
terrorism. 
Similarly, religious differences have greatly inhibited information sharing, for example, 
in the Middle East. The diplomatic tension between countries that play a vital role in upholding 
peace as well as fighting terrorism in the region impedes efforts to eliminate the threat of 
terrorism in the area.444 This religious divide has not only impinged on intelligence sharing but 
also police cooperation between the nations. The historical tension between Israel and the 
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Islamic states coupled with civil strife in the Middle East is one of the biggest challenges facing 
the region in its fight against terrorism. 
Article 3, of UNSC Resolution 1373, provides the platform through which international 
cooperation and sharing of information occur. Section A, of Article 3, of Resolution 1373, 
posits that nations ought to find ways of accelerating and intensifying the dissemination of 
intelligence.445 Furthermore, Section B, of Article 3, of Resolution 1373, asserts that the 
sharing of information ought to occur based on domestic and international legislations.446 
However, the historical rivalry between various nations and differing ideologies promises to 
continue acting as a deterrent to intelligence sharing between some of the nations. 
In light of the above challenges, it seems that the application of the resolution is quite 
difficult, in particular the resolution’s approach to respond to terrorism is of international 
character where it seeks international intervention to combat terrorism. In other words, the 
resolution seeks to implement its aims via establishing an international regime of cooperation.  
It is not an individual response that the SC seeks to achieve. It is not, for example, dealing with 
the problem of getting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. It is an international task where states 
are called upon to collectively combat terrorism, in particular, that the resolution aims at 
solving this problem. However, in the course of establishing this international regime, human 
rights, intelligence sharing and police cooperation, and cutting terrorism finance constitute a 
serious impediment. This section sought to pay attention to this important difficulty before 
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4.1  Introduction  
So far, we have examined the international strategy of counter-terrorism through a 
thorough analysis of Resolution 1373. The aim of this study is to draw on the Saudi strategy of 
counter-terrorism and examine the conformity of the Saudi strategy to the international one. In 
order to achieve this end, the thesis now examines the general and legal strategy of counter-
terrorism in Saudi Arabia. This chapter explores how the Saudi authorities have developed 
legal and administrative measures to respond to international, regional, and domestic threats 
and acts of terrorism, and in particular, how the danger of terrorism has dramatically changed 
over the last two decades. The chapter, will describe the national measures taken by the Saudi 
authorities to develop its system of combating terrorism. This is followed by exploring the two 
important responses of the Saudi Government to improve its security and judicial systems to 
fight terrorism. Next, the chapter explores the legal system of counter-terrorism in the 
Kingdom. It analyses some parts of the Law of Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing, 
of 2014 and 2017, which is important to understand the challenges that face the conformity of 
both international and national strategies. 
4.2  Saudi Arabian Strategy of Counter-Terrorism  
The means by which acts of terrorism can be prevented is an important consideration.  
Although these means are carried out outside the criminal law domain in the legal system of 
Saudi Arabia, the failure to apply these means may require this law to intervene. These means 
aim at preventing a terrorist attack before it occurs or reducing their effects after they occur. 
The selection of these means depends on knowing the types of terrorist acts to be prevented 
and identifying the potential techniques that the terrorists may use to achieve their goals. The 
effectiveness of these means depends on the element of surprise. So, it is often said that there 
is a sense of competition between the terrorists who seek to undertake an act of terror and the 
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authorities who seek to prevent them. One of the most important lessons learnt from the 
aftermath of 9/11, was how governments and intelligence agencies need to collaborate and 
prevent acts of terrorism from occurring.  
It should be noted in this regard that the UN has formed commissions and adopted 
several declarations and resolutions, encouraging all states to cooperate with each other to 
prevent acts of terrorism taking place. It also calls upon all states to establish principles of 
criminal justice. The Eighth UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, held in 
1990, recommended action against organized crime and terrorism. The Congress also 
recommended strengthened international cooperation against terrorism.447 In addition, 
Resolution 1373 imposed another obligation on states requiring them to prevent the presence 
of terrorists on their territories.448 It also imposed another obligation on these states to prevent 
those who finance, organize, facilitate or commit acts of terrorism by using the territory of that 
state to commit such acts against other states or against the nationals of these states,449 by, for 
example, rejecting granting refugee status for them. In addition, the resolution asked states to 
control their borders and prevent terrorists crossing it which also requires that travel documents 
are checked to ensure their validity.450 Hence, there are a set of measures that national 
legislatures should follow to prevent the occurrence of the crime of terrorism in pursuance of 
international and national legal obligations.  
As far as the Kingdom is concerned, although the Saudi government has undertaken 
several measures to counter terrorism following the events of September 11th, Al-Qa’idah’s 
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attacks against Saudi citizens and foreigners within the Kingdom in 2003 and 2004 constituted 
a turning point in relation to the Kingdom’s efforts to combat terrorism and its financing.451 
The Kingdom’s policy considers Al-Qa’idah as a serious threat to the ruling regime in the 
Kingdom,452 following the returning of many Saudi people who took part in the Jihadi attacks 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. These incidents have pushed the Saudi government to decisively 
undertake rigorous measures against terrorism and extremism; and to change its then strategy 
of combating terrorism to a more rigorous one, where Saudi Arabia has started to establish a 
totally new strategy to face these threats. The Kingdom has launched a comprehensive 
campaign against terrorism, utilising three critical key areas: men (human resources), money 
(financial control), and mindset (de-radicalization). This is an attempt by the Kingdom to 
implement measures to prevent the occurrence of terrorist acts or to mitigate their severity.453  
The Kingdom has set up a highly sophisticated anti-terror apparatus that has been 
involved in providing training programmes and devoting various units and personnel of the 
Royal Saudi Armed Forces, the Ministry of Interior and other governmental and private entities 
to fight terrorism. In addition, the Kingdom has invested vast amounts to enhance its 
cybersecurity as a response to the development of cyber-attacks by terrorists, and also to fight 
extremist thoughts, which are one of the main causes for the emergence of terrorism in the 
Kingdom. These three concerns underpinning the Saudi strategy of counter-terrorism are 
analysed in the following sections.    
4.2.1 Human Resources Development  
This area of concern focuses on developing and training units and personnel who are 
working in the area of combating terrorism. 
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4.2.1.1 Main Forces 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has started to strengthen its forces by focusing first on 
internal security forces. Several forces have been devoted to fight terrorism. For example, the 
Kingdom’s U.S.-trained Special Operations Force (SOF) specialises in provincial counter-
terrorism and internal security operations. The SOF’s units have recently been involved in 
military operations against Shia Houthi rebels and ISIS in Syria. Several other sub-units of the 
navy and marines were also required to undertake direct tasks, including counter-terrorism, 
hostage rescue, and intelligence-gathering. Due to the increasing threat of terrorism, the Saudi 
government assigned three Special Forces Companies to tackle this threat. As part of the policy 
of cooperation, the U.S. Navy SEALs trained several Royal Saudi Navy and Marines forces in 
fighting terrorism. The Ministry of the Interior’s Special Security Force (SSF) was also 
required to deal with internal security operations, including fighting terrorism, using all 
methods, protecting VIPs at home and abroad, protecting vital installations and facilities, and 
others. Even the conventional forces of Saudi Arabia, such as the Saudi Arabian National 
Guard (SANG) and the Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF) were actively involved in several 
military operations against the ISIS forces in early February 2016 in Syria during airstrikes 
with the U.S.454 
4.2.1.2 Supporting Forces 
Both the SANG and the RSLF are in charge of the defence and safety of the Kingdom 
against any act of aggression, especially in the context of increasing threats in recent years 
either from IS in the north, Houthis in the south or Iran in the Arabian Gulf. The Kingdom has, 
therefore, allocated three military cities, located in strategic locations in the Kingdom, which 
are in charge of an immediate response to any threat of terrorism. There is also a fourth city 
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which is currently under construction. The RSLF can intervene to support any operation against 
terrorist threats. For example, it intervened in the war against IS in Syria and Iraq during the 
US coalition against IS in 2006.455  
Despite several important successes achieved in relation to counter-terrorism in the 
Kingdom through strengthening the capabilities of the police, security and intelligence 
services,456 this does not mean that the Kingdom is safe against possible terrorist attacks in the 
future. The fight against terrorism needs to be dealt with from its roots. Despite the strong 
substructures of Saudi Arabia’s strategy against terrorism, the Kingdom’s boundaries still 
constitute a formidable challenge in this relation. For example, Yemen still constitutes a source 
of concern to the Kingdom. After several terrorists fled to Yemen, Al-Qa’idah’s subdivisions 
in Saudi and Yemen merged under the name of Al-Qa’idah in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), 
aiming to continue their Jihadi activities in the region. This has made Yemen as a base and 
launching pad for this terrorist group to carry out individual attacks against the Kingdom.457 
For example, one of the Saudi citizens belonging to this group was sent to the Kingdom as a 
suicide bomber to kill the then-Defence Minister in August 2009.458 Although the attack failed, 
as David Cook said, according to the Jihadi concept, there is no place for failure. It is therefore 
considered by them to be a delayed success.459  
In relation to the northern boundaries with Iraq, in addition to the Kingdom’s existing 
security precautions, the Kingdom has erected an 821 km security fence (3.4 Billion USD), 
equipped with the latest control devices.460 However, the northern border constitutes a real 
danger, particularly with the existence of IS and other potential groups which have emerged 
 
455 Ibid.  
456 Report to Congressional Requesters, U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi 
Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed. Sep 2009. Pp.18. 
457 Hegghammer, supra n. 14, P.353. 
458 Slackman, M.  ‘Would be Killer Linked to Al Qaeda, Saudi Say’, New York Times, (2009), at 
{https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/29/world/middleeast/29saudi.html]. 
459 David C. ‘Understanding Jihad’ (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
460 Saudi General Directorate of Border Guard, http://fg.gov.sa/. 
182 
 
from it, and in particular the ability of these groups to use heavy weapons that might penetrate 
these security precautions.  
In addition, in the era of globalisation, the question of security becomes more 
challenging to Saudi Arabia’s counter-terrorism strategy. An unstable status in a certain part of 
the world may constitute a threat to stability in any other part of the world. It is an interrelated 
problem. Nowadays, the threats of terrorism have been mutual for all states. There is almost no 
state that is immune from the threats of terrorism. The existence of well-trained personnel is 
still not enough to combat these threats. Against this background, the decision-makers in the 
Kingdom have undertaken a collective approach to combat the threats of terrorism through 
creating universal centres and joining the international and regional coalitions. The Kingdom 
adopted the idea of creating an international centre of counter-terrorism, within the UN 
framework, which resulted in the foundation of the international coalition against the IS, and 
the Arab coalition against Houthis in Yemen. The Kingdom also supported the regional power 
in western Africa, known as G5, strategically and financially, spending nearly 100 million 
dollars. The Kingdom also founded the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition 
(IMCTC), whose headquarters is in Ar-Riyadh to counter terrorism.461   
In fact, it seems that the decision-makers, by adopting a collective approach to combat 
terrorism, have become fully aware of the danger of increasing terrorist organisations, which 
have reorganised to work collectively, as was realised with Al-Qa’idah in Yemen and Saudi 
Arabia. However, combating terrorism in one region may result in its prevalence or growth in 
nearby states, in particular if the latter do not take sufficient action to confront it. For example, 
as a result of the collective military efforts to combat terrorism in Nigeria, the Nigerian 
Government, with the support of allied states, managed to dramatically decrease the threats of 
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terrorism, especially related to Boko Haram, a matter that forced the terrorist organisation to 
lose most of the territory that was under their control. However, terrorism has prevailed in 
nearby countries, such as Cameroon and Niger, the number of victims of terrorism in Niger 
increasing eightfold in 2015 over the previous 15 years as a result of Boko Haram’s expansion. 
In Cameroon, the death rate increased by 4% in 2015, compared to 2014. It was estimated that 
1,081 were killed as the result of Boko Haram’s operations in 2014- 2015.462 In addition, 34 
people were killed as the result of other affiliates of Al-Qa’idah.463 
4.2.2 Cybersecurity 
In addition to the above policy and as terrorist activities have been widely carried out 
through information warfare, the Saudi Arabian government enacted laws against ‘cyber-
crime’ in 2007. For this purpose, the Ministry of Defence created special departments, working 
in both the private and public sectors, whose tasks were to defend the Kingdom against cyber 
threats. Heavy penalties were laid down for anyone involved in cyber related crimes.  
In modern warfare, competition is not limited to the size of the fleet, but how data is 
exploited to increase combat efficiency and maintain progress through cybersecurity. This 
caused the Kingdom to address this issue. However, it seems that the terrorists who have been 
affected by counter-terrorism measures have sought to launch more cyberattacks against the 
Kingdom, making Saudi Arabia the most affected country in the Middle East by cyberattacks. 
This has forced Saudi Arabia to concentrate on the question of cybersecurity. For example, 
under the auspices of Crown Prince Muhammad, an international conference was held in 
Riyadh in 2017 to address the issue of leadership and control under the theme of ‘The Coalition 
Against Terrorism: Strategies and Capabilities’, which aimed to devise scientific solutions and 
recommendations; a better knowledge of strategies and capabilities to combat terrorism; and a 
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mix of counter-terrorism methods, within the frame of developing the concepts of leadership 
and control. The conference resulted in a foundation of a specialised centre of advanced 
leadership and control studies. This centre is considered firstly as a regional one and secondly 
as a universal one.464  
Not satisfied with this, Saudi Arabia also increased its focus on cybersecurity, which 
led to the establishment of The Saudi Federation for Cyber Security and Programming 
(SAFCSP), headed by a minister, to build specialized national capacities, spread the culture of 
cybersecurity and programming, and raise the awareness of Saudi society about the dangers of 
electronic media. The federation also founded the Prince Muhammad bin Salman College for 
Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence and Advanced Technologies, to graduate a professional 
and capable generation in advanced technologies.465 In 2017, the Kingdom also organised an 
international conference on electronic security which addressed the security and electronic 
challenges which impact the Kingdom and the whole region, with an emphasis on finding 
solutions.466  
These efforts resulted in the establishment of the National Cybersecurity Authority 
(NCA), presided over by a minister, and linked directly to the head of state, King Salman Bin 
Abdul-Aziz. This government entity aims to boost the cybersecurity of the Kingdom, 
protecting vital interests and the national security of the Kingdom as well as sensitive 
infrastructure of the state. The authority embraces most of the security departments in the 
Kingdom in one place. It consists of the Head of State Security, the Head of General 
Intelligence, Deputy Minister of Interior, and Deputy Minister of Defence.467 As can be seen 
from this membership, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has made a significant effort in relation 
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to the field of cybersecurity. This is a positive indicator of the capability of the government to 
protect the nation against cyberattacks. 
4.2.3 Extremist Thoughts 
Both Saudi officials and religious leaders realise and agree that ‘intellectual perversion’ 
is one of the most dangerous reasons for the emergence of terrorism.468 It is this deviance, that 
makes terrorists conduct bombings which kill innocent men, women and children. In order to 
fight this menace, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia initiated wide-ranging counter-terrorism 
campaigns. Central to Saudi Arabia’s counter-terrorism endeavours has been the utilization of 
unconventional ‘soft’ measures planned to combat the mental and ideological justifications for 
extremism and terrorism.469 The essential aim of this technique is to fight and engage a deviant 
philosophy that the Saudi Arabian government ascertains is based on a corrupt and degenerate 
understanding of Islam. The driving force for this approach came, to a large extent, from the 
acknowledgment that extremism and terrorism cannot be fought through conventional security 
measures alone. The Kingdom has formulated a strategic plan to combat extremist ideologies 
and intellectual perversion. It starts with a series of educational steps aimed to weaken 
extremist views and prevent the activities of those who support and call for terrorism. The 
development of public education, counselling programmes, review of publications, and other 
steps, were among the measures undertaken in terms of education and re-education. The 
government also reformed the Kingdom’s religious studies curriculum, following a large 
number of accusations that Saudi Arabian schools support hatred and violence. However, the 
Kingdom also paid particular attention to educators and conducted several training programmes 
for teachers to enhance their religious tolerance. In addition to this, officials and religious 
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figures also launched a media campaign as a part of their fight against extremism. This 
approach was supported by the government and religious clerics. Then Minister of Interior, 
Prince Naïf Bin Abdul-Aziz, stated that the achievement of integration requires combining 
efforts, and that the most important part, that of ‘intellectual security’, needs to be taken into 
consideration so as to protect society from extremism and terrorism.  
       Moreover, religious pioneers, such as the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, published a 
number of statements critical of terrorism and extremist thought. Secretary General of the 
Islamic World League also confirmed that terrorism can only be defeated by eliminating the 
extremist ideology that fuels terrorism. He added that it is true that military efforts are critical 
in this relation, however, this technique helps combat terrorism, but does not eliminate it at its 
roots. Terrorism needs to be combatted by eliminating its ideology.470   
Rehabilitation Centre: Muhammad Bin Naïf Counselling Care Centre, established in 
2006, seeks to “re-educate” its beneficiaries by involving them in religious talks and providing 
psychological counselling. The program by and large comprises of one-to-one and group 
sessions between beneficiaries(wrongdoers) and religious scholars, psychiatrists, and 
clinicians, about their convictions. The officials of this program endeavour to convince the 
beneficiaries that their religious legitimization for their activities is based on a 
misunderstanding of Islam. Mental counselling incorporates conventional strategies as well as 
innovative training activities such as art therapy. The program draws intensely on the family 
and tribal relations of the beneficiaries. Family members can visit and phone the centre, and 
reformed beneficiaries are permitted to leave, to go to family occasions such as weddings and 
funerals. Those who finish the program and are regarded to be fit for discharge are given a 
social bolster to help with their reintegration into society, such as counselling, jobs, and 
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stipends. In addition, these social services are expanded to the family and tribes of the 
discharged members, as a means of including the beneficiaries’ wider social network in their 
recovery. The members of the centre take part in the program for 6 to 8 months.471 The Saudi 
government had stated that it bolsters the activities of the Sakinah (or Tranquillity) Campaign, 
which is an independent nongovernmental organization involved in engaging discussions using 
the Internet, with people who have accessed extremist websites.472 Moreover, in 2008, the King 
of Saudi Arabia also began a series of conferences to advance interfaith discourses. The 
primary conference was facilitated by the Muslim World League in Makkah in June 2008 and 
was attended by 500 Muslim researchers from around the world. 
As part of the efforts of engaging with its citizens, the Kingdom, in April 2003, founded 
the King Abdul-Aziz Centre for National Dialogue (KACND). This Centre aims to fight 
extremism, create a modern culture for different sections of the Saudi society, and present the 
true image of Islam. One of the main recommendations that these conferences proposed was 
the call for the rejection of any fatwa made by individuals in relation to issues of national 
interests, such as peace and security. They reaffirmed that these matters must only be tackled 
by qualified official bodies that represent the country. The Government also tracks the illicit, 
immoral, and illegal contents of some websites related to extremism by filtering and monitoring 
them.473  
In addition, the King Abdullah Bin Abdul-Aziz International Centre for Interreligious 
and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID) was established in Vienna. It is ‘an intergovernmental 
organization whose mandate is to promote the use of dialogue globally to prevent and resolve 
 
471 Boucek C. ‘Extremist Reeducation and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia Publication: Terrorism Monitor’, The Jamestown 
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and-rehabilitation-in-saudi-arabia/}. 
472 U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter 
Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed, United States Government Accountability Office, (2009). 
473 See, King Abdul-Aziz Centre for National Dialogue available at  https://www.kacnd.org/. 
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conflict to enhance understanding and cooperation and foster dialogue among people of 
different faiths and cultures that bridges animosities, reduces fear and instils mutual respect.’474  
Furthermore, the Global Centre for Combating Extremist Ideology (GCCEI) was also founded 
in Ar-Riyadh in 2017. The Centre is a standard bearer rallying the international community in 
combating extremist ideologies. It aims to effectively fight and refute extremist ideology in 
coordination with states and organisations.475 
Saudi authorities expressed that the “mindset” pillar is the most challenging aspect of 
the country’s counterterrorism strategy and will remain a long-term challenge. In any case, 
Saudi officials state that the Saudi Arabian government is committed to fighting extremist 
ideology. This pushed the new leadership in the Kingdom to pursue a policy of openness to the 
world. For example, the Kingdom is now allowing women to drive cars, run businesses, travel 
freely, and has also relaxed dress-code regulations for women. In addition, the Kingdom 
created the General Authority for Entertainment aimed at transforming the domestic travel and 
entertainment industry. This has led to the promotion of performing arts, re-opening of 
cinemas, and more. On religious affairs, the Kingdom has met, for the first time in its history, 
Lebanon's Maronite Patriarch in late 2017, and the Vatican's Pontifical Council for Interfaith 
Dialogue in April, 2018.             
         The efforts of the country are not limited to policy efforts. Indeed, several legal measures 
were taken by the Government. The Kingdom issued Resolution 163, in March 1997, which 
founded a committee from various security agencies to block nearly 400 websites which seek 
to promulgate radical religious calls to violent Jihad. In 2007, the Saudi Council of Ministers 
also enacted the Law to Fight Cyber-Crime.476 The law calls for long prison sentences and huge 
 
474 See, King Abdullah Bin Abdul-Aziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue, available at 
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fines for anyone who establishes a website that promotes radicalism or publishes any 
information on how to make explosives. In early 2014, a Royal Decree issued in the Kingdom 
imposed tougher prison sentences for Saudis who travel outside the country to fight with 
terrorist groups.477  In early March of 2014, under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior, 
several regulations were issued, which outlawed any activities that support terrorist groups, in 
particular the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS(Daish), and Al-Qa’idah.478  
According to Saudi Arabian authorities, the success rate of the ‘soft’ strategy of fighting 
terrorism ranges from 80% to 90%.479 There are a number of other states who adopted this 
strategy, such as Egypt, Algeria, Singapore, Indonesia, and the US army in Iraq through 
following the programme of Task Force 134. However, the ‘soft’ strategy still raises challenges 
to the Kingdom which need to be addressed.  For example, its current sudden social openness 
with the world is one of those challenges. It is true that the new policy does not contradict 
Islamic rules, however, the overall hard-line character of Saudi society might not accept the 
openness policy and in turn, may generate another wave of extremism. Therefore, it is advisable 
that this sudden openness with the world not occur too quickly, but rather be implemented at a 
gradual pace.    
           In addition to this, the failure to rehabilitate terrorists who completed the rehabilitation 
programme is one of the biggest challenges to this strategy. It is true that the expected rate of 
the failure, which ranges from 10 to 20% is relatively small, however, this figure is still 
significant if one takes into consideration the number of terrorists under detention. For 
example, in 2014, six members of Al-Qa’idah in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), based in 
Yemen, attacked a Saudi border check-post from the Yemeni side. Four of those attackers were 
 
477 For instance, in May 2014, the Saudi Ministry of Interior assessed that at least 1,200 Saudis had voyage to battle in 
Syria, and a few free gauges suggested that the figure may be more than 2,500 Saudis. 
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Saudi nationals, who were previously imprisoned for charges of committing terrorist attacks. 
In addition, and in the same year, four attackers assaulted several members of the Saudi Shi’ite 
community who were praying. It appears that three of those attackers were previously in prison 
on the charge of being part of Al-Qa’idah. Several weeks later, 77 persons who were related to 
this incident were arrested and it was revealed that 33 of them were previously in jail for 
terrorism related-charges.480    
      All in all, Saudi Arabia’s relative victory in its campaign against radical belief systems is 
having a substantial effect on extremist thought. As a result of the ideological and 
organizational audits conducted by well-known Saudi scholars, who solemnly renounced their 
prior fatwas in support of terrorists and, particularly, Al-Qa’idah sympathizers, wrote audits 
withdrawing from previous radical and degenerate considerations. Comparative steps have 
been embraced by foreign terrorist theologians who have begun to abandon their radicalism.  
4.3  Development of the Judicial and Security Structure of Counter-Terrorism 
The rapid and new challenges and threats have rendered the old methods adopted 
previously by the Kingdom outmoded, necessitating new strategies capable of addressing and 
dealing with these new challenges. In fact, the new leadership in the Kingdom has assumed a 
new position and adopted a new policy that can address these challenges. The new leadership 
has taken a number of steps toward implementing this new policy and decided to merge all 
units that are responsible for combating terrorism into an independent agency (Security State 
Agency), separated from the Ministry of the Interior. It also created the Public Prosecution 
office as an independent judicial body. These new developments are of important reference, as 
the legal procedures of counter-terrorism were revised. These new changes will be further 
explored as follows.  
 
480 Watannews, Available at: https://watannews-ye.com/15878/. 
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4.3.1 Security State Agency 
The Saudi Interior Ministry is responsible for all 13 provinces of the Kingdom; their 
affairs; internal security; guarding of borders; serving the citizens and foreigners; combating 
crimes, drugs, and smuggling; and other services. The Ministry was also in charge of combating 
terrorism, being financed through various specialized agencies and departments and operating 
in coordination with other ministries and agencies such as the Foreign Ministry, National 
Guard, and intelligence agencies.481 Bearing in mind that the Interior Ministry bears a heavy 
burden of responsibilities, this, in fact, might reduce the quality of its services to the citizens 
as well as the foreigners. In light of the foregoing, King Salman issued Royal Order No. 293A 
on 20th July, 2017, establishing a new governmental body known as the Presidency of State 
Security. This body is in charge of several activities that were initially under the responsibility 
of the Interior Ministry. This body is directly linked to the Prime Minister (The King) and is 
led by a minister. It specializes in all affairs of the security of the Kingdom, such as counter-
terrorism and its finance. This body also involves several departments and agencies, which are 
responsible for the security of the state, such as general investigation, special forces, special 
emergency forces, National Information Centre, and others. The Royal Order states that there 
is now a need to make this development and change for the continuous strengthening of the 
security sectors according to the latest divisions of administration, so they can effectively and 
genuinely function to face the current security challenges. This development would enhance 
the counter-terrorism strategy in the Kingdom from a security and intelligence perspective as 
well as financial. It would also boost the capacity of the Kingdom to take the initiative to face 
any terrorist challenges before they even take place, as the new body is equipped with the latest 
technologies and tools, for example, collecting information and analysing this in relation to any 
 
481 See, Saudi Ministry of Interior, available at  https://WWW.moi.gov.sa/. 
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potential threat of terrorism. This, in turn, would help in the preparation of precise reports so 
that decision-makers can take the most relevant response to the threat.482  
This type of governmental body exists in many countries around the world. For 
example, in the USA in 2002, the American Government merged more than 22 administrations 
and agencies into a single agency called the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with the 
aim of enhancing the security of the state to more effectively combat the threat of terrorism.483 
This is considered one of the most important developments in the US administration over the 
last 50 years. This was what caused then President George W. Bush to say that the USA’s 
security needs a comprehensive and unified system to face the international threat of terrorism. 
The Saudi Presidency of State Security is, to a large extent, similar to the USA one. However, 
there had already been strong collaboration between the DHS and the Interior Ministry of Saudi 
Arabia484 before the establishment of the Presidency of State Security. Therefore, it is 
anticipated that this cooperation will increase.  
4.3.2 Public Prosecution  
This is yet another new step taken by the Government to face the new challenges. It is 
an independent judicial body. Among its several functions, it is in charge of investigating 
crimes in the Kingdom. It is a legal representative of Saudi society, as it represents them in 
seeking punishment for criminals. The members of this body enjoy judicial immunity. Before 
the Public Prosecution obtained this name, it went through different stages.  
1. First stage: During this stage, the main duties of this body were initially conducted by 
criminal investigative officers, who were part of the police section. These members were 
assigned the duty of investigating and prosecuting criminals.  
 
482 Royal Order No. 293A on 20th July 2017. 
483 See, United States Department of Homeland Security, available at: http://www.dhs.gov/. 
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2. Second stage: Royal Decree No. 56 was issued in late 1989, creating the Bureau of 
Investigation and Prosecution (BIP), and was under the oversight of the Interior Minister (the 
executive authority), which was the initial name of this body. 
3. Third Stage: The latest Royal Order issued in 2017, amended the BIP to ‘Public 
Prosecution’ and linked its office directly to the King. However, it is not linked to the Interior 
Ministry anymore.485   
The last Royal Order explained the reasons behind amending the name of this body. 
One of these reasons is that the nature and function of this body has a judicial character. Also, 
the change is in line with the development of the concepts and rules of the public prosecution 
that are followed by most states in the world, however, with consideration of Islamic Shariah 
rules. Another reason was the necessity of the separation between the executive authority and 
this body, as it is a part of the judicial authority in the Kingdom. The Public Prosecution body 
should be given total independence in order to ensure that it performs its duties impartially.  
The independence of the Public Prosecution, linked to the King, from the executive 
authority is one of the most important features of having an impartial body, which can bear its 
responsibilities with an ability to genuinely function. This is one of the most important 
developments that the Royal Order brought forward.    
According to the formal website of the Public Prosecution, its vision is to promote 
justice and the protection of the society with distinguished performance. It also states that this 
body aims to protect rights and freedoms, and support the oppressed and punish oppressors, in 
accordance with the legal texts and the established rules, and in cooperation with the relevant 
judicial and security bodies.486 
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4.4  The Binding Legal Framework of Taking National Legal Measures 
All states are committed to protect their security and public order from the dangers of 
terrorism. This responsibility requires these states to take all measures to prevent, criminalise, 
and punish the acts of terrorism, taking into account the norms of international law. Terrorism 
is an international crime as it violates international legal norms, either those which are referred 
to in international conventions, or customary international law.487 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the matter that has facilitated the task of 
implementing international law in the face of terrorism is that individuals are subjects of 
international law. Hence, individuals enjoy rights and bear responsibilities under public 
international law. Public international law also imposes obligations on states to combat 
terrorism and develop the means of international cooperation, as terrorism constitutes a threat 
to national and international societies together.488 In the context of combating terrorism, there 
are 13 international conventions and 3 protocols to counter terrorism,489 each of which has been 
ratified by the Kingdom and is designed to combat a certain aspect of terrorism and determine 
a set of acts that need to be criminalised by the relevant members within their legal systems. 
These international acts constitute the response of the international community to the threat of 
terrorism. Therefore, and according to Resolution 1373, any step to enact an international act 
of counter-terrorism should essentially aim to securely provide the states’ members with the 
relevant mechanisms to prevent and criminalise these acts. It should, however, consider the 
measures adopted and followed by states as well as the basic values and principles necessary 
for all democracies. In particular, the adoption of the measures to prevent acts of terrorism 
should be taken on the basis of respecting the rule of law and human rights, as the conflict 
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between international and domestic legal norms, the priority of application at the national level 
is for international legal norms, as explained in Chapter Three. 
UNSC Resolution 1373, declares that ‘acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.’ Paragraph 3 (d) adds that all 
states to ‘[b]ecome parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and 
protocols relating to terrorism.’ The resolution also affirms that all acts of terrorism ‘constitute 
a threat to international peace and security’. Based on this, the resolution calls upon all states 
to take all necessary measures to prevent acts of terrorism. It is well known that the provisions 
of this resolution are mandatory, based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The resolution, 
therefore, requires all states to join all international actions that seek to counter terrorism and 
implement their provisions.  
These international acts are not enough to meet the aims for which they are enacted. 
The provisions of these international acts need to be incorporated into the domestic legislations 
of states and the latter should criminalise and punish acts of terrorism. Therefore, the punitive 
system of any state, including criminalization and punishment, to combat terrorism is an 
essential step and such action renders any act of terrorism a domestic act, even when the sources 
of the enactment of the domestic law are derived from an international source, such as an 
international convention or any other international legal act. The criminal responsibility of 
committing an act of terrorism only takes place through domestic legislation. This caused some 
scholars to define the domestic crime of terrorism as a crime of an international concern.490 
This is because such acts may breach international peace and security especially if their scope 
is expanded to reach the level of war.491 Therefore, once states ratified such international legal 
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acts to counter terrorism, they are supposed to incorporate them into their domestic legislations. 
This is an important step, not only for the more effective implementation of the measures of 
counter-terrorism, but also to establish a legal basis for legal staff, including judges and lawyers 
to make decisions. The incorporation of international legal acts into domestic laws should not 
be overlooked, as it is a part of the state’s sovereignty and also so that terrorists cannot exploit 
it.     
4.5  National Relevant Legal Framework 
To avoid the problem of enacting irrelevant punishments or the escape of terrorists, 
some international legal acts for combating terrorism require the states to enact penalties of a 
certain gravity. For example, The Hague Convention 1970492 and the Montreal Convention 
1971493 require states to punish acts of terrorism with ‘severe’ penalties. However, other 
conventions ask for ‘proportional’ penalties, such as the International Convention against the 
Taking of Hostages 1979 and the Terrorist Bombings Convention 1997. Therefore, the 
international conventions have left states with significant discretion to determine the extent of 
the severity of penalties, as the legitimacy of these penalties depends on the criterion of 
proportionality, which should be in parallel with the gravity of the acts.  
It is also worth noting that the international conventions do not impose obligation over 
the states in relation to the issuance of the legal characterization of the acts that have been 
mentioned in their provisions. In other words, those states are only obliged to criminalise the 
acts that have been included within the conventions, however in accordance with the legal 
characterisation that the national legislature adopts.494 The decisive element of the national 
criminalisation, based on an international obligation, is related to the acts themselves rather 
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than on the international legal characterisation of these acts.495 For example, and in the context 
of the principle of complementarity, if a national court deals with an act as an act of terrorism, 
and that such an act is under the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction (given that the act comes under 
the enumerated crimes in Article 5 of the ICC Statute), then the ICC may not claim the 
admissibility of the case even if this act is labelled by the ICC as a crime against humanity. 
The priority here is extended to the legal characterisation that is provided by the domestic 
legislature not to the one stipulated by the Statute of the Court. 
4.6  Terrorist Crimes as an Independent Crime 
The definition of terrorism received some attention and symbolic international attempts 
at the United Nations, however, the criminalization of terrorism and the establishment of an 
independent crime punishable under domestic laws did not find due deliberation until after the 
adoption of Resolution 1373, which created the committee of combating terrorism and obliged 
all states to provide the SC with periodic reports about their efforts taken to combat terrorism 
especially the legal criminal measures. Some states treat some acts of terrorism as normal 
crimes, such as acts of killing, beating, public incitement, and others. They consider that 
damage or danger is the determining factor in deciding the criminal outcome of this crime, 
ignoring the special elements that should be available to label these acts as terrorism. However, 
other states treat these acts as terrorist crimes. and they require special intent to render these 
acts as terrorism, in particular the special intent to commit an act of terrorism, though distinct 
legislations in various states differ in the definition of this intent. However, it can be noted that 
dealing with acts of terrorism as normal crimes may lead a state to breach its international 
obligations, in particular when it comes to determine the gravity of the act.  
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In relation to the Saudi strategy of counter-terrorism, it was dealing with acts of 
terrorism without adapting the term terrorism, as this was derived from Islamic Shariah. This 
system called the crimes of terrorism crimes of Hirabah,496 where these crimes were considered 
as part of the corruption (or the spreading of evil) on earth, and it adopted the maximum 
penalties for the offenders, including the death penalty. The reason for adopting such extreme 
punishments is because these acts do not only harm individuals (victims), but also the whole 
society and, therefore, these victims do not have to forgive the offenders. This is the scenario 
upon which the judges establish their decisions against these offenders.  
In addition to this, decisions of judges are also made on the basis of some national laws 
in relation to certain acts of terrorism, such as Article 4 (8), of the Border Security Law, which 
states that ‘[i]nspecting people in the border area and outside Customs Department and 
investigating the reason for their presence and their ID. If their presence in the area is proved 
illegal, they should be extradited to the competent authority, having applied the Law of Border 
Security against them’. Paragraph 7, of the same Article states that ‘inspecting land and sea 
transport, which are in the border area’. In addition to this law, Article 4, of Weapons and 
Ammunition Regulation placed strict limitations over the manufacturing of weapons as well as 
their equipment, spare parts, importation, selling, transferring, and even possession. Article 34, 
of this regulation refers to the deterrent penalties that might reach up to a sentence of 30 years 
in prison and a fine of 300,000 Saudi Riyals (USD$80,000). Furthermore, in fighting the 
financing of terrorism, the Kingdom depends on the provisions of the Anti-Money Laundering 
Regulation, in particular Article 2, that includes legitimate and illegitimate funds from the 
finances that may be used for terrorist purposes.497 
 





However, having joined several international agreements on counter-terrorism, the 
Kingdom had to change its strategy and view the crimes of terrorism as special crimes. 
According to this new trend, Royal Decree No M/16., issued in 2013, specialised in the crimes 
of terrorism as such, called ‘Law Concerning Offenses of Terrorism and its Financing’. This 
law established a special court for these crimes, a special committee for mutual legal assistance, 
a permanent committee of counter-terrorism, and also a Special Financial Investigation 
Department to investigate terrorism financing and money laundering. As can now be seen, the 
Kingdom has undertaken a special and comprehensive legal and judicial system, assigned only 
for the crimes of terrorism, and in accordance to international standards. 
Then, another Royal Decree, No. 92, was issued in 2017, that enacted a new law of 
counter-terrorism and its finance. This law replaced the previous one and involved some new 
changes. This law also deals with procedures and penalties relating to acts of terrorism. These 
issues are explored and discussed later in this chapter.   
4.7  Defining Terrorism 
The legal confrontation of terrorism firstly requires a definition so it can be criminalised 
and punished. There is no internationally unified definition of terrorism. Several international 
acts and conventions mention acts of terrorism without specifying a unified definition of 
terrorism. With the issuance of UNSC Resolution 1373, there is growing agreement on a 
unified definition of terrorism, as the Resolution arguably indicates in the view of several 
scholars.  As mentioned in Chapter One,498 this thesis builds on the definition of the crimes of 
terrorism as laid down in UNSC Resolution 1566. In this part, we analyse the definition of 
terrorism as adopted by the Saudi legislature in the Law of Crimes of Terrorism and Finance 
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2017; and will show how this definition fits with the one laid down in Resolution 1566 in view 
of Resolution 1373. 
Before we analyse the definition that has been used by the Saudi legislature, it is worth 
discussing the scholarly arguments about the permissible scope of the definition that can be 
taken by a national legislature. It has been widely argued that Resolution 1373 does not provide 
a definition of the act of terrorism.499 Other scholars opined that the resolution does tacitly 
involve a definition, based on ‘previous counter-terrorism legal instruments’,500 specifically, 
the definitions provided in the Suppression of Financing Convention501 and Resolution 1566. 
However, those with the view that Resolution 1373 does not provide a definition argue that 
had the resolution provided such a definition, states would have been literally obliged to it. 
Taking together the arguments of the tacit definition of terrorism in Resolution 1373, and those 
who assumed the problem of bindingness, this hypothesis raises the question of whether or not 
states are literally required to only criminalise the same acts as the definition states, or can they 
go beyond the scope of the definition and add more acts to it. In other words, if the content of 
the Resolution does not require states to go beyond the scope of its definition, this means that 
when the states adopt a broader definition, this does not mean that the latter would be in conflict 
with the resolution. However, if the resolution means that states are required not to go beyond 
the terrorist acts that the resolution mentions, this means that any broader definition would be 
in conflict with the resolution. Therefore, does the resolution bind states to only those terrorist 
acts it encompasses or are the states free to go beyond the scope of the resolution’s definition?  
 
499 Ben S. ‘Defining Terrorism in International Law’ (Oxford University Press, 2006) Pp. 316-7, 320. See also, Kent Roach, 
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of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international 
organization to do or abstain from doing any act.’ 
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Some scholars argue that the resolution does not restrict states in going beyond the 
terrorist acts it captures.502  The Resolution only imposes a duty on states to criminalise and 
punish those who are engaged in the conduct it captures.  It is argued that the Resolution neither 
explicitly nor implicitly imposes a duty on states not to adopt a broader definition. States fail 
to comply with the Resolution’s instructions only if their domestic definitions do not cover all 
conduct that the Resolution captures.503 The states are then free to criminalise more acts on top 
of the ones captured in the Resolution. Indeed, the Saudi legislature has adopted a broader 
definition than the one that the Resolution implicitly endorses in the two legal instruments, 
namely the Suppression of Financing Convention and Resolution 1566, as explained below. 
However, whether such a definition is too broad to the extent that it raises the question of 
human rights related-violations and political exploitation of broadness is a different issue that 
will be addressed in the next chapter. In the forthcoming sections, reference will be made to 
the analysis of the Saudi definition of terrorism.  
The Law of Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing (2017)504  defines terrorism 
as:  
[a]ny act committed, individually or collectively, directly or indirectly, by a perpetrator, 
with the intention to disturb public order, destabilize national security or State stability, 
threaten national unity, suspend the Basic Law of Governance or some of its provisions, 
cause damage to State facilities or natural or economic resources, attempt to coerce any 
of its authorities into a particular action or inaction, cause harm or death to any person, 
when the intention of such act, by its nature or context, is to terrorize people or force a 
government or an international organization to commit or refrain from committing a 
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certain act, or threaten to carry out acts that would lead to or instigate any of the 
aforementioned intentions.  
As well as any conduct constituting a crime under Saudi Arabia obligations in any of 
the international treaties or protocols related to terrorism or its financing - to which Saudi 
Arabia is a Party- or any of the acts listed in the Annex of the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 
Article 3, of the Law states the acts of terrorism by looking at the aims of these acts. 
Article 3, of the Law identifies acts of terrorism by looking at the aims of these acts. It states 
that ‘Notwithstanding the principle of territoriality, the provisions of this law shall apply to any 
person, Saudi or non-Saudi, who commits, aids, attempts, instigates, participates, or conspires 
to commit outside the kingdom a crime provided for in this law, and is not tried for, if such 
crime is to: 
1. Change the government system in the Kingdom, 
2. Suspend the Basic Law of the Government or some of its articles, 
3. Coerce the state into a particular action or inaction, 
4. Assault Saudi citizens abroad, 
5. Cause damage to state properties abroad, including embassies or other diplomatic or 
consular premises, 
6. Carry out a terrorist act on board any means of transport registered in the Kingdom or 
carrying its flag, or 
7. Undermine the interests of the Kingdom, its economy or national or societal security’. 
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In general, the Saudi legislature adopted an inclusive approach to the definition of 
terrorism which embodies a comprehensive and common definition of terrorism through a 
general frame that includes both international and national acts of terrorism. In addition, the 
Saudi legislature approached an analytical method in determining seven groups of acts of 
terrorism, expressed in a broad way. These acts threaten several rights, such as the right to life, 
right to well-being, right to property, right to safe transport and security. The Saudi legislature 
stays away from narrowing the scope of the definition, which might fall short of unpredictable 
acts that might not be covered by a narrow sort of definition. 
        As can be seen now, the terrorist acts that have been criminalised by this Law do not only 
include the ones mentioned in Resolution 1566, but include other acts which have been added 
to its scope. This caused Ben Emmerson, Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human 
Rights, to say ‘[d]espite many positive developments, I am concerned about the unacceptably 
broad definition of terrorism and the use of Saudi Arabia’s 2014 counter-terrorism law and 
other national security provisions against human rights defenders, writers, bloggers, journalists 
and other peaceful critics’.505  However, it seems that most states which defined terrorism 
adopted a broad approach so it can be flexible to the extent that it can cover any new form of 
terrorist acts, as the manifestation of terrorism keeps developing and changing. According to 
more than 500 state reports submitted to the CTC, almost all the definitions of terrorism by 
these states are not just innumerable, but also very broad and vague.  
Considering that a too-broad definition of terrorism might raise human rights-related 
violations, it seems that Resolution 1566 does not explicitly or implicitly forbid states to 
approach a more comprehensive definition than that of the Resolution. Therefore, even if the 
 
505 Saudi Arabia Must Reform Counter-Terror Law and Free Peaceful Critics, Says UN Rights Expert, United Nations Human 
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national definition encompasses a wider scope, this does not mean that the latter is contrary to 
the Resolution’s provisions.  
4.8  Criminal Conduct  
In this regard, it is important now to explain the conduct of terrorists and their 
relationship with the concept of violence, in the context of the Law of Combating Terrorist 
Crimes and its Financing (2017). The older version of this law in 2014, when defining 
terrorism, used the term ‘every act’, whereas the new version uses ‘every conduct’ or Solok (In 
Arabic). This usage indicates that the Saudi legislature’s orientation is to adopt a wider scope 
so it encompasses not only the act as such, but it includes other related action, including 
endorsement, showing sympathy, or incitement to terrorist acts, or propagating extremist 
thoughts, even when they happen by the way of omission. As terrorism is a crime that might 
violate or threaten human rights, public security and order, this conduct could lead to these 
outcomes. The Law of 2017 referred to the term violence as ‘harming any person, or causing 
his death’. The definition also does not fall short of violent conduct, but also it includes a list 
of activities that has been declared to be the conduct of terrorism, including ‘disturbance of 
public order, unsettling the security of the community and the state security, or jeopardizing its 
national unity’. On this basis, the Saudi legislature also approaches a wider concept of violence 
that is embodied within any terrorist criminal conduct. For example, he criminalised the 
conduct of showing sympathy with terrorist thoughts as well as inciting people to join terrorist 
groups. This sort of criminalised conduct does not accompany the traditional meaning of 
violence. The Saudi legislature emphasises this trend when it expanded the scope of violence 
in relation to terrorist conduct to include the new forms of terrorism, which are associated with 
new technologies. Therefore, it determined that the sort of violence that might constitute the 
conduct of terrorism is the establishment of a data system for terrorist purposes. It went further 
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when it criminalised the conduct of using the territories of the Kingdom as a base for meeting 
and planning to commit terrorism.   
It can be noted here that the Saudi legislature tends to adopt the wider concept of 
violence, as was asserted in the report of Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam,506 submitted to 
the International Law Commission, which states that terrorism is described by the use of 
violence. Therefore, the traditional concept of violence should be extended to the broad 
meaning of it so it can cover all forms of terrorist acts that technology facilitates.   
4.9  Criminal Activities and the Crime of Terrorism 
The crime of terrorism is not only the actual act of violence itself, but includes other 
activities that are associated with the violence. For example, there are many crimes related to 
terrorism, such as the attempt to commit a crime of terrorism or to secure finance for terrorism; 
the creation of a terrorist organisation; or providing assistance to terrorists. Some people call 
these sort of crimes ‘indirect terrorism. On a national level, the criminal legal systems of states 
deal differently with those who assist terrorists in terms of the degree of danger of their actions 
and the penalties imposed. For example, some of these legal systems deal differently with those 
who assist terrorists compared to the main perpetrators.507 Hence, an independent category was 
established which includes partners, accomplices, inciters, and so on. These people are given 
lesser punishments than those who commit the barbarity. Other criminal justice systems deal 
with terrorist accomplices in the same way as the perpetrators in terms of the gravity of their 
conduct and the corresponding punitive actions.508  
The aforementioned Law of 2017, as it particularly relates to criminal terrorist conduct 
and the broader concept of violence within the meaning of terrorism, provides numerous 
 
506 Doc. A/CN. 4/387. Ann. CDI, 1985, II, leme partie, p.77. see also, Le regles internationals relatives a la lute contre le 
terrorism, op. Cit., p. 49. 
507 See Article 27 of the Criminal Code in China. 
508 See Article 61 of the Criminal Code in Japan. 
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penalty provisions for those who collude with terrorists. For example, some were treated the 
same as the main terrorist perpetrator(s), whilst others were given lesser punishments, as 
discussed in the next sections.  
Incitement to Terrorism  
This is one of the key strategies that terrorist organisations use to support and justify 
their claim and call for acts of violence. Resolution 1373 states that this sort of strategy is 
against the principles of the UN. The SC also calls upon all states to criminalise such acts 
through their legal systems (Resolution 1624). The prohibition of incitement to terrorism is an 
indispensable part of public security and order.  
The legal system in Saudi Arabia, as is the case with many states in the world, 
criminalises certain forms of incitement to terrorism, such as incitement via lecturing, 
gathering, religious platforms, or the Internet. It also outlaws this conduct as an independent 
offense and is punished to the extent of the law as the perpetrator(s) of the crime. 
Characteristically, the Saudi justice system uniquely criminalises a distinctive and serious form 
of incitement to terrorism, known as the incitement to terrorism via fatwa (religious edict).509 
This form of incitement has been one of the main sources of terrorism in the Kingdom, which 
was the reason for the emergence of many terrorists who were recruited on the basis of fatwas 
to conduct Jihad, as was seen in Chapter Two. This is what caused the Council of Senior 
Scholars in the Kingdom in September 2014, to prohibit the joining of any extremist groups in 
conflict zones, such as in Syria and Iraq. The Kingdom also sought a policy to counter those 
who call people to join terrorist groups. On 16th February 2017, the Saudi authorities arrested 
a number of inciters who were engaged in activities related to promoting and publishing the 
thoughts of the IS, recruiting people, and inciting people to join the Syrian conflict.  
 




Due to ever present danger of terrorist groups, in particular the ones that have spread to 
more than one state and are well-known as transnational organised crime, Resolution 1373 was 
concerned about the close relationship between international terrorism and transnational 
organised crime. Due to the dangerous characteristics of such organisations, the mere plan to 
establish such an organisation is viewed as a crime. 
In order to suppress the activities of recruitment and propaganda of these dangerous 
groups, many states introduced measures to declare them illegitimate, basing such a decision 
on the grounds that the aims and activities of these groups lead to terrorist acts or facilitate 
them. Each country has flexibility to define these groups. For example, the framework decision 
of the European Union Council on 13th June, 2002, stated that a terrorist group is an assembly 
which is organizational in structure, consists of more than one individual and whose activities 
involve conducting terrorist acts.  
As far as the Kingdom is concerned, the establishment of organisations or political 
parties is forbidden. However, several secret entities opposed to the policy of the Kingdom, 
and with affiliations to external organisations, such as Al-Qa’idah, or backed by foreign states 
such as Iran, were created. The Saudi legislature criminalised these organisation as well as the 
participation in them as a preventive measure against terrorism to deter any one who may have 
sympathy towards these groups. In 2014, the Committee created via Royal Order held a 
meeting with the aim of producing a periodic report on unlawful terrorist factions and 
organisations.510 It introduced a list of several organisations and groups that are considered to 
be terrorist entities, including IS(Daish), Hezbollah in the Kingdom, Houthis, Muslim 
Brotherhood and all internally recognised terrorist groups. The Kingdom warned its citizens 
 
510 Royal Order No A/44. 
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and residents of the sanctions, issued through the Royal Order that it will encompass anyone 
who engages, invites, incites or belongs to unlawful organisations and groups. It also includes 
anyone who pledges allegiance to any party, organisation, or even an individual inside or 
outside the Kingdom. However, this Royal Order granted the Saudi people who joined terrorist 
groups outside the country a deadline to review their situations and, therefore, return to the 
country with the hope of repentance and never to return to these activities.  
4.10 The Duality of the Standards of Terrorism Lists 
All state members of the UN are committed to forbid all organisations listed on the 
terrorist list by the SC. In practice, whilst some states create their own list of terrorist groups, 
other states do not consider these groups to be terrorists. For example, whilst the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwān Al-Muslimūn) is considered a terrorist organisation by the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, it is not designated as a terrorist entity in other 
countries such as Turkey and Qatar. The latter countries even allow the members of this 
organisation to freely operate in their territories. This situation detracts from the effectiveness 
of international and regional efforts to counter terrorism and extremist thought. It also opens 
the opportunity for them to publish propaganda and promote their ideologies. However, this 
state of affairs is due to the political interests and the security considerations of each state 
whereupon they decide how to deal with those groups. What is important in this regard is to 
show that this state constitutes tension between the national strategies of counter-terrorism and 
the international ones. It constitutes a legal and practical challenge to counter terrorism among 
states at national and international levels. Efforts should be consolidated and coordinated 
between these states on the one hand and between them and the international organisation, in 
particular the UNSC on the other. There should also be unified criteria in the identification 
mechanisms of terrorist networks.  
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Finally, the issues that have been raised in this chapter, in turn, highlight an important 
issue in relation to the response of the Saudi strategy of counter-terrorism to the three main 
implications that Resolution 1373 raises, which are financing terrorism, international 
cooperation, and human rights, in the context of the legal framework of combating terrorism 









































5.1  Introduction 
       One of requirements of UNSC Resolution 1373 is to combat the financing of terrorism. 
The Resolution calls upon member states to enact or modify national legislation on counter-
terrorism. As emphasised in Chapter Four, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia committed to this 
Resolution by enacting the Law of Counter-Terrorism and its Finance that was replaced by the 
Law of 2017. In addition to this, the SC’s strategy further requires states to counter all forms 
of terrorism financing and implement the respective international criteria, including the 
international conventions of suppressing terrorism financing. The crime of terrorism was 
regarded as a mere punishable financial crime. However, having issued this Resolution, a 
number of laws and regulations were enacted to control the financing of terrorist activities.511 
Most financial institutions have been subject to several stringent requirements in relation to 
monitoring the transactions and behaviours of customers. The FATF, for example, was founded 
to assist in countering financial crimes, including terrorism. The first part of this chapter 
discusses the extent to which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has committed to the second 
requirement of the SC’s strategy of counter-terrorism. The legal strategy of Saudi Arabia of 
countering terrorism financing has gone through various stages. It was not a crime in its own 
right, rather it was a part of the money laundering crimes, before it was treated as a distinct 
crime with a special law to govern it. The chapter, then, investigates the Kingdom’s 
commitment to the SC’s requirement to combat terrorism financing, bearing in mind the 
different aforementioned stages, before and after the issuance of the SC’s strategy of counter-
terrorism. It will highlight certain challenges that might hamper the implementation of the SC’s 
strategy, including kidnapping hostages for ransom, and the independence of non-profit 
institutions in the activities of financing terrorism. 
 




 The strategy of counter-terrorism of the SC also requires the member states to cooperate 
together either via the framework of the UN and its main branches and relevant agencies, or 
through regional agreements and bilateral ones. The importance of this requirement derives 
from the fact that the crime of terrorism has been of a cross-border nature where the question 
of cooperation becomes critical. This question will be addressed in the second section of this 
chapter, which discusses how the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has committed to the third 
requirement of the SC’s strategy of counter-terrorism. In this regard, the chapter will focus on 
three means of cooperation: extradition, legal assistance, and intelligence cooperation. This is 
discussed with reference to some potential challenges that might obstruct the implementation 
of this requirement. The chapter then completes the exploration of the implementation of the 
requirements of the SC’s strategy that was first presented in the previous chapter. However, 
the success of the commitment to these requirements is usually contingent on the respect of 
human rights. The CTC calls upon all member states to fully commit to respecting human rights 
when countering terrorism. This particular point is scrutinized in the last section of this chapter. 
It examines the extent to which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia adheres to the question of human 
rights. The chapter highlights a number of examples, including the right to personal safety, the 
right to privacy, and the commitment to the principle of due process, in particular the period of 
detention. 
5.2  Terrorism Financing 
Since the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has one of the highest GDPs and is one of the main 
oil producers and exporters in the world,512 the Government joined the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), whose function is to facilitate trade with greater safety, freedom, and 
flexibility. Consequently, joining this organisation required the Kingdom to introduce more 
 




changes and increase flexibility in its national systems of trade, investment, and economy, such 
as the establishment of the capital market and investment sectors. These economical changes 
have, to a large extent, corresponded with the Afghani-Russian war and the Iraqi war which 
allowed some people to exploit these two significant regional events, the two wars and the new 
trade flexibility, in financing terrorist organisations and terrorists; and money laundering. 
However, the policy of the Kingdom in fighting these new terrorist activities (terrorism 
financing) was based on the same one regarding the initial fight against terrorism. This counter-
terrorism was based on Shariah Law, which considers terrorism financing an anti-social offence 
and is inseparable from terrorism (one crime). Although terrorism and terrorism financing are 
two distinct crimes, under Shariah Law, both crimes are treated as terrorism. Any form of 
cooperation between a terrorist and his financier is seen as a terrorist offence but is not treated 
as an associated crime, even if the act of terrorism is never committed. The act of terrorism 
financing is still punishable and Saudi judges regard these two incidents as one crime.513 
However, following the events of 11th September that had adverse consequences on most states 
in the world, including the Kingdom, the latter had to make fundamental changes to its financial 
sector, particularly because the Kingdom was accused of being the main source of terrorism 
financing. This forced the Kingdom to adopt a strategy to deal with the challenges of terrorism 
financing. The Kingdom started to cooperate with the United States Department of Treasury, 
aiming to develop its financial system.514 In addition, several permanent committees were 
founded, including the Anti-Money Laundering Committee,515 the Permanent Committee of 
Counter-Terrorism, and the Financial Intelligence Unit, which is currently under the 
supervision of the Head of State Security. The main duty of this Unit is to receive and analyse 
 
513 MENAEATE, Mutual Evaluation Report, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, 4 May 2010, 63. 
514 Report to Congressional Requesters, U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi 
Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter-Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed. Sep 2009. 
515 Generally, see, SAAMLC, at (http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/AntiMoney/Pages/Home.aspx). 
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reports about suspicious financial transactions, and then to generate its own reports and pass 
them to the relevant committees. This Unit also cooperates with its counterparts in other states 
in relation to money laundering and terrorism financing.516 In addition, the staff of this Unit 
have been trained under a system of cooperation with the US Treasury in order to develop their 
abilities and skills to familiarise themselves with money laundering and terrorism financing 
challenges in accordance with international obligations, which have been adopted by the 
Kingdom in its strategy.517  
5.2.1 The Kingdom's International Commitment to Combat Terrorism Financing 
The Kingdom’s international commitment to fighting terrorism financing is based on 
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 (ICSFT) 
and UNSC Resolution 1373. The ICSFT requires states to criminalise all acts that are 
considered crimes within the previous conventions and commit to the definition of these crimes 
(the previous nine conventions, which defined the crimes of terrorism).518 It also criminalises 
the collection and provision of funds with the intention of using them wholly, or partially, for 
criminal acts. The crime of terrorism financing is a special and standing crime and not only an 
associated crime.519 On this basis, the crime of financing occurs regardless of the occurrence 
of the act of terrorism itself. Resolution 1373 emphasises this state of affairs, where it considers 
the crime of terrorism financing as a distinct and independent crime. The Resolution imposed 
obligations on all states to prevent, criminalise and punish acts of terrorism financing and to 
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prosecute the perpetrator(s).520 This Resolution constitutes a new framework to counter 
terrorism financing and a new legal act that supplements the previous legal acts which were 
adopted before the events of 9/11.  
5.2.2 Combating Terrorism Financing in the Kingdom 
Saudi Arabia has been involved in combating terrorism financing since it enacted the 
Anti-Laundering Law in 2003. This was followed by issuing the 2005 Implementing 
Regulations of this law. In addition, several other regulations and rules were issued by 
supervisory authorities. The Kingdom also established a number of permanent national 
committees to coordinate its policy efforts. Article 2 (d), of the 2003 law considers the crime 
of terrorism financing as a type of money laundering crime and was not considered as a 
standing crime as such. The Saudi specialists clarified that there is no need for a particular 
statutory crime since terrorism financing is already criminalised by Shariah Law.521 Article 
2(d), in this regard is, then, a complementary statutory arrangement. As it can be seen now, it 
seems that the Saudi statutory offense for terrorism financing does not fit in with international 
obligations, whether those referred to in the ICSFT or UNSC Resolution 1373. It also does not 
seem to conform to the international criteria, which were adopted by the FATF on anti-money 
laundering and terrorism financing, ever since the Kingdom became the founding member of 
the Middle East - North Africa FATF (MENAFATF) in 2004,522 which was established with 
the aim of implementing and promoting international guiding principles in relation to 
combating money laundering and terrorism financing. On the other hand, although the Saudi 
policy of dealing with these crimes is founded on Shariah Law, there is no legal barrier to 
combat them in accordance with a law that would treat these acts as independent crimes. 
 
520 UNSC, R. 1373, Article A/1. 
521 UN, S/2004/884. 
522 Nicholas R. ‘The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: a critical review of its response to money laundering and terrorist financing’, 
CREST, Paper presented at Turbulence in the Kingdom – financial crime risks in Saudi Arabia, (Sep 2017).   
216 
 
5.2.3 MENAFATF’s Assessment of Saudi Arabia 
The Kingdom underwent a mutual assessment, conducted by both MENAFATF and 
FATF, to ensure that it was committed to the international standards of countering money 
laundering and terrorism financing.523 The Kingdom passed this assessment and has been 
delegated as an observer member of FATF. However, the assessment made several 
recommendations for the Kingdom to follow. For example, it recommended that the Kingdom 
make several changes to the legal framework that organises the issues of money laundering 
and the financing of terrorism in accordance with international standards. Also, it urgently 
asked the Kingdom to make a conceptual difference between the crime of money laundering 
and terrorism financing. Another recommendation was that the Kingdom creates a legal basis 
for freezing the funds and assets of terrorist entities, as there was no clear basis. This basis 
should conform to Resolution 1373. Competent authorities with responsibility for 
implementation must be identified and a procedure to monitor the freezing of funds as well as 
a procedure for the implementation of penalties should the financial authorities fail to comply 
with their duty to freeze funds.524 As a consequence, Saudi experts reviewed the legal and 
institutional framework, regulations, guidelines, and other tools related to the crime of money 
laundering and terrorism financing through financial institutions (FIs) and Designated Non-
Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs).525  
Following these recommendations and the expert review, the shortcomings of the then 
legal and institutional system were addressed, in particular, with the enactment of a new money 
laundering law in 2012, which made significant modifications to the previous law of 2003. 
This included adding 3 new articles to the law and a number of subjective and formulative 
 
523 Rules Governing Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing, Third Update, Feb (2012). 
524 MENAEATE, Mutual Evaluation Report, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, (4 May 2010), 145. 185. 
525 Supra n. 523. 
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modifications to another 20 articles to conform as much as possible to international and 
domestic requirements. The Implementation Regulations were also updated. The crime of 
terrorism financing was accordingly, considered to be a standalone crime when the Law of 
Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing was issued in 2013, and went into effect in 
February 2014.526 Article 32 of this law authorises the Permanent Committee of Countering 
Terrorism to introduce a clear mechanism for the implementation of Resolution 1373’s 
provisions.  
In addition to this, the Kingdom made other changes and updates to the Law of 
Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing (2013), when it issued its new version in 2017. 
The Kingdom therefore submitted a new and comprehensive report to MENAFATF about its 
progress towards the implementation of recommendations of their assessment. Following these 
important events and developments, MENAFATF conducted another assessment in October 
2017 of the legal, procedural and institutional developments introduced by the Kingdom. The 
discussion of these changes concluded in June 2018. As a consequence, in June 2019, the FATF 
accepted Saudi Arabia as a member of state, instead of being an observer. 
5.2.4 The National Legal Framework for Combating Terrorism Financing  
As previously stated, the legal basis for combating terrorism financing is the Law of Combating 
Terrorist Crimes and its Financing (2017). This law refers to terrorism financing as:  
Providing funds for committing a terrorist crime or for the benefit of a terrorist entity 
or a terrorist individual in any form stipulated in this Law, including financing the 
travel and training of a terrorist individual.   
 
526 Law of Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing, Article B/1, 2013. 
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Article 4/1 of the Law also defines funds as ‘assets, economic resources or properties 
of any value or type, however acquired, whether material or immaterial, movable or 
immovable, tangible or intangible, along with documents, deeds, transfers, letter of credits and 
instruments of any form, whether inside or outside the Kingdom. This includes electronic or 
digital systems and bank credits that evidence ownership or interest therein, also all types of 
commercial papers, securities, or any interest, profit or other income generated from such 
funds.’527 Article 47 of this Law states that the crime of terrorism financing stretches to any 
conduct that incorporates the accumulation or arrangement of assets – alongside other forms 
expressed by the law, for example, receiving, distributing, moving or exchanging stores or their 
proceeds - whether directly or indirectly - realizing that they will be utilized by an individual 
or groups or for an act of terrorism, composed or otherwise, even when the act itself does not 
occur or the money was not used.528 It is worth mentioning that the extent of crime grows to 
cover any type of financing for other aims, for example, the invitation or advancement of 
ideologies or orchestrating training places or giving a safe house to individuals or any type of 
financial means. In addition, the material element of the penalty of terrorism financing expands 
in accordance with the definition given in Article 47 to sufficiently and adequately include the 
material elements stated in Article (2) (a) (b) of the ICSFT. The Law also criminalises an 
attempt, involvement as a partner, incitement, or assisting to commit a crime of terrorism 
financing. This also applies to the act of joining a terrorist organisation. As can be seen, this 
Law deals with criminal intention in the crime of terrorism financing in the same way as it did 
with terrorist crimes, where the broad meaning of this element is undertaken in the definition. 
This is in conformity with the international standards.529 
 
527 See https://www.moj.gov.sa/Documents/Regulations/pdf/79.pdf. 
528 Law of Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing (2017), Article 47. 
529 Ibid.  
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5.2.5 The Mechanism of the Implementation of the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime  
Further to criminalizing terrorism financing by law as an independent crime, a set of 
executive procedures were taken by the Kingdom to implement the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism via Ministerial Decision No. (1697) dated 
14th March 2012, based on Royal Order No. (1804) dated 3rd December 2011.530 These 
procedures treated crimes alluded to in Article 2, as crimes carried out in the Kingdom, and 
subjected all legal bodies to financial, penal, and administrative responsibility. The procedures 
likewise incorporate reallocation rules in terrorism financing violations; rulings on the 
extradition of offenders; mutual legal help; steps taken by law enforcement entities for 
investigation and assessment; controlled conveyance of funds; and other rules identified with 
jurisdiction and victims’ protection. It is additionally worth noting that commitments forced on 
financial institutions in relation to Anti-Money Laundering (AML) regulations, for example, 
the disallowance of opening unknown accounts, and measures of confirming permanent or 
temporary clients, are mandated by the Law of Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing 
(2017).531 
5.2.6 The Mechanism of the Implementation of Resolution 1373 
Saudi Arabia has a legitimate reason for implementing UNSC Resolution 1373 as per 
Article 32 of the Law of Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing 2013.532 The set of 
mechanisms required to implement Resolution 1373 and other related resolutions was put into 
 
530 This explanation of the mechanism of the implementation of Resolution 1373 is based on the report of MENAFATF, see 
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place by the Permanent Committee on Combating Terrorism, and which were issued by the 
Minister of Interior in 2012.533  
The above mechanism incorporates procedures taken by the authorities in the Kingdom 
to classify individuals (nationals and residents) and entities that possess or direct financial 
activities associated with terrorism or its financing, notwithstanding other procedures for Saudi 
nationals and expatriates, and entities included by a foreign organization or state on the national 
records.  
As per the mechanism, all government bodies as well as private institutions are 
equipped to freeze and stop transactions (Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of 
Finance; Ministry of Commerce and Industry; financial and non-financial organizations; and 
businesses) and shall deny and stop financing terrorist conduct and immediately freeze funds 
and any benefits or monetary assets owned by people who conduct, or try to conduct, take an 
interest in or encourage terrorist acts; relating to bodies owned or controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by such people; possessed by people and substances that work for or under direction 
of said people and bodies; in addition to natives who purposely give or gather finances using 
any and all means, regardless of whether directly or indirectly or inside the Kingdom domains, 
to be utilized in terrorist conduct.  
The procedures taken by the Kingdom’s authorities to identify people and bodies by 
their national records include the following: during the underlying doubt stage, there shall be, 
immediately and without earlier notice, and within three working days, prudent seizure of 
accounts or end of dealings led by financial and non-financial establishments and also 
professions and businesses specifically by the Ministry of Interior (General Directorate of 
Investigation) and SAMA in accordance with the system carried out through the 
 
533 See the Royal Order No. 25505 dated 14 April 2012.   
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correspondence channel amongst them and the FIU as per the requirements assigned thereto. 
In the event that investigations show the suspicion is true, the Ministry of Interior shall assign 
skilful authorities within five working days, calling them to freeze and stop monetary 
transactions on investment portfolios and properties, including companies and land claimed by 
those people or bodies.  
Furthermore, the rules and directions issued by the supervisors to financial institutions 
(FIs) and designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) incorporate an 
extraordinary section under those rules identified with the announcement of commitments of 
those institutions applying UNSCRs. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) issued 
directions routed to banks within the rules and administrative procedures of the self-regulatory 
organizations (SROs) work received in October 2013. The Capital Markets Authority of Saudi 
Arabia (CMA)issued a statement to the authorized people on their commitment to enforcing 
UNSCRs.  
5.2.7 Kidnapping for Ransom 
In the context of combating terrorism financing, kidnapping for ransom is considered 
the main source of, and most dangerous challenge in combating terrorism financing. In 2014, 
the UN report emphasised that kidnapping as a tactic to fund terrorist activities has dramatically 
increased.534 The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office also stated that the amount of money 
asked for by kidnappers has dramatically risen.535 It usually ranges between 600,000 to 
8,000,000 million euros for each ransom. This source of income constitutes nearly 5-50% of 
the total income of terrorist groups. For example, during the period from 2008 to 2018, terrorist 
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groups, including Al-Qa’idah and IS and others managed to make 222 million USD from 
ransom payments.536 More than half of the budget of Al-Qa’idah in the Arabian Peninsula was 
funded via kidnapping for ransom.537  
This tactic is, in particular, more challenging for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as 
kidnapping people for ransom is a very common phenomenon in countries bordering the 
Kingdom, namely Iraq and Yemen. The Kingdom has experienced this problem several times, 
for example, the Saudi Ambassador in Yemen was kidnapped in March 2012 by Al-Qa’idah 
who asked for a great amount of money and also for some prisoners to be freed. The Saudi 
security spokesman condemned this incident and refused to cooperate and respond to their 
requests. However, the Ambassador was later released in 2015 via cooperation between Saudi 
and Yemeni Intelligence.  
Saudi’s policy of non-cooperation with kidnappers is similar to the policy of several 
other countries, including the USA and UK and may play a strong role in preventing or, at 
least, mitigating the problem of terrorism financing. In our aforementioned example of the 
Saudi ambassador in Yemen, the Saudi Government managed to arrest the kidnappers and 
handed them to the judicial department, who then tried them and punished them. On the other 
hand, other countries such as Germany and France have a different strategy to deal with 
kidnappers, as they give precedence to the safety of their citizens over any other aspect. For 
example, in 2010, France paid millions of dollars to Al-Qa’idah to free Pierre Comate, who 
was kidnapped in Mali.538 This policy might have adverse effects on those states who refuse to 
adhere to the requests of kidnappers and puts hostages in immediate danger. For instance, in 
2009, four European hostages (1 British, 2 Swiss, and 1 German) were kidnapped. The UK 
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followed its policy and refused to pay the ransom to Al-Qa’idah, while the other countries had 
different policies and paid the ransom. These two contradictory policies resulted in the death 
of the British citizen and the other hostages were released.539  
This problem attracted the attention of the SC, which adopted several resolutions under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter that emphasised Resolution 1373’s requirements, asserting that 
terrorists should not gain any ransom or benefit from any political compromises.540 However, 
the challenge is still outstanding, as there are several countries which do not commit to this 
requirement. For example, it was submitted that Qatar routinely engages,541 as a participant, in 
negotiations with terrorists in relation to freeing hostages, even if the latter is not Qatari.542 
They have engaged in many negotiations and paid millions of dollars. For example, Qatar paid 
nearly 1 billion dollars to free 26 of its citizens who were kidnapped in Iraq during a hunting 
trip.543 This issue has raised the fear of the neighbouring states in the region and, indeed, was 
one reason why some Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, decided to break their 
relationship with Qatar. 
5.2.8 Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) 
The right to the establishment of associations is usually protected by human rights law. 
There are many non-profit associations and institutions in the Kingdom which are concerned 
with humanitarian, social, cultural, professional, and scientific aspects. However, organisations 
that carry out political or sectarian activities are forbidden. The right to raise money and use it 
to implement the aims of these associations is the most essential element of their establishment. 
Therefore, placing limitations on their sources of funding to exercise their activities constitutes 
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a blatant intervention in the right to establish these associations.544 Before the events of 
September 11th, there was no management organisation or clear legislation that organised the 
work of these associations in Saudi Arabia.  
NPOs are particularly vulnerable to being misused for terrorism financing purposes.545 
It became evident, particularly after 9/11, that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was facing a great 
challenge. A number of Saudi charitable associations, such as Al-Haramain Foundation, were 
accused of funding terrorist organisations.546 Several philanthropic Saudi nationals used to send 
their Zakah and donations to places where Muslims need more help than any other places in 
the world, in particular the conflict zones, aiming to mitigate the suffering of affected Muslims. 
Such compassion is derived from an Islamic principle that a Muslim's support for other 
Muslims is obligatory. As is well known, the common rule is that each person is free to use 
and spend his or her money, but within a legitimate scope. This is what Saudi society has done 
for the last 50 years. Unfortunately, some extremists misled the public by stirring up their 
religious passion via pictures of dead Muslim children so they can obtain donations and Zakah. 
They used these funds to finance their terrorist activities. Although the right to freedom of 
association is protected, however, it is not absolute. This can be limited for national security or 
public order requirements as long as these limitations have legal bases. Resolution 1373 
compels all states to prevent acts of terrorism financing. In addition, the ICSFT calls upon 
states to forbid all activities that are related to terrorism financing.547 As NPOs are particularly 
vulnerable to being misused for terrorism financing purposes, states are required to ensure that 
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they cannot be exploited by any terrorist organisations. Equally, those states are also required 
not to disrupt or discourage the activities of legitimate charities.  
For these reasons, the Kingdom has faced a huge challenge. It had to choose how to 
deal with charities and donation transactions. There were two choices for the Kingdom. The 
first option was to allow people the freedom to spend their Zakah and donations, either 
externally or internally, via charities that are under governmental oversight and administrative 
and legal jurisdiction. This choice enables donors who are driven by their religious duties to 
fulfil their aims. However, this option means that some of these resources might reach terrorist 
organisations and this, in turn, makes the government liable. The second option is to allow 
people to donate and pay Zakah through specific national charities, which are authorised by 
the Ministry of Labour. On the other hand, charitable donations and foreign relief assistance 
could be consolidated into one institution or government body. This entails state responsibility 
for any misuse or transgression. This state of affairs would then require the Kingdom to make 
a greater effort to avoid these resources reaching terrorist organisations.  
As can be seen, the Kingdom had two choices and there is a strong argument for both. 
The Kingdom chose the second option. It prevented all sorts of charities at mosques and only 
allowed those charities that have a permit to work, and monitored its activities, organised its 
work, and penalised all violations under the Civil Society Associations and Organizations Law. 
The Kingdom also forbade these charities to make any external donations or Zakah, as this 
must be done through the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSRELIEF),548 
which is now the only body authorised to make such monetary transactions. This strategy 
concurs with the SC Resolution 1373 and the ICSFT, which aims to prevent or at least mitigate 
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terrorism financing. Thus, the Government, as can be seen, also committed to its international 
legal commitments, that is the Resolution and the ICSFT. 
However, this choice raises a new challenge for the Government. When someone has a 
desire to donate or pay their Zakah to a certain party and that such a desire is derived by 
religious duty (a mandatory duty), this might increase the potential for these donors to look for 
alternative charities (civil ones), which are supposed to be restricted, instead of governmental 
ones to send their money to. This becomes more challenging when this happens through social 
media which is usually exploited by terrorist organisations when they call for donations, in 
particular those organisations which have a variety of means to manipulate governmental 
measures. For example, it was detected in the Kingdom that some people were sympathetic 
with some donation campaigns run on Twitter. The organisers of these campaigns ask the 
donors to call them through Skype and then ask them to buy international prepaid cards and 
send the numbers of these cards to them. The organisers then sell the cards and send the revenue 
obtained from this process to Syria to fund their terrorist related-activities.549  
In addition to the above challenge, another problem results from the first one. The false 
aims that the terrorists use to manipulate people to obtain their donations raises another 
problem as to how the Government can identify those donors who purposely use this method 
to take part in these illegal activities.550 While some donors are manipulated by false calls for 
donations, others are aware of the real aim of these activities and it can then be difficult for the 
Government to detect them. It is quite difficult to obtain evidence that these funds, transferred 
over the Internet, were used for terrorist related-activities. This challenge highlights the 
importance of monitoring, blocking, or deleting websites that look suspicious, although at the 
same time, it raises the question of the right to privacy and human rights. The latter question 
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will be discussed in the next section. Yet, there is still a lot of work to be done by the 
Government to improve the vitality of social media for the purpose of investigation and using 
it as evidence within the judicial system in Saudi Arabia.    
5.3  International Cooperation  
 Sovereignty is one of the most important principles of international law. This means 
that all states have a right to control their territories.551 However, this principle does not 
constitute an obstacle for criminals who seek to take advantage of it and exploit geographical 
limitations.552 In the past, Saudi prosecutors did not have to look for evidence of any crimes 
committed outside the Kingdom. However, this has now been changed. The articulation of the 
advanced dimensions of the phenomenon of modern criminality, including the external 
dimension, cannot be conducted only within the internal border of a country. It needs exchange 
of information and evidence between countries in order to counter this phenomenon. Crimes 
of terrorism, in particular, have a strong aspect of external dimension, as they are called trans-
border crimes and require effective cooperation among states to force international law. No 
country can stand alone in its battle to counter terrorism unless it follows a cooperative 
approach with other countries and adopts judicial mechanisms which enable it to carry out 
effective measures across borders, so it can ensure that terrorists have no safe place to hide. 
Hence, counter-terrorism nowadays is implemented through establishing bilateral, regional, 
and international agreements, which provide member states with legal rules of international 
cooperation, not geographically defined. For example, the events of 11th September show that 
the perpetrators of this event crossed national borders, trained in one country, and developed 
their plan in other states. Therefore, states have to accept international cooperation in the battle 
to counter terrorism so they can prevent terrorists escaping punishment and, at the same time, 
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maintain their sovereignty. International cooperation in countering terrorism has become an 
international duty, finding its source of obligation in Resolution 1373, which calls upon all 
states to provide assistance to each other in relation to counter-terrorism, including reporting 
the movement of terrorists, and providing judicial and administrative assistance. This 
Resolution noted the close relationship between international terrorism and transnational 
organised crimes. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(UNCATOC) is another legal basis for requiring international cooperation to counter 
terrorism.553 However, the scope of international adherence to international cooperation for 
countering terrorism is not only determined by Resolution 1373 and the UNCATOC, rather its 
scope is also determined by bilateral, regional, or international agreements. Thereafter, the 
implementation of international cooperation occurs in accordance with the provisions of these 
agreements. However, in the absence of such an agreement, a state that is required to provide 
international assistance will abide by its own legal rules. However, it has to provide maximum 
assistance and consider the international legal principles and international legal cooperation, 
such as the principle of state sovereignty and reciprocity. 
Consequently, a number of states entered into bilateral agreements as well as those 
states who shared the same traditions, borders, or close interrelationships.554 Among these 
countries is Saudi Arabia, which ratified the UNACTOC555 and the Riyadh Arab Agreement 
for Judicial Cooperation,556 the Arabian Agreement of Counter-Terrorism, and the Convention 
on the Implementation of Judgments, Disputes and Judicial Declarations in the GCC States, 
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1997.557  The Kingdom also entered into a number of bilateral agreements in relation to 
extradition and legal assistance. The most important ways of engaging in international 
cooperation to counter terrorism are extradition and legal assistance to ensure that terrorists 
have no safe place. In addition to this, intelligence cooperation is another important 
international cooperation, as it is a preventive measure to prohibit the occurrence of a crime or 
mitigate its outcomes. These are discussed and analysed in the following sections, showing the 
extent to which, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has adhered to them under the Law of Terrorist 
Crimes and Financing 2017, as this law assigned a full chapter to deal with the issue of 
international cooperation. 
5.3.1 Extradition 
The extradition of criminals for justice, as one of the images of international 
cooperation, is vitally important to try them and enforce the sentences issued against them by 
a requesting state. This is because the trial of terrorists is usually vested in the national courts, 
as there are no international courts which have jurisdiction. International agreements and 
protocols in relation to counter-terrorism require their member states to consider extradition in 
relation to the crimes embedded in these international legal agreements and protocols. Also, 
prevention agreements, generally, specify the sorts of illegal activities, however, they do not 
organise the way by which national authorities apply their domestic laws.558 Therefore, it would 
be possible to implement an agreement correctly once the detail of the national system becomes 
deceptive. This makes the agreement workable.559 In organising the issues related to 
extradition, the Saudi authorities relied on Article 42, of the Basic Law of Governance, which 
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international agreements shall specify the rules and procedures for the extradition of ordinary 
criminals. 'In addition, in the context of counter-terrorism, the authorities rely on the Law of 
Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing 2017, in relation to the issue of extradition, 
where Article 73 of this law provides that 'the accused or convicted may be extradited to or by 
another state for any of the offenses provided for in the Law, provided that extradition is 
affected pursuant to a valid agreement between the Kingdom and the requesting State or 
reciprocity principle. If a request for extradition is rejected for any of these crimes, he shall be 
tried by the competent courts in the Kingdom. In this regard, the investigations carried out by 
the requesting state shall be used, and the Regulations [of this law] shall determine the 
mechanism of receiving and extradition '. In its approach to extradition, the Kingdom relies on 
the agreements that it ratifies. In case where there is no agreement, the Kingdom follows the 
principle of reciprocity that is commonly adopted by the vast majority of states. 
In addition, the Saudi authorities follow many other states' policies in relation to the 
issue of extradition of its citizens, that is, it does not extradite its citizens. In this case, the 
Kingdom tries those wanted through its own courts. However, rejecting a request for 
extradition raises several challenges. This resulted in several states being critical of the practice 
of non-extradition of citizens and some states found alternatives to the issue of non-extradition. 
For example, the Netherlands and the USA signed an extradition treaty where both countries 
agreed to extradite their citizens to the other state, however on the proviso that after having 
been tried by the requesting state, they must return to their own country to complete their 
sentence if the individual is subsequently convicted of another offence in their own country.560 
This researcher believes it would be positive to further study this issue to determine whether a 
future change in Saudi policy is possible as it would ensure that criminals do not escape justice. 
 




It is well known that some governments support terrorism and terrorist organisations for their 
own political aims,561 where terrorists can find a safe place to stay. The case of Lockerbie is a 
good example in this regard. The Libyan law of penal procedures prevents the extradition of 
citizens to be tried outside the country which enabled the Libyan Government to refuse to 
extradite its citizens in this case. Further to this, in the case that the given state is not involved 
in the terrorist activity, the sentence the terrorist receives in his home country may be lighter 
than that given in the place where the crime was committed. For instance, if a foreigner 
commits a terrorist crime in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, such an act usually attracts a death 
sentence, whereas, in his own country, the sentence is usually lesser, such as prison, hence, it 
would be better for him to be tried in his own country. These different outcomes for the same 
person for the same act do not fulfil the ultimate aim of international cooperation.   
Based on its international commitments, the Saudi Public Prosecutor revealed that in 
2015 and 2016, the Kingdom handed over 91 wanted criminals of different nationalities and 
for different crimes, including terrorist crimes, to states to which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
had entered into bilateral, regional, and international agreements. In accordance with the 
principle of reciprocity and courtesy, and during the same period of time, the Saudi authorities 
handed 14 criminals wanted for different crimes including terrorist crimes to states with which 
there were no agreements between them. It is worth noting that if the Kingdom rejected a 
request for extradition, the relevant Saudi judicial body would try the wanted person, with the 
help of investigations done by the country who sought extradition.562 On the other hand, the 
principle of extradition or trial cannot be implemented unless the requesting state exchanges 
legal assistance with the requested state. This, in turn, shows the importance of legal assistance. 
5.3.2 Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) 
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MLA is another method of cooperation among states and provides assistance in 
investigatory and prosecutorial activities. It is also used by states to obtain materials that cannot 
be obtained through the domestic enforcement of law. This method of cooperation is usually 
required from courts or prosecutors and is referred to as ‘judicial cooperation’.563 MLA also 
deals with all aspects of criminal cases, including collecting evidence and hearing witnesses. 
Therefore, nowadays this has become an important factor in the global government, because 
domestic legal enforcement authorities cannot work outside its valid jurisdiction. MLA is an 
important part of the international obligation, just like extradition of the wanted, imposed by 
Resolution 1373, which obliges all states to provide each other with all maximum legal 
assistance in the context of investigatory and prosecutorial activities and all criminal 
procedures related to terrorist crimes.564 In addition, the Resolution calls upon all states to take 
all measures and establish bilateral and collective agreements to counter terrorism. The 
Resolution focuses attention on this particular method and broadens its scope, especially when 
the Resolution uses the term ‘maximum legal assistance’. States need to understand this method 
in its wide usage, as intended by the Resolution, because this would boost counter-terrorism 
strategies.  
In addition, UNLACOT also follows a wide scope of MLA. This convention involves 
a number of measures that a state needs to implement in the context of providing MLA to each 
other. The wide scope of the concept of MLA undertaken by this convention can be noted in 
one of its articles which states that any request for any investigative measure that is not 
mentioned in the convention should be given, as long as this request does not contradict with 
domestic legislations. It also allows information sharing between states without the need for a 
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formal request.565 As the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a party to the Arabian Agreement of 
Counter-Terrorism, it is committed to providing maximum legal assistance for all criminal 
procedures of terrorist crimes.566 In addition, a number of international agreements require 
nominating a central authority, assigned with the responsibility of receiving MLA, its 
implementation, and referring it to the relevant authorities. For this reason, the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia established the Permanent Committee of Legal Assistance, which is tasked to 
send and receive MLA requests between states and international and regional organisations in 
order to counter terrorism and achieve as much international cooperation as possible in 
collecting evidence, investigating suspects and the wanted, and discovering the records of 
criminals and prosecuting them. The Law of 2017 assigned to this Committee the task of 
receiving MLA in relation to the terrorist crimes referred to in this Law.567 As previously 
mentioned, the Law of 2017 criminalised all acts of terrorism that are criminalised by all 
conventions and protocols plus the acts that the Law of 2017 added. Therefore, the Committee 
exercises its mission to punish crimes either mentioned in the Law of 2017 or any of the other 
conventions and protocols.568       
The Law of 2017 follows the same approach as UNSC Resolution 1373 and UNLACOT 
by expanding the concept of MLA. This can be noted when the Law authorises administrative 
authorities, criminal control authorities, law enforcing bodies, and supervisory authorities 
which are responsible for countering terrorism and its finance, investigation, inspection, fund 
freezing, arresting, prosecution, and trials to exchange the available information with 
counterparts in other states, conducting investigations on behalf of the Kingdom, creating 
mutual investigatory teams to provide assistance, or ‘controlled delivery’ of money by other 
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states through current agreements or the principle of reciprocity.569 The Law also authorises 
the Financial Investigation Unit to exchange information or make agreements with foreign 
bodies.570 However, this power given to the Financial Investigation Unit is conditioned on its 
commitment only to use the information given to it for the assigned purpose. It is true that the 
Law asks for this limitation, nonetheless, this does not limit the clear expansion in the meaning 
of the concept of MLA. The above limitation is only related to financial issues. It seems this 
particular condition is a measure to protect bank secrecy rules. 
The Kingdom is also concerned with MLA in the context of criminal crimes. This was 
endorsed in the Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation.571 This principle is also 
embraced in the Arab Gulf States, as the Saudi Public Prosecutor stated ‘[t]he Gulf states 
believe in the importance of developing judicial cooperation relations between their judicial 
agencies to ensure cooperation and achievement as soon as possible, such as the use of public 
prosecutors for a direct communication base with all the available means of communication 
between them in relation to the exchange of information of international terrorist crimes and 
organised crimes.’ The Kingdom has always declared its readiness to cooperate with other 
states to counter terrorism, however, it rarely mentions a specific situation. For example, in 
2016, A spokesman for the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Interior, General Mansour Al-Turki 
mentioned that Saudi and German security experts exchanged information about evidence that 
proved that one of the terrorist attackers in Germany was in touch with IS by using one of the 
social media outlets, using a Saudi phone number.572  
As explained earlier, the extradition of wanted persons and MLA are usually carried 
out via international, regional, or bilateral agreements. At the same time, we often see some 
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states enter into a bilateral agreement, and also into international and regional ones for the same 
subject. This usually raises a question about a potential contradiction that may occur between 
these different agreements to which a state is party. What is the position of the Kingdom in this 
regard? In order to answer this question, we refer to Higgin’s approach. In making a decision 
as to which choice to select from two strong ones, Higgins tends to select the one that achieves 
the given aim of the context. By looking at the principle of extradition and MLA, we note that 
these two means aim to prevent transnational organised crimes by ensuring that a criminal does 
not escape justice. This is one of the preventives means of countering international terrorism 
to prevent the occurrence of crimes in the future. The approach of the Kingdom, in this regard, 
is embodied in the Royal Decree (No. 14, 1999), and issued in relation to the ratification of the 
Arabian Agreement of Judicial Cooperation. This Decree states that in the case of the 
contradiction between the provisions of this Agreement and another agreement, an agreement 
that more secures the extradition of the wanted and fulfils security and judicial cooperation, 
shall apply. The Saudi Arabian Kingdom suggested modifying this Agreement in a way that 
concurs with the latter approach by the Kingdom, which is what happened. Article 69, of the 
Arabian Agreement was modified in a way that corresponds with the Kingdom's view that 
makes the achievement of the ultimate aims of the Agreement a criterion of making a choice 
between two contradictory agreements. As can be seen, it appears that the policy of the 
Kingdom in selecting the most judicious decision that achieves the given aim of the policy is 
in conformity with Higgins' policy-orientated approach.   
The Saudi authorities, follow many state policies in relation to the issue of extradition. 
It does not extradite its citizens. It also requires double criminality, where the given crime for 
which extradition is requested should be criminalised in the legislation of both countries. This 
policy concurs with the principle that a state does not participate in punishing acts that are not 
penalised in its own legislation. However, this principle becomes less important when it comes 
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to terrorist crimes, as most international conventions and protocols of counter-terrorism do not 
require such a condition, but only require them to include a number of crimes within their 
national legislations. Such an inclusion would enable the criminal legislation of the member 
states to be harmonised and the legal terminologies of international cooperation would be 
unified, resulting in the similarity of crimes, set out in the legislations of all states.  This makes 
the condition of double criminality less needed.  
5.3.3 The Rule of Non-Enquiry 
In regard to the question of extradition, the rule of non-enquiry was for a long time seen 
as an essential standard and commonly used within the common law states.573 The principle 
means that the requested state abstains from investigating the justice system of the requesting 
state and the conditions of extradition.574 However, the principle has lost its underlying weight 
recently. Especially in the context of conventions, such as the UNLACOT,575 where states are 
usually inclined to abandon this principle in practice due to the trust problems between member 
states in relation to the given convention. When it comes to MLA, it is well known for speed 
and flexibility and extensive investigations concerning the specifics of the justice system of the 
other state could straightforwardly challenge this point.  As explained, the crimes of terrorism 
are crimes that constitute a threat to international peace and security, therefore all states are 
required to counter them. If we consider the rule of non-enquiry from the wide perspective of 
international law, we follow Higgins’ policy-oriented approach in selecting the best decision 
that could achieve the aim, which, in our context, is the prevention of terrorism and ensuring 
terrorists do not escape punishment. This would generate a sense of flexibility among states in 
relation to the question of international cooperation. In fact, there are some states who followed 
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the flexible approach in the context of MLA. For example, in the case of the “Bali Nine” (2005), 
where nine Australian citizens were arrested on charges of drug trafficking at the airport in 
Bali, Australian authorities showed full flexibility and completely cooperated with Indonesian 
authorities, even though the Indonesian Government may have sentenced the accused to death 
for their crimes. In this regard, the Commission of the AFP commented that "we operate within 
our criminal-justice system here in Australia, and if we only co-operated with countries that 
had the same criminal-justice system, then our co-operation wouldn't extend very far beyond 
Australia. We have to work with the systems that operate in other countries, and to a large 
degree this has been successful”. Senator Chris Ellis also commented on this case, saying that 
"It's certainly not in breach of Australian law for there to be police-to-police assistance on a 
matter which may carry the death penalty".576 Indeed, several of those arrested were sentenced 
to death in 2015 and the rest were sentenced to life in prison. Such flexibility between states in 
mutual cooperation is a positive response to the requirements of UNSC Resolution 1373.   
5.3.4 Intelligence Cooperation 
As terrorism is an international affair, the response to combat it has been increasingly 
undertaken in coalition, where states provide financial, technical, and logistical help to each 
other, as well as security training and intelligence support to increase the potential to combat 
terrorist threats.577 The specialised departments and agencies of counter-terrorism in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have started to exchange intelligence with other states and regional 
and international bodies, as a sort of early warning to combat terrorism. The Kingdom's 
commitment to this cooperation stems from the international and regional conventions it signs, 
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or the principle of reciprocity.578 In order to combat terrorism, the Kingdom’s cooperation with 
organisations and states is as follows: 
1. Cooperation with Organisations 
a. Interpol: The Kingdom exchanges a wide range of information through the 
Interpol database. For example, in March 2009, the Kingdom gave the names of nearly 
80 persons suspected of being terrorists and related to Al-Qa’idah. This is the largest 
number in the history of Interpol. In addition, this cooperation was a reason for the 
Kingdom to gain the confidence of Interpol, the Middle Eastern states, and the northern 
states of Africa, who unanimously voted, at the headquarters of the Office in Lyon in 
April 2018, for the Kingdom to host the regional office of Interpol in the Middle East 
and the northern African region.579  
b. Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units: In accordance with the 
Kingdom’s strategy of counter-terrorism, the Saudi Arabian Financial Investigation 
Unit (SAFIU), a member of the Egmont Group,580 exchanged intelligence through the 
group's secret site in relation to those who have been classified or are suggested to be 
classified as suspects of committing illegal financial operations. This cooperation 
process was conducted through flexible procedures in relation to the exchange of 
intelligence, or providing assistance, except the ones that might impede investigations’ 
related activities or any other legal process within the legal system of a state. The 
Kingdom is party to this Group581 as well as to MENAFATF.582 
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c. The Islamic Military Alliance to Combat Terrorism: This alliance consists of 44 
member states and its headquarters is in Ar-Riyadh. Its main goals are the exchange of 
intelligence among member states, supporting states, and international organisations in 
relation to counter-terrorism and supporting other alliances.583 For example, the 
Kingdom provided military assistance to West African states, including Mali, Burkina 
Faso, Chad, and Niger; and also delivered financial assistance of USD$100 million.  
2. Cooperation with States: The Kingdom has paid significant attention to this aspect of 
counter-terrorism, as was asserted by the Secretary of the Saudi Standing Committee of 
Counter-Terrorism during my interview with him on February 2017.584 He mentioned that the 
Kingdom has played a vital role, in recent years, in detecting several terrorist plans and the 
infiltration of terrorists into the territories of several European capital cities. For example, he 
stated that ‘the Saudi Intelligence service exchanged information about a shipment of explosive 
parcels sent from Yemen to the USA through the Emirates Airlines, which were supposed to 
target several sites of Jewish worship and that President Obama thanked the Kingdom for its 
efforts to thwart these threats before they took place.’ In the interview, the Secretary provided 
me with more examples of the efforts and the outcomes of the Kingdom’s cooperation with 
states in relation to combating terrorism.585 He told me that ‘Prime Minister David Cameron 
mentioned the information received from the [Saudi] Kingdom in relation to a suicide bombing 
in London in October 2015.’586 ‘In December 2016, Prime Minister Teresa May declared that 
the information received from the Kingdom helped save a lot of innocent people in the UK, 
during her meeting with the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council, convened in Bahrain’.587 
The Secretary also asserted to me that the Kingdom is concerned with the security of all states 
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in the world through cooperative means even with states with which there is no Saudi 
representative or there is no cooperation with them. He continued, ‘the Kingdom does not 
hesitate to exchange or send intelligence with any states as a sort of an early warning through 
different methods. This includes the submission of intelligence through the permanent delegate 
of the Kingdom to the UN to the permanent delegate of the targeted states or through a 
mediator; the submission of the intelligence to the nearest Embassy of the targeted states or 
through an embassy of a mediator; or the submission of the intelligence to the resident 
counterpart in the Kingdom who in turn passes the information to the targeted state.’588  
Having explored the strategy of the Kingdom in relation to its policy of cooperation 
with states and organisations, based on Resolution 1373’s obligations, there are several 
challenges that might impact both the international and Saudi strategies of counter-terrorism. 
For example, the commitment of the Kingdom to Resolution 1373 raises a legal question. In 
case a state provides assistance (submitting information) to another state in relation to 
combating terrorism and the latter exploits such assistance to conduct illegal acts under 
international law, will the assisting state be responsible for this act under international law? 
For instance, is the installation of airbases in a state’s region illegal in the case where flights 
from these bases are utilized to carry out airstrikes in breach of international law? In the event 
that the assisting state provides intelligence to bolster these strikes, is it obliged to verify in 
advance the circumstances in which this information will be utilized?  It is true that Resolution 
1373 obliges states to cooperate with each other, nevertheless this does not mean that such an 
obligation is not limited. Cooperation among states is limited to not being contrary to 
international law. The law in this zone incorporates a common rule, provided in Article 16 of 
the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, which declares that a 
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state that helps or aids another state commit a universally wrongful act by the beneficiary state 
is universally responsible.589 
There are a few limits on what can be uncovered within the setting of sensitive counter-
terrorism activities, owing to worries that a revelation may compromise national security or 
have a negative effect on the relationship with other countries. Also, there is a demand for 
private meetings between officials in government, and between governments, so that each side 
can comprehend the other’s legitimate reasoning for military actions. Such meetings or 
consultations can offer assistance to outline the public discussions on a few central legitimate 
issues. However, fundamental information about how countries comprehend the lawful system 
administering their assistance, and the lawful rules underlying the conduct that they aid, is 
unlikely to be so delicate.590 There should be a better balance between sufficient involvement 
and the reservation of information. The Director of the USA National Intelligence, James R 
Clapper, stated that there is a need to establish a sweet spot between involvement and the 
protection of information.591  
Other challenges that might impact the international strategy of counter-terrorism is the 
importance of the presence of well-trained people who are able to detect accurate information 
and data for decision-makers. For example, regarding the Brussels’ attacks in 2016, the 
investigations showed that there was a weak system in exchanging intelligence among the 
different security services and the inaccuracy of the intelligence that they collected in relation 
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to the extreme terrorist networks.592 The investigations of the Parliament Committee stated that 
the security services failed to obtain accurate and precise information on those who carried out 
the attacks at the metro station and the airport in Brussels. Several experts claimed that there 
was a failed system of exchanging intelligence between the six police stations in Brussels; 
between the local police and the federal police; and the different security services.593 
A further challenge is the lack of interest of states in the intelligence that they receive. 
For example, in the 1990s, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia called for the international community 
to hand over Usama Bin Laden to its authorities, however, there was no response to this call. 
In addition, in 2014, then King Abdullah, during his meeting with the ambassadors of some 
states, sent a message to the leaders of the world stating the importance of combating terrorism, 
using force, wisdom, and speed, referring to the danger of IS. He added that any neglect of this 
phenomenon would lead to the spread of terrorist threats to Europe and the USA within months. 
The President of Turkey had also warned Belgium about Ibrahim Al-Bakrawi, one of the 
perpetrators of the Brussel attacks in 2016,594 but the authorities in Belgium neglected this 
information. Therefore, if the international community had responded to the Kingdom’s 
warnings and calls, would the events of 11th September have happened, would we have 
witnessed the spread of IS, and would the Brussels attacks have taken place? 
It seems currently that most states have realised the need to commit to Resolution 1373 
in relation to the importance of cooperation, so they can address the danger of terrorism. For 
example, in November 2017, and for the sake of boosting the role of the security services 
between countries in the European Union, the latter approved a package of new amendments, 
aimed to improve cooperation and the exchange of intelligence between these countries. For 
 
592 Renard T. ‘European and Global, Counterterrorism in Belgium: Key Challenges and Policy Options’, Egmont Paper, 
October (2016), at [https://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2016/10/Egmont-Paper-89_OFFICIAL-
FINAL.pdf?type=pdf]. 




instance, if any terrorist attack takes place in some of these countries, all states must share all 
intelligence quickly. In addition, if any of these states prohibits a person access to its country, 
this information should be shared with the others. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also developed 
its strategy of sharing intelligence with other states and put this issue on top of its priorities to 
combat terrorism.    
5.3.5 Future Challenge 
The big future challenge for intelligence agencies and the states’ strategies of counter-
terrorism was discussed by former US Secretary of Homeland Security, Jeh Johnson, in 2014, 
during an interview with CNN at the Reagan National Defense Forum, that "The new 
phenomenon that I see that I'm very concerned about, is somebody who has never met another 
member of that terrorist organization, never trained at one of the camps, who is simply inspired 
by the social media -- the literature, the propaganda, the message -- to commit an act of violence 
in this country." This is known in the field of counter-terrorism as the ‘Lone Wolf’.595 The lone 
wolf has long been a problematic issue for policymakers and intelligence agencies.  The 
isolation and withdrawn nature of this phenomenon makes it troublesome to proactively 
accumulate data about their potential pernicious malignant intentions.596  
In September of 2014, Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani, the official representative of IS, 
encouraged devotees, sympathizers and Muslims living in Western nations to “kill 
[Westerners] in any manner”.597 In fact, he depended on the fertile ground that Al-Qa’idah had 
already laid since 2000 in the USA. The most vocal advocate of this phenomenon was Yemen 
preacher: Anwar Al-Awlaki,598 who was one of the writers of Al-Qa’idah’s journal, which 
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issues its articles in English.  In the literature, the Internet plays a major role in lone wolf 
terrorism. It is believed to be a driver of the threat, by others as a quicker actor, and by a few 
commentators as a surrogate community – a social space in which the lone persons feel they 
belong.599 
Senator Dianne Feinstein, member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, also referred 
to this, stating that the question of lone wolves is a big problem, including the use of the Internet 
by homeless Muslims, who are fuelling this phenomenon.600 The multiple attacks that were 
witnessed in 2014 reveal that the propaganda being publicized has an effective impact and the 
best way to combat this is through the exchange of intelligence. However, this is a harsh 
response, as it entails the use of certain techniques that might not satisfy the Americans. This 
is what caused the UN’s Counter- Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to caution that 
the quick pace of technological progress encouraged international communication, travel and 
access to data.  
However, it seems that lone wolves are not totally isolated. They have been 
communicating in the virtual world, obtained training and were recruited through chat rooms. 
This led Robert Hannigan601 to accuse several US tech companies, working within the Silicon 
Valley, to be the favourite command and control network for terrorists,602 revealing that 
members of IS (Daish) in Syria and Iraq used social media to intimidate people and inspire 
potential extremists throughout the world to join them.  
It can be noted from the statement of the Head of British Intelligence, that governments 
concerned with the war on extremism are not individually able to face the phenomenon of lone 
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wolves. In fact, it may only happen through cooperation with private companies owning social 
networking websites in the sense of spying on the users. However, the dilemma faced by these 
developed states, which are democratic in nature, is the issue of a breach of privacy and the 
right of everyone to privacy, which in turn, will violate the national laws of these states that 
prevent the use of spying techniques on its users. Thus, the question in such a scenario is, which 
is more important and vital -the protection of privacy or the protection of societies and the lives 
of people from the threat of terrorism? Which of these two arguments should take priority? 
These are two opposing arguments, and each has strong reasonings to defend its argument. 
How can this dilemma be solved? 
In the context of countering organised terrorism, international cooperation should be 
based on a fundamental principle that should conform to human rights’ requirements and the 
protection of the freedoms of individuals. If this basic condition is not met, then the measures 
undertaken to counter terrorism will be criticised and not considered legitimate, hence, the 
matter might be exploited by criminal organisations.603  
5.4  Human Rights 
The importance of human rights laws is that the overlap between national security and 
human rights has been one of the thorniest issues in international law.604 Legal systems usually 
face a dual responsibility towards the question of human rights. States face a dilemma of being 
obliged to ensure their citizens are safe from terrorist attacks whilst at the same time ensuring 
that their general human rights are protected when taking anti-terrorism measures. The 
measures taken to counter terrorism and protect human rights should be complementary to each 
other and reinforce each other’s goals. The Human Rights Committee of the United Nations 
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asserted that states shall be committed to undertake necessary measures to protect its 
individuals within its jurisdictions, however, the personal security of those people shall not be 
ignored.605 The European Human Rights Court also emphasised that not all means of counter-
terrorism are acceptable, and that states, under the pretext of countering terrorism, cannot adopt 
any measures without considering the question of human rights.606  
The question of the threat of terrorism and human rights requires states to consider the 
balance between both and that such a balance is subjected to the degree of danger of a state’s 
national security. If the danger reaches a level of gravity that triggers a state of emergency, 
then the rules to counter such a state of affairs need to increase the powers of governments to 
react to such a danger, using their power, resources, and flexibility. The reconciliation between 
these two questions can occur without sacrificing human rights’ considerations in any way,607 
as there are rights which cannot be undermined under any reason, such as the right to life and 
personal safety. The then-Secretary General, Kofi Annan, also asserted during the international 
summit on democracy and terrorism held in Madrid in 2005, that human rights and the rule of 
law should be respected, and that the disregard for human rights would be in contradiction with 
a successful strategy of counter-terrorism. He added that states which sacrifice human rights in 
reality are assisting the terrorists, as this may make the terrorists’ goals easier to achieve, as 
those who have had their human rights violated may lose trust in their government and cause 
them to re-evaluate their principles.608 
The balance between human rights and national security is usually subjected to a set of 
political, social, religious, and cultural factors. The aggregation of these factors plays an 
important role in how the legal systems of states deal with the above two questions. Higgins 
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refers to them as extra-legal considerations that cannot be separated from the decision-making 
process, and can be taken into consideration by decision-makers in order to reach the best 
possible decision. Higgins opines that justice, the meaning of which differs from one society 
to another, cannot be achieved without considering these factors. Usually, decision-makers, in 
the context of criminal justice, face dilemmas as to how to apply legal rules that may appear 
contradictory with the given context, and this may result in justice being jeopardised. This 
scenario corresponds with the question of human rights in the Kingdom’s policy, which 
considers Islamic Shariah to be the only source of all its legal regulations, which, in turn, aims 
to protect human rights in accordance with the international criteria of human rights that 
conform only to the doctrine of Shariah Law and Saudi culture. The Saudi Arabian policy is 
based on Shariah Law, is different to the European or American understanding of human rights, 
though there might be some similarity in the two concepts. This state of affairs has been 
emphasised by several Saudi officials, including the Saudi Crown Prince, who said ‘We don’t 
share values. But we also believe that different states in the US also don’t share values. There 
are different values between California and Texas. So, how do you expect us to share your 
values 100 percent when you do not share your own values?’609  In Saudi Arabia, some steps 
that are taken by the government in relation to the question of human rights, such as the 
establishment of the National Assembly of Human Rights, have been widely denounced by 
extremists. They accused the government of “abandoning Islamic values and adopting the 
Jewish concept of human rights.” To back their claim, they cited former Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir Muhammad's outrageous assertion that Jews “invented human rights and 
democracy” so as to achieve legal equality with Christians and thus seize control of government 
 




in predominantly Christian countries, implying that the same would be done in the Muslim 
world.610  
In this section, we discuss the question of balance between Saudi national security and 
human rights in the context of counter-terrorism, as perceived by the Saudi Government’s 
policy, and the extent to which this policy is in conformity with the international legal 
commitments.   
5.4.1 The International and National Legal Framework 
Saudi Arabia is a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council. It has been 
elected for the fourth time from 2017 to 2019. In addition, the Kingdom is a party to another 5 
out of 9 international conventions and 3 protocols on human-rights-related issues. It is also a 
member of the Arab Charter on Human Rights.611 These memberships require that the 
Kingdom is committed to its international and regional responsibilities on the question of 
human rights. Resolution 1373 also made a narrow reference to the question of human rights 
and this was in the context of granting refugee status. However, the first chairman of the CTC 
asserted in 2002, that the assessment of whether states comply with human rights rules is 
outside its jurisdiction. This caused some member states of the UN to pay more attention to 
counter-terrorism imperatives, as a way of a formal pretext to ignore human rights. For 
example, the UK argues that the UN Charter imperatives are superior to the ones laid down in 
the CTC under Resolution 1373.612 This made the SC issue Resolution 1456, in 2003, which 
calls states to ‘ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism complies with all their 
obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with 
international law, in particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law;’.613 
 
610 Taheri A, Saudi Arabia: Between Terror and Reform, American Foreign Policy Interests, (2004). 
611 Saudi Human Rights Commission, http://www.hrc.gov.sa/ar-sa/Pages/home.aspx. 
612 Mariner J. ‘The UN Counter Terrorism and Human Rights’, The Stanley Foundation, (September 2017). 
613 UNSC, Resolution 1456 (2003), Article, 6. 
249 
 
Thereafter, the CTC started to require states to respect their responsibilities towards human 
rights when countering terrorism. In 2005, the Human Rights Committee decided to assign a 
Special Rapporteur whose mandate was to boost and protect human rights in the context of 
countering terrorism. Therefore, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is committed to respecting 
human rights before the SC (the CTC).614  
The history of the protection of human rights in the Kingdom has gone through different 
stages, each having a different form that suited the given period of time. The most important 
change undertaken in this regard is the issuance of the Law of Basic Governance, which 
explicitly confirms the necessity of the protection of human rights. For example, Article 26 
provides that ‘the State shall protect human rights in accordance with the Islamic Shari‘ah.’ It 
also emphasises the importance of respecting a number of human rights, such as justice and 
equity before judiciary and the right to security.615 Article 36 provides that ‘the State shall 
provide security to all its citizens and residents. A person’s actions may not be restricted, nor 
may he be detained or imprisoned, except under the provisions of the Law.’ Thereafter, a 
number of laws were issued that were concerned about the question of human rights that 
together establish a legal framework for the protection of human rights.  
In addition, a number of human rights’ departments were founded in the Kingdom 
within several ministries. In 1997, the King issued a Royal Order that established the High 
Committee of Human Rights, whose members were high-profile officials in the Kingdom. This 
Committee also founded the National Assembly of Human Rights in 2004. This is the first 
independent body, the civil assembly, which is not subjected to any governmental supervision 
and whose mandate is to defend the human rights of all Saudi citizens, residents, and visitors. 
In 2008, the Saudi Government established an independent governmental body, called the 
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Human Rights Body and whose president is a minister; and serves at the pleasure of the King. 
This body aims to protect the human rights in accordance with the international criteria that are 
in conformity with Shariah Law and Saudi culture.616 In addition to these steps, a number of 
governmental and non-governmental institutions were created in the Kingdom to look after the 
question of human rights. One of the most important ones is the King Abdul-Aziz Centre for 
National Dialogue, which aims to address national issues, including human rights issues 
through a national dialogue which brings together all different communities and societies. It 
also aims to create a suitable and valid environment in which people can express their opinions 
through national meetings in different parts of the Kingdom.    
5.4.2 Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism in Saudi Arabia 
The Law of 2017 does not make any reference to the question of human rights when 
countering terrorism, however, it refers all issues that have not been addressed by it to the Law 
of Criminal Procedures, which is the one that makes reference to the question of human 
rights.617 The Law of 2017 should have reference to the question of human rights due to its 
importance to ensure that the authorities enforcing this Law are committed to upholding human 
rights. In this section, we discuss some human rights issues in the Kingdom in the context of 
countering terrorism.618  
5.4.2.1 Right to Personal Safety 
Most human rights conventions forbid torture, cruel treatment, and degrading penalties. 
Despite the existence of such human rights conventions, states who have suffered from 
terrorism have gone through exceptional experiences that oblige them, equally, to undertake 
exceptional measures to combat it. Some people opined that some states have used torture as a 
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legitimate means of power. For example, Dershowitz619 opines that the result of a simple 
analysis of the calculation of cost and benefit of the use of torture which does not lead to death 
is clear and does not require argument. This is because the torture of one terrorist in a way 
which does not lead to death who is hiding important information about a supposed terrorist 
act is much better than the devastating outcome (thousands of victims) that may occur if the 
terrorist act takes place.620 Such an opinion raised the concern of the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in relation to allegations that some states have used secret 
detention centres, where suspects were moved to other places through illegitimate ways.621  
It is the opinion of the researcher, based on the experiences of some states, that the use 
of violence as a way of countering terrorism will generate more violence and therefore, result 
in more victims. In addition, states should enable their citizens to use their rights and not 
sacrifice those rights when countering terrorism.622 The latter mission should be conducted 
through legal tools. The right of people to be protected from torture is an absolute right and 
cannot be derogated for any reason under international law. Judge Frank Forter623 stated that 
absolute rules inevitably lead to exceptions and these exceptions would erode the rules.624 In 
his assessment of the British legislation of counter-terrorism issued in 1996, Lord Lloyd stated 
that the legislation against terrorism should be close and similar to criminal law and the law of 
procedures as much as can be done. He also added that crimes and the extra authority can only 
be justified if they are necessary to counter the expected threat and that the balance between 
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security necessities and the rights and freedom of individuals should be balanced, and that 
national laws should be in conformity with states’ responsibilities under international law.625  
The Kingdom is a party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Saudi Criminal Procedures Law also forbids 
abusing those who have been arrested, physically and morally,626 and that they shall not be 
subjected to torture or degrading treatment. The same Law also provides that the investigation 
of a suspect shall not be carried out in a way that may affect the will of suspect, and that 
coercion shall not be used.627 Further to this, another Royal Decree was issued which punishes 
the abuse of power in any criminal proceedings, such as violating human rights or 
mistreatment.628 These prohibitions are also asserted in the Law of Prison and Detention. The 
latter law prohibits assaulting prisoners and detainees in any sense of assault, and that any 
perpetrators should be disciplined.629 There are five prisons for the accused and those convicted 
of crimes of terrorism. For example, the prison of investigation is one of these prisons and is 
under the oversight of the State Security Presidency. There are also a number of offices 
established to follow and address the complaints of prisoners, such as offices of banks, political 
parties, the Public Prosecutor, and the body of human rights. In addition, all investigation 
rooms are fitted with CCTVs to ensure the integrity of the investigation procedures.630 
In his former capacity as UN Special Rapporteur, Ben Emmerson631 visited the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 2017, to assess the progress made by the state in its legal and 
policy systems in the fight against terrorism, in relation to international human rights law and 
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standards. He praised the transparency and the high-end, constructive and cooperative manner 
facilitated by the Saudi government to this official visit. He also visited a number of prisons, 
including the prison of investigation and some divisions of police, and conducted a number of 
interviews with some suspects and those convicted of terrorism. Further to this, he showed his 
admiration, in particular, with the circumstances of detention in the five prisons. He also 
checked all utilities in all prisons and spoke with most of the staff in the prisons. He confirmed 
in his report that the level of care and the circumstances of detention in these utilities, including 
the medical and entertainment facilities, is of high quality.632 
The Special Rapporteur also mentioned that despite the positive developments, there 
were still a number of human rights concerns with regard to abusive counter-terrorism, 
security-related legislation, and the ‘overboard’ definition of terrorism adopted by the 
Kingdom. Particularly, he was concerned about the death sentence and that such a sentence 
should be only applied against the perpetrators of the most serious crimes that result in the loss 
of many lives. This has been addressed in the Law of Combating Terrorist Crimes and its 
Financing (2017), which declares that the death penalty will only be applied to crimes 
stipulated in the law, which result in the death of one or more persons.633 The same Law also 
authorises the relevant court with the right to use the death penalty against any person who 
abducts a person, or uses means of transport, if accompanied by the use of a weapon or 
explosives. Generally, the death penalty is only applied in the Kingdom for the gravest crimes 
and on a low scale, as such cases are reviewed by 15 judges throughout different stages of the 
trial.634 However, with the existence of all these guarantees, there is also a big challenge in 
relation to the death penalty. Most states have abolished the death penalty and therefore may 
refuse any sort of cooperation with those states that have not. The challenge becomes worse, 
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as the four most populous countries in the world apply the death penalty. This may result in 
difficulties in areas of inter-state cooperation over terrorism. 
In this regard and in order to avoid the above challenges, and according to the view of 
Higgins, who opines those extra-legal considerations should be taken into account when 
making a decision, this researcher believes that the religion of Islam (Shariah Law), is a 
relevant consideration, as this determines the existence of the death penalty. Thereupon, if this 
penalty is a reason for the loss of cooperation with other states who consider this punishment 
as contradictory to human rights, then the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would face two choices: 
one being to  keep the punishment and lose the opportunity to cooperate with states who do not 
wish to deal with countries who apply the death penalty, or two, it may look for an alternative 
solution that boosts the relationship with those states and therefore effectively counters 
terrorism. The Kingdom should decide which approach might help it to achieve its ultimate 
goal, which is, in this regard, countering terrorism. Therefore, according to Higgins’ policy-
oriented approach, this researcher suggests that the Kingdom abandon the death penalty in such 
cases, as this may accomplish the interests of Saudi society and at the same time correspond to 
the enactment of Shariah Law which also seeks to fulfil the interests of Islamic society. This 
does not mean eliminating the death penalty from Islamic legislation in an absolute sense, 
however, it could involve a suspension of this penalty and replacing it with life sentences or 
long-term imprisonment. There are a number of instances that show that some Islamic rulings 
have been suspended and replaced with other ones due to changing interests and that such a 
change occurs over time. For example, the Holy Qur’an, which is the first source of Shariah 
Law, specifies eight categories of people who are entitled to receive financial support. One of 
them is called ‘to bring hearts together’.635 People who fell into this category were given 
 
635 Surat At-Taubah, Ayat.60, (Zakah expenditures are only for the poor and for the needy and for those employed to 
collect [Zakah] and for bringing hearts together [for Islam] and for freeing captives [or slaves] and for those in debt and for 
the cause of Allah and for the [stranded] traveller - an obligation [imposed] by Allah. And Allah is Knowing and Wise). 
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monetary compensation during the time of Prophet Muhammad. However, when the Prophet 
passed away, his senior companion, Umar Ibn Al-Khattab, decided to remove this category 
from the list, as he claimed that the reason for which the money was given to those people (that 
Islam was still weak at the time) had disappeared as Islam was not weak anymore. This decision 
was approved by Caliph Abu Bakr. As another example, in the era of the succession of Umar, 
he stopped enforcing the penalty for theft due to the widespread poverty at the time, the reason 
being that some people had to steal so they could survive.636 In this example, Caliph Umar used 
the criterion of ‘Maslaha’ – public interest – which leads to justice. The use of this criterion to 
make rules has played an essential role in the development of Islamic jurisprudence, which was 
adopted as a response to the continuous development of life’s needs.  
In addition, with the death penalty, there is no opportunity to reform terrorists, which 
is one of the most important policies in countering terrorism. Those who are influenced by 
beliefs and ideologies cannot be deterred by such a penalty, as the given terrorist would 
consider such a penalty a reward and gate for him to enter paradise. In practice, statistics show 
that the termination of the death penalty does not increase crime. For example, in Canada, the 
murder rate dropped for every 10000 people from 3.09 in 1975 (the year that preceded the year 
in which the death penalty was eliminated) to 1.73 in 2003. This was the lowest rate for three 
decades.637 
5.4.2.2 Right to Privacy  
Counter-terrorism often takes place through different means. Some of these means may 
require intervention in the right of people to privacy, when attempting to arrest terrorists, 
searching for evidence, or taking proactive measures to prevent the occurrence of terrorism. 
This requires collecting information and taking special measures that are different to the ones 
 
636 Ibid. 
637 International Court of Justice, Doc. 550/006/2005.    
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set for normal crimes. For example, the need to collect information in the context of a terrorist 
crime does not require a justification that should reach the level of evidence or suspicion against 
some people. In addition, collecting information or evidence may take a short or longer time. 
Solove states that it is very difficult nowadays to live without being recorded. Monitoring has 
been widely and socially accepted. However, people are not just being recorded, these records 
are usually stored. This may give rise to the issue of the right to privacy, even when this step 
is taken through good will to protect society. Therefore, there is a need to understand the 
meaning of privacy in the context of protecting society and when there should be restrictions 
placed on this right.  
Definition of Privacy 
Privacy is not a new concept. It has been through several developments and its concept 
has changed over time.638 The new meaning of the concept of privacy appeared for the first 
time in a study conducted by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren in 1890.639 They determined 
the meaning of privacy as ‘the right to be let alone’. Since that time, privacy has been 
considered as a right and one of the most essential rights of human beings. Despite the fact that 
legal systems guarantee the right to privacy, however, there is still disagreement about what 
exactly should be protected? There are several jurists who sought to create a definition for the 
term, but because of its incomprehensibility, the on-going changes of the components 
belonging to the private medium of the individual, the greater part of these definitions just 
cover a part of it. For example, privacy was defined as ‘the claim of an individual to determine 
what information about himself or herself should be known to others. Further, Fried defined 
privacy as the control over information about ourselves.640  
 
638 Konvitz M. ‘Privacy and the Law: a Philosophical Prelude’, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 31, No. 2. (1966), P. 
272. 
639 Shapiro F. ‘The Most-Cited Law Review Articles’, California Law Review, Vol. 73, No. 5 (1985), P. 1545. 
640 Fried C, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475,482 (1968). 
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Despite these attempts to define privacy, there is no unified and global definition of the 
term due to the diversity of the religious, cultural, economic, and political characterisations of 
different societies. The question, therefore, that can be raised in this regard is how can this right 
be legally protected if the determination of the content of privacy is still disputed? 
Counter-Terrorism and the Right to Privacy 
It can be noted that most member states of the European Union have enacted special 
legislation in relation to the right to collect personal data for national security and counter-
terrorism-related issues.641 In addition, some of these states increased the power of electronic 
mentoring, in particular after the events of 11th September, as they extended this power to cover 
the new forms of technological communication. For example, the European Court of Human 
Rights ruled that the European conventions accept the use of electronic surveillance to protect 
the public interest in the fight against terrorism.642 The American administration also increased 
its investment in counter-terrorism initiatives based on mentoring communication means, 
mining data, and mixing data. Also, the Patriot Act allows the use of electronic surveillance of 
random people.    
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia did not enact any special legislation for the collection of 
information, as it only depends on the Basic Law of Governance, which makes reference to the 
protection of privacy in accommodation, communication, and correspondence; and prohibits 
its confiscation, watching them, or hearing them except in situations where the law authorises 
it.643 In addition, the Law of 2017 authorises the Public Prosecutor to restrict the right to 
privacy, where he can issue permission to enter and investigate any buildings during the time 
stated by the prosecutor in relation to any crimes mentioned in the law. The Law of 2017, in 
 
641 Sottiaux S. ‘Terrorism and the Limitation of Rights: The ECHR and the US Constitution’ (Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 
2008), P.283. 
642 See the case of Klass and Others v. Germany, Series A No. 28, (1978). 
643 Ibid, Articles 37 and 40. 
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the event of necessity, allows buildings to be entered without permission of the Public 
Prosecutor, however with the condition of reporting the reasons for entrance and urgency to 
the Prosecutor within 24 hours.644 The Law of 2017 refers the determination of the 
aforementioned necessity to the special regulations of this law, which have not been issued at 
the time of writing of this thesis.   
Moreover, the Law of 2017 states that the Public Prosecutor should make a decision to 
authorise the surveillance and collect evidence, data, records, and messages, including the 
means of communication and information, stored in the electronic systems that are related to 
the crimes referred to in this law.645 Although the law places some restrictions on the right to 
privacy, however, the special courts of terrorist crimes do not consider the information obtained 
through electronic surveillance as evidence, but rather presumption. This researcher thinks that 
this type of information should be considered as evidence, because the special investigative 
techniques are an essential part of the preventive strategy of counter-terrorism. In addition, 
there are a number of developed countries which regard such information as evidence, such as 
the UK in the case of Regina v. Khyam in 2000, and Muhammad Hamid and a number of his 
associates in 2008.646  
Although the issue of national security is very important, there should be a balance 
between this issue and the right to privacy. This researcher thinks that such a balance cannot 
be achieved without the existence of special legislation on the collection of information and 
electronic surveillance which contains the following aspects: 
 
644 Ibid, Article 7. 
645 Ibid, Article 8. 
646 UNODC, Digest of Terrorist Cases, (2010), 214. 
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1. A flexible interpretation that can determine the content of privacy in accordance 
with the current developments and the special Saudi characterisations of religion, 
culture, and society.  
2. A determination of the body which has the right to obtain such information, and 
the purpose for which this information is to be used.  
3. The creation of a central body which conducts the act of surveillance either via 
cameras or the Internet, with the oversight of the Public Prosecutor.  
4. Society should trust the national legislation, having ensured those people that 
such legislations would not be used in any way that might undermine an individual’s 
privacy.  
5. The recognition of the information obtained through electronic surveillance as 
sufficient evidence, as long as the legal procedures are respected.  
6. Declaration of the responsibility of a corporate entity in relation to the data that 
it holds on its customers and an assurance that this data will not be publicised or 
violated. 
5.4.2.3 Commitment to Investigation of Terrorism Crimes 
 In terrorism cases, investigations go through a number of challenges, which are mostly 
complex because these missions require collecting evidence which involves dealing with 
human remains, collecting and analysing explosive remnants, and cooperating with a large 
team of forensic medicine experts. Normally, such investigations are very slow due to the 
destruction of the evidence and the camouflage techniques carried out by experienced 
terrorists; or the lack of experience of the forensic experts or unified procedures of the 
administration of the criminal scene. Moreover, the organised nature of terrorist crimes may 
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slow down the pace of the investigation as a number of new relations and activities may be 
uncovered during the investigation that puts the real perpetrators of the terrorist acts away from 
the scene(s) of the crime. For example, in the case of Al-Muhajirun in Italy which lasted for 
six years, the investigations were initially conducted in relation to the issue of stealing and 
forging documents which contained information about recruiting fighters from Chechnya to 
Italy. However, these investigations resulted in detecting attacks planned to be executed in 
France and Germany and other cases.647  
The investigation of terrorist crimes becomes more complex when national and external 
intelligence cooperation or legal assistance are needed. The requested states may reject or 
accept the cooperation for several reasons, such as the confidentiality of the information that if 
disclosed may threaten their national security or interests. This problem occurred in the German 
courts in the case of Mounir Al-Moutassadeq, who was affiliated with the Hamburg cell that 
executed the events of 11th September. In this case, the defendant requested one prisoner, 
detained at a US prison to witness his innocence. The US rejected this request and the case 
took a long time until the problem was solved when summaries of interrogations of this witness 
were sent to Germany.648 What can be noted here is that the procedures of investigations in 
terrorism cases usually take a long time to process for a variety of reasons, as such crimes have 
a special nature compared to other ones. 
Recognition and Witnesses 
Some terrorists recognise their acts voluntarily and sometimes with a feeling of pride 
of conducting or inciting these terrorist acts, as they believe that they have done something 
which is valid and legitimate. The bombing of the USA Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya is a good 
example. The instigator of this attack declared his involvement in this act, with the condition 
 
647 UNODC, Digest of Terrorist Cases, (2010), 210. 
648 UNODC, Digest of Terrorist Cases, (2010), 196. 
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he be tried in the enemy country, the USA, as he believed that the US was his enemy, but not 
Kenya.649 Another example is the 2002 case of Richard Reid, who tried to blow up an aircraft 
that was flying from Paris to the USA. Within 8 hours, he admitted that he had tried to do so, 
stating that ‘I don’t care. I’m a follower of Usamah Bin Laden. I’m an enemy of your country 
and I don’t care’.650 
However, it is mostly uncommon that terrorists admit to their actions. Therefore, some 
legal systems may issue legislation that may motivate terrorists to cooperate with the respective 
authorities. This sense of cooperation may even result in exempting or mitigating the proposed 
punishment for the given suspects. For example, the Law of 2017, authorises the Public 
Prosecutor to cease criminal proceedings against suspects who inform the relevant authorities, 
either before, or after, the occurrence of a terrorist act, and cooperate with them to arrest other 
terrorists who were involved in the incident or direct the authorities to other terrorists who are 
planning to carry out another terrorist attack. Further, the same law also states that the court 
also has the right to mitigate the proposed punishment stated in the law, albeit it no more than 
half of the whole duration of the punishment,651 for those terrorists who provide the respective 
authorities with important information that cannot be obtained through any other means.652 
The testimony of cooperating witnesses has proven to be very useful in the context of 
the investigation of terrorism cases. Therefore, this requires a witness protection programme 
to maintain the safety of witnesses and their families, and that such a programme should have 
a legal basis. The Law of 2017 asserts the importance in providing protection for these people 
and also for judges, prosecutors, and lawyers, in cases where there are reasons to believe that 
 
649 In Terrorism of U.S: Embassies in East Africa, 552 F: 3rd 93 (2nd Cir: 2008), West Publishing Company. 
650 UNODC, Digest of Terrorist Cases, 2010, 224. 
651 Saudi Criminal Procedures Law, Article 11. 
652 Saudi Criminal Procedures Law, Article 56. 
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their safety is in danger. The proposed Regulations of this law will determine the mechanism 
of this programme once they are issued.653      
Period of Detention 
The legal rules for a period of detention are wide-ranging. For example, in the aftermath 
of the events of September 11th, new legislation issued in the UK authorized the arrest and 
detention of foreign nationals for an extended period of time, without being formally charged, 
on the basis of a testimony of the UK minister, stating that the given person is an international 
terrorist.654 For instance, in the case of A and others, the detainees remained in administrative 
detention for three years and six months.655 The European Court concluded that the detainees 
were in a position that prevented them to appeal the decision of detention and that their right 
to appeal against the detention was violated. However, this is different from the UK law of 
counter-terrorism. The period of detention has been increased from 7 to 14 days. The UK 
Government, in particular when the risk of terrorism increased, tried to extend this duration to 
90 days. However, the House of Commons rejected the British government’s proposal and 
decided to fix the duration at 28 days, under the law of 2006.656  
In Canada, the criminal legal system is also different. Detention without accusation last 
for only 3 days. This is followed by referring the case to the relevant judge if the given detainee 
is required to stay in detention for a longer time. The judge, however, can release the detainee 
if the police officer fails to provide a reasonable basis for detention. If the judge finds that there 
is a reasonable basis for such a request, he can order the detention of the suspect for a period 
 
653 Saudi Criminal Procedures Law, Article 85. 
654 Mitchell A. ‘A 28d ay Time Limit on Immigration Detention would Save Money and Make the System More Just’, the 
Home of Conservatism, (Jun. 5. 2018), at [https://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2018/06/andrew-mitchell-a-28-
day-time-limit-on-immigration-detention-would-save-money-and-make-the-system-more-just.html]. 
655 The Case of A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, The European Court of Human Rights, Application no. 3455/05, (19 
February 2009). 
656 Terrorism Detention Powers, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department 




not exceeding 12 months.657 Further, there are some terrorist cases that are covered by 
Canadian Immigration Law. For example, and in relation to the case of Ahani v. Canada, after 
he had been granted refugee status, the Solicitor-General of Canada and the Minister of 
Employment & Immigration, received information which showed that Mr Ahani had been 
trained by security agencies in his home country of Iran to be an assassin. On this basis, the 
Minister of Employment & Immigration filed a security certificate stating that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that Ahani might conduct terrorist acts. Based on this testimony, 
Ahani was detained for nine years without any charges levelled against him for any crime he 
had committed.658  
The legal system of detention in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is different to the 
aforementioned ones. On the basis of the Law of 2017, the Public Prosecutor’s Office is in 
charge of investigating terrorist crimes659 and making decisions on the detention of anyone 
suspected of committing a terrorist crime for one or more subsequent periods of time, which 
does not exceed each of those periods 30 days and 12 months as a whole. In cases requiring a 
longer detention time, a request should be sent to a judge who can authorise it.660   
As previously discussed, the crimes of terrorism require special investigative 
procedures that may take a long time. As noted, according to Saudi terrorism law, the period 
of detention of suspects might extend to 12 months without a need for court authorization. This 
researcher believes that this period is too long and should be a maximum of one or two months 
and that a request should be made to the court for a longer time. The judicial oversight over the 
period of detention is an important matter when it comes to terrorist crimes to ensure that there 
 
657 Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Practice: A Survey of Selected Countries, Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, (October 2005), p.6. 
658 Source: Human Rights Committee, Ahani v. Canada, Communication No. 1051/2002 (CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002), (15 
June 2004). 
659 Law of Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing (2017), Article 18. 
660 Law of Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing (2017), Article 19. 
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are reasonable reasons for detention. The court should obtain maximum information about the 
case so a judge can make a decision in this regard. Further, the suspect should have the 
opportunity to attend the court session so the court can ensure the health and safety of the 
suspect and that his rights are not violated. This requires the judge to have extensive experience 
to make such decisions due to the exceptional and dangerous nature of terrorist crimes. In the 
UK for example, a compulsory hearing session must be held for all crimes of terrorism. Such 
a session provides the opportunity for a quick decision and submission of an immediate appeal 


















Every so often in history, there is an event that alters the course of history by bringing 
new issues to the fore and changing the outlook of society towards the subject in focus. The 
attacks of 11th September, 2001, constituted a pivotal moment on several fronts, which raised 
to prominence in the minds of the public the association of the religion of Islam and terrorism, 
which had adverse effects on both Muslims and non-Muslims. More importantly, the attacks 
were a precursor that heralded a change in the method adopted for the fight against terrorism. 
This was followed by UNSC Resolution 1373, which charted a radically different course of 
action for the war against terrorism on the international front. The attempts of individual states 
to comply with the new Resolution involved great complexity. As a result, this thesis used the 
case study of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to highlight the practical difficulties that emerged 
in the course of such implementation, which required nations to develop local anti-terrorism 
laws within the context of the aforementioned resolution. 
This thesis sought to explore and analyse the potential tension between international 
law and obligations, as stipulated in UNSC Resolution 1373, and Saudi Arabian national law, 
as laid down in the Law of Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing (2017). It used the 
policy-oriented (New Haven) approach to make this analysis and meet the goals set out in the 
introduction of this thesis. The latter founded several outcomes resulting from the relationship 
between international law and national law in the view of the policy-orientation and in the 
context of the war on terrorism in the Kingdom.  
It drew on the policy-oriented approach particularly developed by Dame Rosalyn 
Higgins, in the conceptualization of the means for implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373 
by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is evident that there is a clear disparity in culture, since the 
Saudi Arabian law is anchored strongly and inextricably in Islamic Shariah Law. This is one 
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of the perceived facilitators of terrorism in the world and could be in conflict with the 
international law on multiple levels. However, it appears that the Saudi Arabian visualization 
of its own national legal system does take a policy-oriented approach to fighting terror, in that 
its legislation is led by clear objectives. Nevertheless, as has been pointed out there are is a 
tension between the objectives of Islamic law and those of a liberal world order, as implied by 
the policy-oriented approach to international law. Thus, while Saudi Arabia has prioritized the 
objective of countering terrorism as its ultimate goal it has difficulties in accommodating its 
national legal system within its international obligation due to Shariah Law. However, taking 
Higgins’ approach, the kingdom has managed to make laws that take account of its socio-
political circumstances (extra-legal considerations). For example, Saudi Arabia has chosen to 
undertake rehabilitation of radicalized terrorists as a respite for the due to the perceived 
misinterpretation of Shariah Law by extremists. As a result, the relationship between the 
objectives of the liberal world order and Islamic values need not always be at odds. 
Another example of its accommodation of extra-legal considerations can be seen in the 
solution found by Higgins in relation to the tension between states calling for an end to the 
death penalty and accusing the Islamic countries that apply this punishment of the crime of 
apostasy. She stated that state practices and social factors should be more considered. She 
argued that there are a number of international law scholars who use the rulings of apostasy 
under Shariah Law, to say that international human rights laws cannot be applicable to 
countries that have strict punishments for apostasy. They added that the differences in applying 
the international laws of human rights between the West and the Middle East emphasises the 
fact that these human rights laws are weak. Higgins, however, opined that the effectiveness of 
international law does not depend on analysing the practices and the consequences of breaching 
international law, but on the general practices of states who are members to a certain treaty. 
Higgins found that most states who apply the punishment of apostasy are members to a number 
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of international human rights conventions and that these countries have various religious and 
cultural backgrounds and yet are members to these conventions. This means that the laws of 
human rights are still applicable in these countries, though they have the right of reservation 
and withdrawals.  
Another example of the possible elisions between policy orientation and the Islamic 
Shariah, which is the main source of the Saudi laws, is the philosophy of Islamic scholar Al-
Ghazali. The latter adopted the organised approach, which provides a way to look at issues 
from a realistic point of view. This is another way to understand the Islamic system in the 
current context of the society, taking into consideration the continuous and emerging social 
circumstances and changes. This view of Al-Ghazali is reflected in the Saudi government’s 
approach towards countering terrorism and reducing any tension between this effort on the 
national level with the requirements of UNSC Resolution 1373.  
This thesis also concluded that the Kingdom was already affected by terrorism even 
before 9/11. The Kingdom was in the middle of important regional events, including the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and the conflict in Chechnya, where in a large number of Saudi 
nationals were involved, resulting in several international, regional and local repercussions 
within the Kingdom. The return of these militants to Saudi Arabia contributed to the 
establishment of Al-Qa’idah in the country, which in turn carried out many terrorist attacks 
within the Kingdom and beyond. The research found that the motivation of most of the fighters 
who went to Afghanistan for Jihad was their fervent desire to assist their Muslims brothers in 
other countries, believing that should they die in this fight, that this would be a religious matter, 
and not a political one.  
The thesis also found that the idea of terrorism is not inherent to the Kingdom, whether 
be it Sunni or Shiite. The Saudi Shiites adopted terrorist thoughts first as a result of the Iranian 
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revolution in 1979. On the other hand, the Saudi Sunnis also adopted terrorist thoughts having 
joined Al-Qa’idah in Afghanistan, and because of their participation in terrorist activities, both 
at local and international levels, such as the events of September 11th where 15 of the 19 
perpetrators were Saudi nationals. 9/11 in particular had severe consequences for the Kingdom.   
However, the Kingdom started to adopt a comprehensive legal strategy in the fight 
against terrorism, responding, in particular, to the requirements of UNSC Resolution 1373. As 
this thesis has shown, the implementation of this legal strategy was a reaction to terrorist acts, 
whether local, regional, or international.  
This strategy, to a large extent, succeeded in the fight against terrorism, as it made a 
considerable contribution in eliminating Al-Qa’idah in the Kingdom. However, there were 
some initial difficulties in conforming to Resolution 1373, as Saudi law-makers did not deal 
with terrorism as a separate crime, rather they categorised the act of terrorism as a crime of 
Ḥirābah according to Islamic Shariah Law, with a possible sentence of the death penalty. In 
addition, Saudi law-makers considered terrorism financing as a part of money laundering, 
which was also covered by Shariah Law.  
This thesis has presented, analysed, and investigated the development of the legal and 
policy systems in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with a particular focus on how the policies 
implemented in Saudi have started to combat terrorism. This is a new study which has looked 
at both the legal and policy systems in one line of argument. The thesis found that the Saudi 
legal strategy of counter-terrorism made attempts to harmonise with Resolution 1373 
gradually, as it finally dealt with acts of terrorism as terrorism crimes as such, including 
terrorism financing. This was seen in the Law of 2013, which was in conformity with Shariah 
Law. This law also created a special court to deal with the crimes of terrorism, appointing 
qualified judges to this court. This was a strong sign shown by Saudi law-makers to ensure 
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conformity between the Saudi laws of counter-terrorism and the Resolution. The next important 
development in Saudi Arabia’s fight against terrorism, that this thesis explored, was the 
replacement of the Law of 2013 with the Law of 2017, officially known as The Law of 
Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing. The latter made considerable progress both in 
the content of the legislations in relation to counter-terrorism; and in the creation of new 
specialised bodies to combat terrorism. For example, a special body, called the Public 
Prosecution (previously known as the Body of Investigation), is now under the oversight of the 
judiciary, instead of the executive, as it used to be in the past.  
In view of the Saudi Arabian case study, it is evident that UNSC Resolution 1373 is 
positioned to yield success in the fight against terrorism. The recently enacted Law of 
Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing (2017), formed the backbone for the 
implementation of the aforementioned UNSC Resolution. It formalized cooperation and 
provided the framework for further action in the war against terror. This is evident because the 
integration of the law into the national legal framework has manifested verifiable results in the 
war against terror. For instance, the thwarted terrorism attacks intended for Europe were only 
detected and acted upon following collaborative efforts between the Kingdom and other 
participants. Saudi Arabia’s acceptance of taking a position against terrorism financing is also 
a very important factor in preventing the flow of funds to terrorists, given that the Kingdom 
had been a hub for money laundering for the same purpose. The potential impact that this may 
have had is unfathomable. It is vital to note that the Law of 2017 is fairly new, and the full 
magnitude of its ramifications is yet to be realized. Therefore, there are grounds to suggest that 
it may further streamline the war against terror. As time moves on, it may be of interest to 
scholars to investigate the full impact it would have had in practice. Be that as it may, it is quite 
successful as of now. Therefore, this thesis concludes that the willing embrace of international 
law makes for a better implementation and more useful outcomes. As such, this amounts to a 
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vote of confidence for Higgins’ view of the policy-oriented approach. International legislators 
may want to consider taking a similar view to international laws and encourage member states 
to implement them, accordingly. 
Further to this, the conformity of this policy with the practice of Saudi law-makers can 
been seen in the suggestion of Saudi law-makers to the Arab Council of Ministers of Justice 
regarding modifying Article 69, of the Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation 
(1985), which reads, after the modification as follows ‘[i]n the event that the provisions of this 
Convention conflict with the provisions of any special agreement, the Convention shall be 
applied to the extradition of accused and convicted persons and the achievement of security 
and judicial cooperation in other areas’. 
What the thesis found interesting is that policy-makers in the Kingdom had a strong 
inclination to expand intelligence cooperation with other states. For example, the American 
administration thanked the Kingdom for its efforts to provide them with intelligence, which 
helped to discover a shipment of explosives, coming from Yemen via an Emirates airplane. 
This shipment aimed to destroy a place of Jewish worship. In 2018, the British Prime Minister 
also mentioned that cooperation with the Kingdom had contributed to saving a lot of innocent 
lives. Further to this and what supports this policy of openness to cooperate with other states is 
the agreement of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the policy of engagement in international 
and regional coalitions to combat terrorism. One of the main bases of these coalitions is the 
speed in the exchange of information. This reflects the desire of the Kingdom to respond to the 
requirements of UNSC Resolution 1373.  
While analysing Resolution 1373, it was found that it did not attempt to define 
terrorism, and allowed states to deal with this matter, despite asking them to criminalise acts 
of terrorism through their respective national legislations. It further asks states to join 
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international conventions of counter-terrorism proposed by the international community to 
prevent acts of terrorism, which in turn, was under the oversight of the UN and its competent 
agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency. On this basis and in consideration of 
the opinions of a number of international jurists, this thesis adopted the definition of terrorism 
as stipulated in Article 3, of UNSC Resolution 1566. These jurists also considered that 
Resolution 1373 adopted this definition implicitly. Based on the comparison between the 
definition of terrorism as stipulated in the Law of Combating Terrorist Crimes and its Financing 
in 2017 and the definition of Resolution 1566, it appeared that the Saudi definition of terrorism 
is broader and includes all crimes mentioned in this resolution and also other acts of terrorism. 
This thesis found that the Saudi legislature has approached a broad definition in order to be 
more flexible so as to encompass all developing acts of terrorism in the future. A number of 
international experts mentioned that this expansion is not contradictory with the provisions of 
UNSC Resolution 1566, as it does not explicitly, nor implicitly, prevent states from expanding 
it in identifying acts of terrorism.    
The thesis also adopted the idea that terrorism is a harmful contemporary phenomenon 
that raises complex legal issues on the national level. The term ‘terrorism’ is not of legal 
importance as much as it is a description for terrorist activities conducted by individuals, 
entities or states, where the methods used in these activities or the hidden objectives behind 
them are illegal. This opinion is in conformity with the views of Higgins on the definition of 
terrorism.662 In analysing Resolution 1373, which called upon the member states to counter 
terrorism and undertake several important steps at the national level, including security and 
financial measures, this thesis found that the Kingdom has taken these steps and built a 
financial strategy to counter terrorism after the events of September 11th, cooperating with the 
United States Department of Treasury. It made a series of changes to its legal and financial 
 
662 Higgins R, & Flory M, supra n. 90, P. 28. 
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systems, including the creation of the Riyadh-Based Terrorist Financing Targeting Center in 
2017. The Kingdom, further, complied with the recommendations of the FATF, and the 
Kingdom’s legal system of counter-terrorism and its financing was assessed by FATF three 
times. The last assessment, carried out in 2018, showed that the Kingdom’s legal system is in 
conformity with the forty recommendations of the FATF. As a consequence, in June 2019, the 
FATF accepted the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a member state instead of being an observer. 
This showed the extent to which the Kingdom has been committed to the requirements of 
Resolution 1373.  
In analysing Resolution 1373, it was found that the resolution made a brief reference to 
the question of human rights (in refugee cases). The Chair of the UNSC Counter-Terrorism 
Committee stated in 2002, that assessing the compliance of states with human rights standards 
when combating terrorism is beyond its competence. This might be the reason why some 
member states disregarded human rights concerns in their fight against terrorism. This, 
however, forced the SC to issue Resolution 1456, in 2003, calling upon all member states to 
take all necessary measures to combat terrorism, while respecting their international legal 
obligations, in particular human rights laws. This required the Committee to ask all states to 
comply to the human rights standards. Further to this step, the Committee also assigned a 
special rapporteur, whose mission is to promote the protection of human rights in the context 
of combating terrorism.   
Although the Kingdom is a party to United Nations Human Rights declarations, and 
has made significant progress in relation to human rights, as the Special Rapporteur of the 
Council has confirmed, this thesis found tension, in terms of legality, between the Saudi 
strategy of combating terrorism and Resolution 1373 in particular, and the international law of 
human rights in general. This tension, as the study found, can be attributed to controversial 
measures taken by the Kingdom, such as the detention of a suspect for an extended period, at 
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times up to one year, without referring the suspect to a court. The other reason for the tension 
lies not in the policies of the Kingdom, but rather, in the understanding of international legal 
norms and their interpretations. The dependence of the legal system in the Kingdom on Shariah 
Law as the main source of law, in some cases, may require the Kingdom to criminalise an act 
that might not be so in the legal systems of other states. Such matters can be in opposition to 
the international law of human rights, which does not often consider religion, culture and 
traditions of some countries (especially Islamic nations) while formulating laws. The death 
penalty is a classic example in this regard, as the Kingdom carries out this sentence for a 
number of crimes under Shariah Law. Other countries consider such a sentence to be in 
violation of provisions of international human rights laws. Hence, in this regard, UNSC 
Resolution 1373, is at variance with the policy of the Kingdom due to cultural and religious 
differences. This point constitutes a challenge which the CTC should take into consideration.  
Jihad, like terrorism, is a term that is mired in controversy and misunderstanding. It is 
of foundational importance to Islam, as its origins are traceable to the Qur’an and the sayings 
and established example, or Sunnah, of the Prophet Muhammad. In the purist sense, the 
definition of Jihad is on two levels. Greater Jihad is the struggle that a believer experiences 
within themselves on a spiritual level. Lesser Jihad, on the other hand, describes the armed 
struggle that believers undertake to defend themselves and their property. Therefore, the only 
aspect of Jihad that invokes violence is from a defensive perspective. However, Jihad is not 
explicitly defined in any of the Holy Scriptures. Therefore, its understanding in the 
contemporary setting is left to the interpretation of jurists, many of whom have personal 
interests in altering the definition. For instance, many terrorist organizations have used Jihad 
as the basis for launching attacks on their enemies in pursuit of power and bloodshed. 
In view of the Saudi Arabian case study, it is evident that the Kingdom has made 
considerable progress in committing to the provisions of UNSC Resolution 1373. It is also 
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important to note that the Law of 2017 is distinguished from its previous attempts, though all 
its outcomes have not yet been fully revealed. Therefore, the law might make further progress 
in relation to the commitment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the implementation of 
Resolution 1373. This thesis, therefore, recommends future studies shed more light on the 
progress of the Law of 2017 to verify its effects in relation to the fight against terrorism. 
Notwithstanding, it can be taken into consideration at this stage that the Saudi Arabian legal 
system has positioned itself to be a formidable partner in ensuring the compliance of its national 
regulations international law.  
As the thesis has established that the text of the Law of 2017 is essentially in harmony 
with international law (in particular Resolution 1373) in relation to the fight against terrorism, 
this thesis, then, has a fundamental importance in terrorism studies, as it investigated the effects 
of the law and the future changes that it will have on the vision of the Kingdom to combat 
terrorism. Therefore, future studies can draw on this thesis, which is the first of its kind, and 
has investigated all of the Kingdom’s domestic laws, regulations, and policies on combating 
terrorism in one study. Future researchers will also be able to assess the performance of the 
Kingdom, having received membership with the FATF in 2019, in combating money 
laundering and terrorism financing.  
Further to this, as the thesis established, the Kingdom is undergoing a qualitative leap 
in many areas and that a number of policies have been changed, resulting in a decrease in 
religious extremism. It also forced the Kingdom to keep changing laws and regulations in 
accordance with national and regional changes. For example, soon there will be a new law of 
counter-terrorism that is related to the security of the state. This may affect the Law of 2017 in 
one way or another. As this law defined terrorism using a wide approach, the new law may 
create a new definition of the crime of terrorism. Future researchers may, therefore, analyse 
this new law, drawing on this thesis. In addition, the future researchers may investigate the 
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extent of the effect of this leap and changes in the policies of the Kingdom on human-rights-
related issues, in particular the challenges that this thesis has raised.    
The thesis will also enable future researchers to benefit from this paper through 
conducting studies about the implications of integrating international law and national legal 
systems, on the regional level, in the aforementioned context of combating terrorism. The Saudi 
Arabian case study has made significant advances in the implementation of international 
standards of counter-terrorism, while concurrently respecting core Islamic values that define 
the image of the Kingdom. This work may make it easier to figure out any positive or negative 
issues that may arise from future legislations on counter-terrorism in the Kingdom of Saudi 
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